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Introduction 
This  volume  includes  a  large  portion  of  papers  initially  presented  at  the  conference,  Rethinking 
Informalization in Labor Markets, which took place at Cornell University in October 2002. The objective 
of the  conference  was to  bring together academics, researchers, and practitioners working on issues of 
labor  market  informalization,  urban  informality,  poverty,  and  social  protection  with  the  purpose  of 
discussing these issues as they were unfolding at the dawn of the new century. We  brought together an 
interdisciplinary group that could approach these  questions from  different angles and experiences  with a 
focus  on  different  geographical  areas.  This  collection  represents  many  of  the  papers  presented  at  the 
conference,  though  the  gathering  also  included  other  participants  who  enriched  the  debates  and 
discussions beyond what is being published here. 
We were especially interested in understanding the processes and reasons behind the increasing use of the 
expression “informal economy,” instead of “informal sector,” when referring to the large range of activities 
that take place outside, or at the borderline of what tends to be viewed as “formal economy.” The first of 
these reasons was the tremendous growth of informal activities experienced across  countries during the 
past two  decades.  Contrary to the  expectations of those who initially focused  on the informal sector in 
developing  countries in the early 1970s, its  extent and importance  had been on an increase over time 
rather than absorbed by the “modern sector” as expected.  
Globalization,  deep  economic  restructuring  across  countries,  and  neoliberal  policies  have  led  to 
increasingly informalized and decentralized  processes of  production, transforming labor markets and the 
world of work, both in the North and the South.  Productive activities that used to be performed in core 
firms have  been relocated to the  periphery of smaller and often geographically distant  firms in search of 
lower production costs, often avoiding different types of regulations and even reaching production levels at 
the borderline of illegality.  Thus, outsourcing and subcontracting have typified the increasing capacity of 
firms to segment out  production in order to meet the pressures of global markets. This has transformed 
labor markets and generated growing informality, precarious jobs for a large proportion of the population, 
and  rising  economic  insecurity.  Informality  has  reached  many  levels  of  activity  ranging  from  mid-size 
subcontracting firms to microenterprises, workshops, sweatshops, and home-based production. 
Alongside  these  processes  of  informalization  tied  directly  or  indirectly  to  core  production,  developing 
countries have continued to experience the growth of subsistent activities generated by the inability of their 
economies to absorb the unemployed and underemployed. These constitute the more traditional urban 
informal activities in  developing  countries, as typified  by the street vendors in many  urban centers, and 
represent an economy in which, in the words of Pérez-Sáinz in this volume, “the  poor  produce for the 
poor,” including some of the most precarious forms of survival for individuals and households. To be sure, 
there is a high level of fluidity between different forms of informal activities, as well as between formal and 
informal jobs and between paid and unpaid work, the latter being particularly the case for women. 7 
 
 
The  result  has  been  the  tremendous  heterogeneity  of  informal  activities.  Far  from  being  the  low-
productivity, “backward” sector described in the early literature, the informal economy has proved to  be 
dynamic  and  a  source  of  growth  in  many  areas  and  sectors,  even  if  representing  extreme  forms  of 
precariousness in others.  Its fluidity  has led to the increasingly  blurred  differentiation  between the formal 
and the informal, even  between the legal and illegal across countries.  It is no longer possible to  clearly 
delineate where the formal ends and the informal begins; on the contrary, the high degree of integration 
and linkages between the two is what led the ILO, in its 2002 annual conference, to emphasize the notion 
of the “informal economy.” Due to the processes of labor market flexibilization and deregulation that have 
taken place under neoliberal policies, working conditions and labor standards have deteriorated for a large 
proportion of the working population, affecting both formal and informal activities. This  has led to a new 
regime of labor-capital relations in which labor has lost much of the hard-won bargaining power that had 
resulted  from  years  of  struggle.  Levels  of  unionization  have  decreased  worldwide,  not  to  mention  the 
absence of bargaining power for the millions of unorganized workers involved in informal activities. 
A different objective for the  conference was to explore the need to link poverty eradication strategies to 
macroeconomic and labor market policies, emphasizing the generation of decent jobs and the importance 
to  focus  on  distribution.  In  addition,  some  papers  focused  on  the  connection  between  informality  and 
poverty while others examined the need to rethink social protection under the circumstances prevalent in 
informal  economies.    Neoliberal  policies  have  represented  a  massive  redistribution  of  income  and 
resources from the social to the private sector, from labor to capital, and from low to high skill labor. The 
increasing  reliance  on  the  unregulated  market  has  not  been  accompanied  by  any  effort  to  address  the 
corresponding rise in economic and social inequalities while concerns about distribution and redistribution 
have  been  neglected.  Programs  of  social  protection  have  been  limited  to  targeted  populations,  often 
temporary  and  insufficient,  de-emphasizing  the  notion  of  universal  protection  despite  the  many  voices 
calling attention to its importance. In many ways, the state has retreated  from these responsibilities, and 
social  protection  has  been  privatized  and  left  at  the  level  of  the  individual,  the  household,  and  social 
organizations, as exemplified  by the  experience of SEWA (Self-Employed  Women’s Association  in  India) 
examined in Mirai Chatterjee’s talk at the conference, which was later transcribed for this volume. 
Almost three years after the deliberations of the original conference, the debates and discussions that took 
place are as relevant as they were then. The world needs a “global labor movement,” following the model 
of  the  environmental  movement  initiated  in  the  early  1970s,  to  reverse  the  direction  set  by  the  great 
march towards informalization and the loss of  bargaining power of labor. The  papers presented in this 
volume provide illustrations of the multiple layers through which this discussion takes place.  
I want to thank those without whom the conference would not have been possible.  Neema Kudva was a 
major  contributor  and  co-organizer,  and  she  took  primary  responsibility  for  moving  the  edited  volume 
forward.  Many  thanks  also  to  Ravi  Kanbur,  who  provided  the  funds  through  Cornell’s  Program  on 
Inequality  and  Development  that  covered  conference  costs,  as  well  as  subsequent  costs  of  translation, 
editing, and publication. The Department of City and Regional Planning at Cornell provided generous help 
with  conference logistics and graduate student assistants.  We decided to make this  publication an open 8 
 
 
source  volume  that  would  be  available  freely  by  working  with  Cornell’s  electronic  publishing  initiative. 
However, to maintain established standards of scholarly publication, the majority of papers in this volume 
have been through a blind peer-review process. We would like to extend our thanks to the reviewers, to 
Julie Simmons-Lynch for her careful editing, and to graphic designer, Deepa Kamath, who took a collection 
of  papers  and  produced  the  electronic  volume.  Last  but  not  least,  our  deepest  appreciation  to  all 
conference  participants; in  different ways and levels, they  contributed to its success with their ideas and 
interest.  
  
Lourdes Benería 
Ithaca, New York 
May 2005 9 
 
 
Distribution, gender, and labor market informalization:  
A conceptual framework with a focus on homeworkers 
Lourdes Benería  
CORNELL UNIVERSITY  
Maria Floro  
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This  paper  is  based  on  the  notion  that  the  nature  and  depth  of  labor  market  informalization  across 
countries requires rethinking in  order to guide action and  formulate policies for  eliminating  poverty and 
reducing  economic  inequality  and  job  insecurity.  Using  homework  as  a  case  in  point,  it  explores  the 
dynamics  of  informality  and  its  distributional  aspects  by  demonstrating  the  interconnectedness  of  job 
precariousness, vulnerability, and gender relations.  The  paper develops a conceptual framework for our 
comparative study of urban, low-income households with home-based workers in four countries: Bolivia, 
Ecuador,  Thailand,  and  the  Philippines.  It  builds  on  some  of  our  empirical  findings  in  the  2002  sample 
survey data based on the Latin American and Thailand parts of the study. 
During  the  1970s  and  early  1980s,  studies  on  the  informal  sector  often  assumed  that,  with  economic 
growth, it would tend to be absorbed by the modern  economy. The tremendous growth of informality 
since then has reversed these expectations,  pointing to the strong tendencies in the global  economy to 
generate  precarious jobs that provide unstable incomes. According to ILO figures, informal employment 
represents one half to three-quarters of nonagricultural employment in developing countries. Regional and 
country differences are significant  but the growing importance of informality has been registered in  high-
income countries as well; self-employment, part-time work, and temporary work represent 30 per cent of 
overall employment in 15 European countries and 25 per cent in the United States (ILO, 2002). 
For  a  variety  of  reasons,  women  are  disproportionately  represented  in  informal  employment,  which 
accounts for 60 per cent or more of female employment in developing countries. In OECD countries that 
reported data, women represented 60 per cent or more of the part-time workers in 1998. In some labor 
categories  such  as  home-based  work,  their  participation  ranges  between  30  and  80  per  cent  of  all 
workers,  while  80  percent  of  industrial  homework  is  carried  out  by  female  labor  (ILO,  2002).  Our 
empirical  work  is  based  on  qualitative  insights  and  interview  surveys  carried  out  in  urban,  low-income 
communities  during 2002. The study’s overall objective is to evaluate the ways in which labor markets' 
liberalization  and  informalization  affect  home-based  workers  in  urban,  low-income  households  by 
analyzing  household  dynamics  linked  to  household  survival,  coping  strategies,  finances,  and  gender 
relations. Thus, our focus on urban households provides a window into informality from the specific angle 10 
 
 
of how poverty is lived by home-based workers and their families. It illustrates how economic vulnerability 
affects not only their decisions regarding employment but also their risk burden and well-being. 
II. THE INADEQUACY OF THE FORMAL/INFORMAL DIVISION 
Since  its  inception,  the  notion  of  the  “informal  sector”  has  been  subject  to  debates  and  criticisms, 
particularly in terms of the heterogeneity and artificiality of the formal/informal division.  The implication of 
the  initial  1970s  formulations  by  Keith  Hart—and  of  the  ILO  mission  to  Kenya  in  1972—was  that 
modernization  and  economic  growth  would  facilitate  the  absorption  of  the  “informal  sector”  by  the 
modern sector (Hart, 1973; ILO, 1972).
1 By contrast, the literature  during the 1980s emphasized the 
links,  rather  than  the  divisions,  between  the  two  sectors,  pointing  to  the  dependency  of  the  modern 
sector on the informal sector, as a way of lowering costs; thus, implying that there was no incentive for the 
modern sector to absorb informal activities (Benería and  Roldán, 1987; Portes and  Castells, 1989). The 
1990s saw a deepening of these processes and an expansion of informality under neoliberal policies, thus 
increasing the  need to further  understand  the factors that  have reversed the initial  predictions.  To  date, 
there have been continuing debates on the topic, especially in the context of understanding the persistence 
of poverty and the increasing vulnerability amidst an expanding global economy (Rakowski, 1994; de Soto, 
2000; ILO, 2002). 
This raises questions regarding the differences between earlier and current stages of informalization. Have 
conditions changed and, if so, in what way? Several observations can be made in this respect.
2 First, since 
the 1980s, the macroeconomic context has changed significantly due to the implementation of  neoliberal 
policies  in  many  countries.
3  Privatization,  market  deregulation,  and  economic  restructuring  have 
contributed  to  set  up  the  conditions  for  an  expansion  of  informal  activities  and  precarious  working 
conditions. Second, the  expansion and  deepening of markets  has extended the links, direct or indirect, 
between  formal  and  informal  activities  while  the  distinction  between  the  two  has  become  increasingly 
blurred  (Pérez  Sáinz,  2000).  Large  firms  have  developed,  directly  or  indirectly,  increasing  links  with 
informalized  production  through  outsourcing  and  subcontracting  while  other  forms  of  informal  work 
remain disconnected from the more formal productive activities. We provide specific examples related to 
home-based work in subsequent sections. 
Third,  informal  activities  are  no  longer  viewed  as  the  anomaly  that  eventually  will  disappear.  On  the 
contrary,  the  trend  has  been  the  opposite;  the  decline  in  formal  employment  in  many  countries, 
particularly in the public sector, and the dynamism of the informal economy in many cases has enhanced 
the relative attractiveness and predominance of the latter. 
                                                 
1  Hart’s study, published in 1973, was based on a 1971 study of urban Ghana. 
2  For a more elaborate version of these arguments, see Benería, 2001. 
3  Along  these  lines,  the  literature  on  structural  adjustment  policies  has  provided  ample  evidence  on  the  effects  of  deregulation  and  labor  market 
flexibilization across countries since the 1980s. For a summary of this literature, see Benería, 2003. 11 
 
 
Fourth, although the traditional association of informal work with low skills and low productivity still holds, 
the  last  two  decades  have  introduced  many  changes  that  produce  new  modes.  With  the  increase  in 
outsourcing and subcontracting under globalization, many informal activities have their center of gravity in 
the  core  firms  that  generate  them.  In  this  sense,  they  may  not  be  associated  with  low  productivity  if 
technology transfers take place through different organizational forms and modern equipment. 
Fifth, increased job insecurity and the deterioration  of working  conditions in developing  countries during 
the  past  two  decades  have  taken  place  in  a  climate  that  has  emphasized  citizenship,  political  rights, 
individual agency, and democracy. Hence, the contradictions and social tensions between these discourses 
emphasize empowerment and equality on the one hand, and the realities of precariousness, poverty, and 
powerlessness  associated  with  informality  on  the  other.  Finally,  globalization  and  the  accompanying 
economic restructuring have intensified these tensions by  enlarging their scope and sphere of reference, 
and by contributing to the factors that generate informality. 
As a result, nonstandard forms of  employment  have multiplied, thereby introducing a greater diversity in 
situations and working life patterns for both men and women workers. There is wide variation in the range 
of  activities,  skill  requirements,  and  the  terms  and  conditions  of  work  experienced  by  these  workers. 
Among  home-based workers, this tends to include a wide range of labor-intensive production activities 
such  as  in  garment  work,  crafts,  furniture  construction,  and  shoemaking.  Others  work  in  capital,  and 
information-intensive  professional  activities  such  as  data  processing  and  providing  software  technical 
assistance.  The  result  is  a  great  heterogeneity  in  terms  of  work  arrangements  but  also  in  its  income 
generating capacity. 
These  changes  have raised  new questions about how to  best reconceptualize the informal economy in 
order  to  understand  its  nature  and  consequences.  In  this  paper,  we  want  to  further  this  discussion  by 
focusing  on  the  distributional  aspects  of  informalization.  There  have  been  recent  efforts  to  expand  the 
concept of informality and to rethink its nature and functions from a socioeconomic perspective. The ILO 
analysis, for example, emphasizes an “expanded concept” of the informal sector by introducing the notion 
of  “informal  economy."  The  latter  concept  demonstrates  the  widening  and  deepening  of  the 
informalization  process  and  thus  “incorporates  the  whole  of  informality—including  both  enterprise  and 
employment relations—as manifested in industrialized, transition, and  developing economies.”  Thus, the 
notion  of  informal  economy  captures  “the  real  world  dynamics  in  labor  markets  today,  particularly  the 
employment arrangements of low-income workers.” (ILO, 2002: 11). 
From a different perspective, the work of Peruvian social scientist Hernando de Soto (2000) has emphasized 
the importance of informal activities and of their entrepreneurial initiatives in developing countries. Focusing 
on the legal/illegal divide, de Soto argues that the official recognition of legal titles for the land and dwellings 
occupied  by  the  poor  could  be  used  to  generate  large  sums  of  capital  and  contribute  to  a  take-off  in 
entrepreneurial activity and growth in developing countries. Once officially recognized, the value of informal 
assets among the poor could then be converted as loan collateral thereby facilitating the growth of credit for 
development.  Unlike  the  ILO  approach  that  focused  on  labor  and  working  conditions,  de  Soto’s  main 12 
 
 
concern is centered around the generation of capital for investment and is based on the premise that this will 
automatically benefit labor, particularly the workers in the informal sector, and generate economic growth. 
What might happen to labor and the subsequent distribution and  control of income and resources is not 
addressed in his work. Given this gap in the literature, we shift our attention to the distributional dimensions 
of informality, including assets, income,  credit, and  factors affecting gender inequality, such as work burden 
and risk distribution. 
III. TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF DISTRIBUTION AND  
      INFORMALIZATION 
Low  earnings  and  precarious  working  conditions  associated  with  informal  labor  can  be  attributed  to 
economic, institutional, and sociopolitical  factors.  In an  unorthodox  economic analysis, low earnings are 
explained by the  dynamics of labor supply and demand—more specifically, on an abundant labor supply 
relative to existing demand. In addition, low earnings are explained through the prevalence of low skills and 
low productivity. Insufficient labor demand can result from scarcity of local capital a la de Soto, reinforced 
by the inability of many  developing  countries to effectively mobilize  domestic savings and attract foreign 
investment. 
Thus, within an orthodox  neoclassical model, low earnings and precarious working  conditions associated 
with  informality  represent  a  labor  market  “equilibrium”  that  can  only  change  to  the  extent  that  these 
explanatory factors can. The shortcomings of this approach become  evident  when “market  equilibrium” 
generates below subsistence incomes and working conditions that undermine human capabilities. This is in 
fact  the  grim  situation  for  a  large  proportion  of  the  population  in  developing  countries  today.  Here  is 
where the institutional and sociopolitical  factors affecting earnings and  working  conditions  become even 
more relevant.  We consider a focus on  distribution  essential to understanding their  effects; antipoverty 
programs that have proliferated at many levels during the past decade will not make a lasting impact unless 
distributive and redistributive issues are considered. In what follows, we focus on key areas relevant for an 
alternative analysis of the distributional dimensions of labor market informalization, all of which are part of 
the rising inequality between capital and labor 
Growing labor market informalization amounts to a regressive process of redistribution. It  has functioned 
as  one  of  the  channels  through  which  capital  has  been  able  to  lower  labor  costs.  Additionally,  it  has 
contributed  to  increasing  labor  market  insecurity  and  to  the  creation  of  precarious  jobs  without  social 
protection.  The  result  has  been,  as  many  authors  have  already  pointed  out,  the  weakening  of  the 
bargaining  power of labor relative to  capital.  There are four related aspects to this  process  namely: (1) 
increasing  labor  market  flexibilization,  (2)  growing  inequality  in  income  distribution  and  diminishing 
bargaining  power  of  workers,  (3)  institutional  factors  such  as  forms  of  ownership,  production,  and 
distribution, and (4) socially ascribed positions in society and within the household. 
1.  Much  has  been  written  during  the  past  quarter  century  about  labor  market  flexibilization.  The  rapid 
integration of  national markets and the global economy through trade and financial market liberalization 13 
 
 
and  the  accelerated  competition  among  firms  have  contributed  to  the  increasing  share  of  the  market 
requiring  a  flexible  labor  force  in  order  to  maintain  low  production  costs.  This  has  contributed  to  the 
profound  economic  restructuring  of  production  of  the  past  decades,  both  in  high-  and  low-income 
countries, with enormous changes that range from the microlevel of the firm to the structure and nature of 
labor  markets  (Benería,  2003).  In  developing  countries,  increased  flexibilization,  together  with  chronic 
unemployment and underemployment generated by structural adjustment  policies  have shifted the labor 
force towards increasingly more informalized production. 
An  increasing  number  of  global  firms  and  domestic  enterprises  have  become  involved  with  workers 
outside  the  “traditional  workplace”  through  the  process  of  decentralization,  outsourcing,  and 
subcontracting,  that  extend  the  link  between  the  formal  and  informal  sectors.  They  have  also  tapped 
further into the seemingly abundant female supply of labor by creating new forms of “putting out systems” 
whereby workers produce goods or perform tasks in their homes (Benería and Roldán, 1987; Portes and 
Castells, 1989; Prugl, 1999; Carr, Chen, and Tate 2000; Freeman, 2000; Buechler, 2002). This has led to 
the evolution of adaptive mechanisms by firms such as the vertical and horizontal  chains of  production 
networks in garments, footwear, toys, consumer goods, and handicraft industries. Production is carried out 
by  multilayered  networks  of  parent  firms,  subsidiaries,  contractors,  subcontractors,  and  home-based 
workers that make finished goods for buyers across the world (Gereffi, 1998). This also enables them to 
maintain a  high degree of “veiled”  competition among workers that regulates  wages and  disciplines the 
workers in the formal economy. 
The  labor  discipline  impact  of  informalization  results  from  the  fluidity  of  movement  by  labor  between 
formal and informal activities. This forces workers (and their households) to be fully responsible for their 
own survival and reproduction when  demand  conditions change. Figures 1a and 1b show the four main 
sectors of economic activity namely: formal economy,  public sector, informal economy, and  the unpaid 
domestic  economy.  They  depict the fluidity of labor and the areas of overlap.  The multiplicity of work 
arrangements  in  the  formal  and  informal  economies  include  activities  of  home-based  workers  that 
combine their livelihood with domestic responsibilities, as well as subcontracting and outsourcing activities 
that link formal and informal work in a production chain. Figure 1b shows how, during economic  crises, 
informal activities and the unpaid domestic  economy expand to  pick up the slack of the formal economy 
and that of the public sector as fiscal austerity brings about reduction in social services. 14 
 
 
 
Fig. 1a: Areas of Economic Activity and Labor Use During Economic Growth 
 
 
 
Fig. 1b: Areas of Economic Activity and Labor Use During Economic Crisis 
 
It is important to distinguish  between two main types of informal activities, i.e., those that represent bare 
subsistence, such as street vending, and those linked directly or indirectly with  formal production. Both 
tend to reduce consumption goods prices and therefore contribute to maintaining low wages. As firms hire 
and lay off workers in  order to adjust to market fluctuations, informal activities and the informal sector 15 
 
 
provide the  cushion that supplies much flexibility for capital while shifting the  burden of survival on to the 
individual  worker.  In  addition,  under  neoliberal  policies,  governments  have  adopted  labor  laws  that 
tolerate, and  even  promote, labor flexibility without much  concern about safety nets and unemployment 
compensation schemes  during periods of high unemployment and  underemployment. Unpaid household 
or  domestic  activities  and  the  unpaid  labor  of  family  members  are  assumed  to  be  flexible  and  can  be 
stretched so as to shoulder the subsistence of unemployed and  underemployed workers.  Thus, global 
competition has generated the typical race to the bottom even in countries with strong welfare states but 
particularly in developing countries. 
2. The growing inequality in income distribution and diminishing bargaining power of labor run parallel to 
this flexibilization and are reinforced by labor market deregulation. The last three decades have witnessed 
a weakening and individualization of the labor contract in many productive processes, resulting in what has 
been  called  “the  new  labor  contract”  in  formal  production  (Stone,  2001;  Benería,  2003).  With  the 
exception of high-skilled and  professional labor, this has led to the diminishing bargaining power of labor, 
either  individually  or  collectively  through,  for  example,  the  absence  or  decreasing  power  of  unions. 
Informalization can  be seen as an extreme  form of this tendency in which it is not the weakening of the 
labor contract that prevails but its absence. In many ways, informalization highlights the unequal nature of 
the labor/capital exchange. The owner of labor is free in the sense that he/she can accept or reject work, 
move from one firm to another, and even from one sector to another, but ultimately, he/she depends on 
the employment-creating capacity of capital for survival. As Marx and other authors have pointed out, this 
creates an exchange between unequal parties. 
In the case of informal labor in which there is no labor contract per se, such as in the case of self-employed 
work  in  microenterprises,  a  weakened  position  in  market  exchanges,  negotiations,  and  social  contracts 
results  from the insecurity and  precariousness in  which these firms operate in the market. At  the same 
time,  these  firms  also  contribute  to  market  flexibilization  by  quickly  adapting  to  market  conditions.  For 
example,  micro-  and  small  enterprises  typically  use  family  labor  that  can  be  brought  in  and  out  of 
production  at  much  ease  and  absorb  some  costs  of  production  (such  as  in  the  case  of  electric  costs 
whenever production is done within the home space). 
During the past three  decades, these tendencies have resulted in a deterioration of relative incomes and 
living standards for a large proportion of informalized labor.  Neoclassical theory typically assumes a  high 
degree  of  competition  among  the  suppliers  of  labor  and  it  rarely  relates  this  to  the  question  of  the 
workers’ relative bargaining power—in the same way that it tends to ignore the issue of power relations in 
production  processes.  Yet, it is quite obvious that flexibilization and informalization tend to improve the 
relative  advantage  of  capital  over  labor,  at  the  same  time  setting  the  parameters  under  which  self-
employed labor, and home-based work, operate. 
One  consequence  has  been  the  tendency  to  rising  income  inequality  and  worker  differentiation.  The 
growing informalization of jobs alongside stagnant growth or decline of regular, core and  protected jobs 
imply that employment adjustments concentrate the burden of shift on those workers who either become 
unemployed or  part of the informalized “periphery.”  These trends also shift some  costs of adjustments 16 
 
 
associated with market volatility and fluctuation onto many of the self-employed workers and the unpaid 
workers  engaged  in  household  maintenance  and  reproduction  of  both  the  unemployed  and  periphery 
workers. 
It is therefore not surprising that we have observed growing income inequalities, first, between owners of 
capital  and  owners  of  labor  input  and,  second,  among  workers  themselves.  A  flexible  labor  force  and 
increased individualization of contracts not only undermine the bargaining power of workers and make the 
maintenance and enforcement of workers’ rights more difficult; they also enable owners and managers of 
capital to reap higher returns and/or to absorb lesser risk. The way in which owners and managers of 
capital/firms  restructure  the  organization  of  the  production  process  and  adjust  their  work  force  has 
important implications on how the costs of adjustment and associated risks—those resulting from market 
instability and cyclical fluctuation—are distributed  between labor and  capital, and also across the working 
population.  They also have implications for the relative vulnerability of the different groups of workers to 
job loss and joblessness. 
Among  the  work  force,  increased  wage  dispersion  has  been  registered  across  skills,  age,  sectors,  and 
ethnicity (Wood, 1991;  Freeman and Katz, 1993; Fontana and  Wood, 2000). For instance, those with 
higher skills and high-end jobs are employed in expanding sectors and are likely to earn relatively high, if 
not rising, wages while those with less skills, work in low-end jobs and/or  employed in displaced sectors 
are  likely  to  face  low,  if  not  declining  real  wages.  Likewise,  workers  who  are  hired  on  a  casual, 
subcontracted, or part-time basis and who have little or no labor protection are likely to earn less and have 
less  benefits  than  those  with  regular  full-time  jobs.  Workers  with  means  of  expressing  their  voice  in 
collective  bargaining are likely to earn more than those without.  These mark the growing division within 
labor and increased differentiation in economic well-being among the working population. 
Along  these  lines,  gender  becomes  a  major  axis  of  differentiation  around  these  processes  of  labor 
flexibilization. Female workers tend to earn lower wages than their male counterparts, are more likely to 
be  in  low-end  jobs,  and  hired  as  casual,  subcontracted,  or  part-time.  This  pattern  results  from 
discrimination and gender norms that permeate in economic and social institution. However, we have also 
observed increasing income differentiation among women (McCrate, 1995; Lavinas, 1996). 
The relative weakening of labor power vis-à-vis capital and the growing individualization of labor contracts 
have  contributed to the  unequal income  distribution and social inequalities observed across  countries—
and to the persistence of poverty amid plenty. Informal labor prevails among the world’s six billion people 
who  live  on  less  than  one  dollar  a  day,  and  poverty  has  been  increasing  in  many  areas  (World  Bank 
2000/2001). As argued by the  World Bank report, the distribution of income is an important  factor in 
dealing with  poverty: “Other things  being the same, growth leads to less  poverty reduction in  unequal 
societies than in  egalitarian ones”  (p. 55). Further, the report  dismisses the often mentioned assumption 
that inequality stimulates individual initiative and fosters competitive and entrepreneurial spirit. In fact, based 
on an analysis of 65 developing countries sampled, the report also argues that: (1) high inequality reduces 
the possible impact of a given rate of economic growth, and (2) lower inequality can increase efficiency and 17 
 
 
economic growth. It is our contention that given the increasing importance of the informal economy, the 
conditions faced by these workers are key in dealing with distribution and poverty. 
3. Institutional factors such as entitlements and ownership rights, as well as privatization, also contribute to 
rising inequalities between capital and labor. The issue of distribution is not simply a question of how much 
people  earn  but  how  they  earn  it.  The  latter  involves  the  identification  of  “who”  owns  what  factor  of 
production  and  the  basis  for  the  returns  that  the  “owner”  receives  for  their  use.  It  requires  an 
understanding of  how the “owners” of factors of production relate to  each other, thus affecting control 
over the  production  process and distribution.  The overwhelming imposition of neoliberal policies during 
the  past three decades  has discouraged the analysis of the  connections between ownership of factors of 
production and the distribution of income/resources, bargaining power, and risk. It’s time to resume this 
debate, and to connect it to our understanding of informality. 
At the level of the informal economy, an institutional analysis of  the  prevailing  forms of production and 
distribution reveals their heterogeneity—in terms of earnings and social composition as well as the degree 
of vulnerability and bargaining power of informal workers. Far from being uniform, the informal economy 
parallels its formal counterpart in terms of organizational forms and capital/labor divides. There are at least 
four main categories of production modes: (a) the use of hired wage labor; (b) self-employment and the 
use  of  family  labor;  (c)  cooperative  forms  of  production;  and  (d)  hybrid  forms  combining  different 
institutional and distributional arrangements. 
The  presence  of  these  different  production  arrangements  in  the  informal  economy  has  been  analyzed 
quite extensively (Benería and Roldán, 1987; Portes and Castells, 1989; ILO, 2002, 2004; Rossell, 2002; 
Freeman, 2000).
  These studies have shown that a large proportion of labor  working in  precarious and 
informalized activities tends to shift regularly between these types of production arrangements. Subsistence 
activities such as street vending or hawking typically represent self-employed labor and include some of the 
poorest  social  groups.  Microenterprises  tend  to  be  very  heterogeneous;  while  some  use  family  labor, 
including  that  of  children,  others  hire  wage  labor  and  become  profitable  firms,  while  still  others  barely 
provide returns for survival. 
Wage labor in informalized settings is also subject to institutional variations, depending on different factors, 
such as the type of work (time or piecework, part-time or full-time, with or without contract); the form of 
employment  (direct  contact  with  employer,  subcontracting,  family  member,  etc.);  the  legal/illegal 
conditions  (in  terms  of  occupational  safety  and  forms/level  of  payment);  and  market  destination  (local, 
regional/national,  foreign,  etc.).  Income  distribution  also  reflects  the  differences  between  these  various 
informal arrangements and  between wage income and  hybrid  forms of  payment to labor.  The earnings 
received  by the workers are affected  by their placement  in the  different  productive  forms and  by their 
relative bargaining power. Those with few labor resources and assets are dependent on the employer for 
raw materials, equipment, and other inputs; they are likely to have less bargaining power than those who 
own capital, equipment, and other resources. Workers with low-skill levels, short work contracts, and/or 
are dependent on a single contractor or employer may be especially vulnerable, and their low-bargaining 
power is likely to affect their incomes and working conditions. 18 
 
 
4. Finally, certain groups of workers, by virtue of their socially ascribed roles and positions in society and 
within the household, may have lesser  bargaining power over their earnings and over the conversion of 
their  income  into  particular  functioning,  including  economic  security  (Benería  and  Roldan,  1987).  The 
relationship  between  income  and  capability  is  an  important  subject  that  Sen  and  others  have  explored 
extensively (Sen, 1992; Nussbaum, 2003). It is one that is strongly affected  by social norms and gender 
ascribed roles that influence a worker’s choice of work location (whether working at home or with others 
in a workplace),  level of  schooling, and ownership of assets (Antonopoulos and Floro, 2004). Some of 
these social factors are not  clearly tangible, such as self-esteem, ability to be assertive, and consciousness 
about one’s own interests. Some of them are highly related to gender constructions. Given their isolation 
and, to the extent that they are mostly women,  home-based  workers tend to  be at the low end of the 
labor hierarchy and of income scales. They are also likely to have little or no employment security and are 
more vulnerable to the fluctuations of flexible markets. 
Whether or not a worker is able to translate his/her earnings into capability functioning depends upon the 
structure of household relations and decision-making processes and not just on the terms of employment 
and level of earnings. As feminists have pointed out, at the fundamental level, the worker’s role in the labor 
market is linked to their role in household work and social reproduction. Home-based work in particular, 
enables  women  to  resolve  the  contradictions  between  women’s  socially  defined  roles  as  wives  and 
mothers  and  the  demand  for  cheap,  flexible  labor  needs  of  capitalist  economic  growth.  This  form  of 
employment reconciles the productive and reproductive roles such as childcare and market work, thereby 
maintaining the notion that the “owner of labor is free in the sense that he/she can accept or reject work 
and move even from one sector to another…but ultimately, he/she takes responsibility for her/his survival 
and reproduction (Foley and Michl, 1999)." 
Thus,  it  is  no  surprise  then  that,  first,  women  are  disproportionally  represented  among  home-based 
workers across countries and, second,  home-based work has increased in all regions (Benería, 2001). It 
has become an important source of livelihood for those who have no other choice but to combine it with 
their domestic responsibilities (ILO, 2002; Carr, Chen and Tate, 2000). Home-based work demonstrates 
the  “spillover”  mechanisms  through  which  insecurity  associated  with  informality  of  work  shift  some 
elements of market risk and volatility onto the informal sector and particularly to women workers. 
The next section examines how the growing precariousness of jobs translates into increased vulnerability 
of those with little or no resources (other than their own labor) to help smoothen their consumption and 
design household and labor strategies. 
IV. POVERTY, VULNERABILITY, AND RISK SHARING 
Over  the  course  of  our  empirical  research,  we  have  come  to  realize  the  importance  of  distinguishing 
between  poverty  and  vulnerability.  The  insecurity  of  the  informal  work  environment  has  far-reaching 
effects in terms of inducing vulnerability among homeworkers and their households. For example, in the 19 
 
 
case of Bolivia and  Ecuador, we have found a high degree of income variability which leads to spillovers 
into the social and economic spheres that affect the workers ability to manage risk (Benería and Floro, 
2005) Even though average household income  does  not fall into poverty levels, the  degree of variability 
can be very high, creating problems of borrowing, debt, and risk that need to be managed. In our study of 
urban households in poor communities in these two countries, the majority of jobs held by both men and 
women are characterized as moderately or highly precarious. The shortness of the work contracts (mostly 
on a day-to-day basis) of those employed as casual or temporary workers demonstrates the instability and 
the extent to which their livelihood is at the mercy of their employers. The majority of the workers in our 
sample,  however,  are  self-employed  and  the  variability  of  their  incomes  is  high  especially  among  self-
employed women workers. This can affect their use of credit (to smoothen consumption rather than for 
productive investment) and it  can alter the fallback level of assets and savings (Messier, 2005; Floro and 
Antonopoulos, 2004). In the long run, it  can also affect the vulnerability of later generations so that the 
cycle of poverty and capability deprivation is maintained. 
While vulnerability is defined in a number of ways (Sebstad and Cohen, 2001), we consider it in terms of 
the household and its members’ ability to deal with risk and hence their attitude towards it.
4 Risk induced 
by the  possibility of income  decline or loss generated by “low sales” or a “slow work contract” season, 
leads  to  concerns  regarding  particular  functionings  including  being  nourished,  sheltered,  educated,  and 
cared for in times of illness. This translates into such commonplace concerns as being able to afford school 
fees  for  children,  to  seek  medical  assistance  when  ill,  and  even  to  pay  for  marriages  and  funerals. 
Vulnerability  relates  to  the  claims  or  rights  over  resources  in  dealing  with  risk,  shocks,  and  economic 
stresses. The lesser claims or rights over resources a household or an individual has, greater is her or his 
vulnerability. The mere  existence of  employment  does  not define the economic status and ability of the 
worker to function in the  capability space.  It needs to be seen as acting together with a number of other 
factors, the most crucial  being access to and control over resources—mutual support  networks, credit, 
savings, and physical assets—in the face of income shortfalls and consumption expenditure shocks.
5 As the 
following  discussion  will  demonstrate,  there  is  a  strong  propensity  for  households  with  irregular  and 
variable sources of income to become increasingly differentiated, depending on a host of social, economic, 
and  demographic  factors.
 There  is  also  a  tendency  for  risk  burden  to  be  shouldered  unequally  among 
household members. 
The  degree  of  social  cohesion  and  trust  prevailing  in  a  given  community  can  help,  to  some  extent,  in 
providing  insurance  to  homeworkers  and  their  households.  A  village,  kinship  group,  or  other  social 
networks may share each other’s risk through some community mechanism or institutional arrangements 
in a given setting.  These include  death  benefit societies such as those in Indonesia and informal savings 
groups in  Thailand (Nguanbanchong, 2004). Systems of ‘generalized reciprocity’  exist as well, in which 
                                                 
4  In the literature on risk and poverty, there is a distinction made between precautionary strategies towards risk and ex-post strategies after a shock or 
economic crisis. Both ex ante strategies (precautionary) and ex- post strategies (managing a loss) for dealing with risk involve a mix of intrahousehold 
measures  (self-insurance)  and  interhousehold  measures  (informal  and  formal  insurance)  See  Morduch,  1992  and  Sebstad  and  Cohen,  2001 for 
examples.  
5  Findings from a number of studies show that although household incomes may fluctuate widely as result of weather, price, and employment- related 
shocks, consumption doesn’t necessarily follow such patterns of variability. Household members make use of different mechanisms to smoothen 
consumption (Bardhan and Udry 1999; Morduch, 1992). 20 
 
 
those  whose  income  temporarily  is  relatively  large  provide  gifts  or  loans  to  those  whose  income 
temporarily is relatively small. Relatives, friends, and neighbors are approached for loans, especially in times 
of need as shown in the credit  patterns of urban poor households in Ecuador (Floro and Messier, 2004). 
Loan provision in this case is part of the income maintenance schemes and mutual support systems that 
have  evolved  to  cope  with  the  basic  requirements  and  contingencies  of  life.  Women  have  played  an 
important role as participants in these types of networks. 
The limits of such risk-pooling mechanisms within  communities and social groups in the context of labor 
market  restructuring  and  increase  in  income  irregularity  suggest  that  vulnerable  workers  and  their 
households  often  will  have  to  deal  with  job-related  risk  themselves.  Recent  studies  on  the  effects  of 
negative  shocks  or  crises  on  poor  households  show  the  critical  role  of  informal  credit  in  consumption 
smoothing  and  in  managing  loss  from  shocks  such  as  family  emergencies  (Boris  and  Prugl,  1996; 
Boonmathya, Praparand, Leechanavanichpan, 1999; Sebstad and  Cohen, 2001). In addition to relatives 
and  friends,  there  are  pawnbrokers,  moneylenders,  traders,  as  well  as  employers,  who  provide  loans. 
Boris and Prugl (1996) point out that homeworkers in Mexico are often in debt to merchants and traders. 
The same pattern exists in countries such as Brazil and Indonesia (Abreu and Sorj, 1996; Susilastuti, 1996). 
A growing number of studies on microenterprises (Sebstad and  Cohen, 2001; Boonmathya et al., 1999; 
Rossell, 2002; Messier 2005) suggest that informal  credit is  the  principal source of loans, even in areas 
where  microfinance  institutions  are  well  established.  In  fact,  microfinance  institutions  typically  target  the 
self-employed  or  microentrepreneurs;  however,  there  is  little  participation  of  the  vulnerable  poor 
households such as those engaged in homeworking. 
In some cases, poor households have made use of assets as buffer stocks to smoothen their consumption 
and designed other household strategies in the face of irregular income streams. As long as the household 
has positive savings, temporary income shortfalls can be smoothed by drawing on their savings. However, 
once the household’s past saving or wealth falls to near zero, the possibility of further smoothing shrinks 
and  consumption  can  become  quite  volatile  (Bardhan  and  Udry,  1999).  This  pattern  has  been  noted 
extensively in the literature on famines (Watts, 1983; Sen and Dreze, 1995). This also seems to be the 
case for a number of households in our 2002 Thailand sample survey whose past savings and assets have 
been either pawned or sold. Urban, home-based workers in Thailand make use of jewelry, transport, and 
even  shop  assets  as  collateral  in  pawnshop  loans  to  meet  household  needs  (Floro  and  Antonopoulos 
2004).
 6 
There  can also be important  effects on future income  from job insecurity if the assets that are used to 
buffer  current  consumption  from  income  fluctuations  are  themselves  used  in  the  production  process. 
Homeworkers who may need their own resources to pay for raw materials, equipment, and other inputs 
in their job, can  find themselves severely  capital-constrained. As a result, their income in the next period 
would be lower or more precarious as a  consequence of the loss of assets; hence, the importance  not 
                                                 
6  The probit analysis performed in the study shows that the probability of asset pawning is higher for women than for men. The results are significant at 
the 10% level and 5% level respectively. Moreover, the employment dummy results suggest that working as a contracted homeworker or regular 
worker instead of being self-employed, is likely to increase the probability of asset pawning. 21 
 
 
only of access to low-cost loans but also of adequate social and public  policy to facilitate their economic 
activities and survival. 
Finally, the poor can rely on other types of strategies for their survival, such as the use of extended family 
networks to relocate household members, decrease housing and other costs, and to redistribute domestic 
responsibilities and migration. Such is the case with shifts in the care of older family members that we have 
encountered  in  our  fieldwork  or  with  changes  in  childcare  responsibilities  and  their  distribution  among 
extended family members. This suggests that income variability can alter the intrahousehold relations and 
patterns  of  decision  making  and  influence  a  worker's  control  over  his/her  labor  time  and  access  to 
household resources. As for migration, since the financial crisis in 2000, Ecuador has registered a very high 
migration  rate—to  the  extent  that  remittances  have  become  the  second  largest  source  of  external 
currency (Herrera, 2004). Bolivia is also experiencing a similar trend although at a lower level. 
V. INTRAHOUSEHOLD GENDER RELATIONS AND VULNERABILITY 
Ethnographic and feminist research and household studies have demonstrated that resources are unequally 
shared  within  families  in  many  parts  of  the  developing  world  (Dwyer  and  Bruce,  1987;  Doss,  1996; 
Hoddinott and  Haddad, 1995). In fact, when intrahousehold inequality exists, poverty among women is 
likely to  be seriously  underestimated in  households not  necessarily  classified as  poor.  This suggests the 
importance  of  examining  the  effects  of  labor  informality,  not  only  in  terms  of  the  worker’s  access  to 
productive  resources,  but  also  in  terms  of  how  each  household  member’s  relative  contribution  to 
household income affects her/his bargaining position and work burden within the household. 
The critical role of women homeworkers in household maintenance, social reproduction, and social asset 
building (or networking) has implications on their gender identities and roles, both as income earners and 
primary caregivers. Factors that alter the level and regularity of income  flow, access to social insurance 
mechanisms, and level and claims to assets have a significant impact on both the welfare of and distribution 
within the  household. For example, the importance of women workers as predominant income  earners 
can shift the ‘borrower role’ from men to women.
7 It can also burden women with greater responsibility 
of debt repayment, as we have found in the case of Ecuador (Floro and Messier, 2004). To the extent that 
informal loan arrangements rely heavily on personalized ties and social networks, this raises the question of 
whether a woman borrower is likely to borrow at different terms than a male borrower. 
The above tendencies highlight the interconnectedness of the homeworker’s productive and reproductive 
roles. The extent to which the risk associated with market fluctuation and changes in demand conditions 
are absorbed by the household can lead to more or less unequal debt burden and differences in the well-
being  of  its  members.  Certain  members  end  up  devoting  more  labor  resources—such  as  with  the 
intensification of  work among  home-based workers in the Thailand sample—to stabilizing the incoming 
                                                 
7  Majority of the designated borrowers in a study of credit patterns among urban poor households sampled in Ecuador are women (Floro and Messier, 
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stream of income in order to  protect the  household from the  dire consequences of substantial income 
fluctuations (Pichetpongsa, 2004).
8 The result can be an increase in tensions among household members. 
The  distribution  of  work  burden  within  the  household  depends  on  the  interplay  of  gender  norms  and 
intrahousehold  negotiations,  which  implies  that  it  can  change  over  time  and  is  affected  by  the  relative 
bargaining power of household members. 
This raises the question of whether a worker’s increased contribution to household income translates into 
greater bargaining power (Benería and Roldan, 1987). If this is the case and a renegotiation of household 
division of tasks occurs, a homeworker may be able to have other members take on her domestic chores. 
But if gender norms are resilient to any change in money income contributions, then a homeworker may 
be  compelled  to  increase  the  length  of  the  working  day  or  intensify  her  work  effort  by  overlapping 
activities, say combining childcare and market work.  
A closer examination of the different forms of homework arrangements can provide invaluable insights on 
the mechanisms of poverty traps and the manner by  which this is repeated intergenerationally. It is  not 
uncommon  for homeworkers to use additional labor resources, typically  children, to perform the work 
task themselves, or to help the worker in her household  chores, such as cooking and doing errands. But 
the compulsion to have  children, especially girls, engage in homeworking limits their access to education. 
This in turn, limits their income and employment opportunities and thus can perpetuate a vicious circle of 
poverty. To be sure, along these lines there are differences across countries and cultures which underline 
the importance of understanding social norms and their changing nature in each case. 
In the absence of social protection schemes, both the means and the manner in which  households  deal 
with  risk  also  affect  the  homeworker’s  capabilities  and  entitlements.    The  so-called  “free  and  flexible” 
workers in households with little or no resources to absorb income variability, tend to invest little, are 
more  dependent  on  contractors,  and  thus  earn  lower  mean  returns  from  these  activities  than  those 
workers in less-asset poor or wealthier households. As case studies among urban, informal sector workers 
in  Thailand  and  Ecuador  show,  the  inability  of  these  workers  in  poor  households  to  insulate  their 
consumption  from income risk is likely to  have adverse consequences  both  for their well-being and for 
productive efficiency. (Pichetpongsa, 2004; Messier, 2005).  
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The preceding  discussion suggests the  need to explore in detail the distributional  consequences of labor 
market  flexibilization.  This  includes  the  weakening  of  the  bargaining  power  of  labor  and  the  gender 
constructs in employment patterns and worker differentiation both in the formal and informal economies. 
Our study illustrates the types of nonstandard forms of employment that predominate and have multiplied 
                                                 
8  Pichetpongsa’s (2004) study of the urban poor home-based workers in our Thailand sample shows that  income alone cannot explain the individual’s 
perspective of their well-being. His analysis shows that women home-based workers tend to have a lower quality of life than men given the long work 
hours and lower levels of earnings. 23 
 
 
in the informal economy. This has generated greater diversity in labor conditions and working life patterns 
for both men and women workers and contributed to rising income inequalities. 
The interconnection between the formal and informal economies and the reproductive sector is reflected 
in particular in the case of the home-based work where the worker’s role in the labor market is linked to 
his/her  role  in  household  work  and  social  reproduction.  Our  study  of  urban,  home-based  workers  in 
Bolivia,  Ecuador,  and  Thailand  show  that  any  examination  of  vulnerability  must  take  into  account  the 
mechanisms  through  which  gender  roles,  risk  sharing,  and  debt-servicing  burdens  different  household 
members  and  how  they  are  affected  by  the  broader  changes  in  labor  market  dynamics,  degrees  of 
informalization, and the accompanying variability in incomes. The maintenance of a flexible labor force and 
the search for the lowest production costs worldwide are at the root of the increased income insecurity of 
informalized workers. Current macroeconomic policies have reinforced these trends in their promotion of 
market liberalization and  deregulation (Floro, Çagatay, Ertuk, and Willoughby, 2003; Benería, 2003). For 
women homeworkers in particular, the resulting work burden is likely to be reflected in the multiple roles, 
which  they  try  to  accomplish  simultaneously  within  severe  time  constraints.  The  gender  identities  of 
homeworkers  directly influence their access to market opportunities, new skills and technologies, as well 
as their bargaining position for work contracts and within the household. 
Our study draws attention to the importance of focusing on distribution and the diversity of factors affecting 
it in order to understand the economic and social significance of informality. The objective is to underline 
the  relevant  factors  for  designing  labor  market  and  social  protection  strategies  that  can  contribute  to 
poverty elimination. In this sense, our conceptual framework points towards a variety of general avenues 
for action that can be illustrated by the following list: 
Rising inequalities between capital and labor incomes  calls for  programs that protect workers’ rights and 
strengthen their bargaining power, such as enforcement of rights to association and of labor standards, as 
well as worker protection programs. Yet, it is obvious that the difficulties for their implementation are even 
greater  in  informal  than  in  formal  production.  As  current  debates  on  globalization  have  made  clear, 
workers' rights and basic labor standards must be observed at a global level in order to avoid the race to 
the  bottom  that  globalization  has  generated  and  to  prevent  some  countries  from  losing  investments,  if 
these standards are implemented. However, as Kabeer (2003) has argued, setting global standards will not 
be effective unless there is pressure to implement them at the national and local levels. 
Increased  access  to  a  wider  array  of  financial  services,  such  as  medium-term  and  consumption  loans, 
insurance, savings mobilization, and technical assistance can be instrumental for poor households engaged 
in informal activities. This is the case with the development of innovative financial instruments that provide 
these services while reducing the  cost of  credit. Such financial policies and credit  programs can enhance 
productive capacity and affect distributive channels (Floro, 2001). They require, however, complementary 
legal frameworks that effectively eliminate the discrimination and biases of financial institutions in serving the 
poor and women. 24 
 
 
Social protection schemes  need to be designed to compensate for the growing insecurity associated with 
informalization.
 These range from unemployment and health insurance to minimum income schemes and 
minimum  wage  legislation.  Given  current  conditions  in  the  global  economy,  the  possibilities  for  such 
programs seem limited; as in the case of the millennium development goals to deal with world  poverty, 
they will require  political mobilization and social pressures from a variety of sectors. As in the case of the 
global environmental movement, it calls for an effort of international proportions. 
Macroeconomic policies  can make a significant  contribution in generating stable and decent  employment, 
raising income levels, and affecting distribution between different social groups, including those affected by 
labor  market  informality  (Heinz  and  Polin,  2002;  Floro,  Cagatay,  Erutrk,  and  Willoughby,  2003).  This 
implies that employment creation and protection of workers rights can not be left to market forces alone, 
nor  to  the  whims  of  firms  and  private  capital.  To  date,  there  has  been  a  general  lack  of  congruence 
between  the  macroeconomic  policies  that  promote  market  liberalization,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
recognized  need  to  reduce  poverty,  attain  gender  equality,  and  empower  women  and  the 
disenfranchised, on the other. This lack of coherence is reflected in the current governance structure and 
organization of the international  economic and financial systems. It is also manifested in the  power and 
influence of  certain interest groups and governments in  how  policy  decisions, especially those that affect 
directly and indirectly the creation of stable jobs, are made. Unless there is a conscious effort on the part of 
policymakers  and  international  economic  institutions  to  promote  decent  employment  and  protect 
workers’ rights, it will be extremely difficult to address the interests of workers, particularly those with less 
bargaining power, such as informal workers. 
For women workers, increasing bargaining power can also result from gender-aware measures addressing 
their  specific  needs,  such  as  programs  fostering  women’s  organizations  and  their  collective  bargaining, 
economic literacy, and self-esteem.  This also  calls for economic and legal reforms that address  existing 
economic  and  gender-based  inequities  in  the  distribution  and  ownership  of  assets  and  productive 
resources  such  as  land,  credit,  education,  market  knowledge,  and  technology.  Increased  access  to 
education  and  training  can  enhance  bargaining  power  while  at  the  same  time,  raise  labor’s  productive 
capacity and income levels while reducing worker differentiation. The importance of government support 
for education at different levels has been amply demonstrated through  empirical studies and emphasized 
through  many  sources.  There  is  also  a  need  to  establish  gender-sensitive  rules  to  guide  employment 
practices of domestic and foreign firms, including global corporations, by building on existing agreed upon 
multilateral  instruments,  such  as  the  ILO  conventions  on  fundamental  workers’  rights  and  other 
conventions with regard to home-based work and informal work.
 9 
 
                                                 
9  In recent years, a few countries such as Canada and the Netherlands, have passed legislation to promote standards concerning working conditions in 
homework activity. In an effort to promote equality of treatment between homeworkers and other wage earners, the 1996 ILO Convention  of 
Homework represented a step forward in ensuring equality in labor rights to organize, to protection in the field of occupational safety and health, to 
protection  against  discrimination,  to  social  security,  to  access  to  training,  and  to  maternity  protection.  However,  few  countries  have ratified  the 
Convention. 25 
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Rethinking the informal economy: 
from enterprise characteristics to  
employment relations 
Marty Chen 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY AND WIEGO 
 
This  paper seeks to explore two  challenges  posed by the growth in the informal economy and in labor 
market informalization more broadly. The first is the challenge posed to conventional labor law and labor 
economics by the  fact that informal employment and production relations are on the rise everywhere, 
albeit in different guises.  The second is the  challenge posed to  conventional  poverty reduction strategies 
that are focused on social policies, by the fact that there is a link between working in the informal economy 
and being poor.  
The paper is in five parts. Part I provides a brief history of the original concept of the informal sector. Part II 
presents the recent rethinking of the informal economy: a broader  concept that attempts to  capture the 
conceptual whole of informal employment in light of the reality of work in today’s global world. Part III 
presents a summary of recent statistics on the informal economy worldwide. Part IV poses challenges to 
conventional labor  force statistics, labor law, and labor market theory. And Part V presents a model for 
analyzing the forces that determine the poverty outcomes of working in the informal economy. The paper 
concludes  with  a  call  for  reintegrating  a  concern  for  distribution  and  equity  within  economic  theory, 
policies, and processes. 
I. THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
During  the  1950s  and  1960s,  both  Europe  and  North  America  experienced  great  advances  in 
employment and labor market security arising from and associated with mass production, social contracts 
between  employers  and  employees,  and  statutory  regulations  of  labor  markets.  This  “Golden  Age  of 
Labor,"  as  it  was  later  called,  confirmed  the  classical  economic  hypothesis  (à  la  W.  Arthur  Lewis)  that 
economic  development would absorb surplus labor in the traditional sector (Lewis, 1954). Despite these 
advances  in  developed  countries,  however,  there  were  lingering  concerns  about  persistent  levels  of 
unemployment in developing countries. 
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“Discovery” of the Informal Sector  
Reflecting  this  concern,  the  International  Labor  Organization  (ILO)  mounted  a  series  of  large 
multidisciplinary "employment missions” to various developing countries. The first of these was to Kenya in 
1972. The Kenya employment mission, through its fieldwork and in its official report, recognized that the 
traditional sector had not just persisted but expanded to include profitable and efficient enterprises as well 
as marginal activities (ILO, 1972). To highlight this fact, the Kenya mission chose to use the term “informal 
sector” rather than “traditional sector”  for the range of small-scale and  unregistered  economic activities. 
This  term  had  been  coined  the  year  before  by  a  British  economist,  Keith  Hart,  who  while  studying 
economic activities in urban Ghana had found that many of the so-called “unemployed” were actually self-
employed in informal activities (Hart, 1973). 
Debates about the Informal Sector  
Although both Hart and the Kenya mission team were very positive about the informal sector—noting its 
efficiency, creativity, and resilience—the  concept received a mixed review in  development  circles. Many 
observers subscribed to the  notion that the informal sector was marginal or peripheral and  not linked to 
the formal sector or to modern capitalist development. Some of these observers continued to believe that 
the  informal  sector  in  Kenya,  Ghana,  and  other  developing  countries  would  disappear  once  these 
countries  achieved  sufficient  levels  of  economic  growth  or  modern  industrial  development.  Other 
observers  argued  that  industrial  development  might  take  a  different  pattern  in  developing  countries—
including the expansion of informal economic activities—than it had in developed countries. 
For the rest of the 1970s and into the 1980s, there was an ongoing debate in academic and international 
development circles about the informal sector. Two dominant schools of thought saw the informal sector 
as a featur e of pr ecapitalist economies.   The “dualists” (including several leading researchers at the 
ILO)  wrote  about  the  persistence  of  traditional  or  peasant-forms  of  production  in  semi-industrialized 
economies  due  to  imbalances  in  economic  development.  Notably,  the  imbalances  arise  when  the 
population growth rate outstrips the economic growth rate and when traditional skills do not match what 
is  required  by  new  economic  opportunities.  The  “legalists”  (led  by  Hernando  de  Soto)  attributed  the 
increase to the number of “plucky entrepreneurs” (to use de Soto’s term) who have to operate informally 
due to the  bureaucratic  procedures of mercantilist states. From the legalist  perspective,  economic elites 
collude  with  bureaucrats  to  design  regulations  and  policies  in  their  own  interest  which  are  too 
cumbersome and costly for the working poor. These schools of thought focused almost exclusively on the 
self-employed in informal enterprises and shared a rather romanticized notion of the informal sector as a 
vehicle  for  labor  absorption;  a  means  of  survival  for  the  poor,  a  means  of  redistribution,  or  as  having 
potential for dynamic growth (de Soto, 2000). 
Only one dominant school of thought—the “structuralists” (led  by Alejandro Portes)— saw the  informal 
sector  as  a  feature  of  capitalist  dev elopment  that  was  subordinated  to,  if  not  exploited  by,  the 
formal sector. The structuralists did not focus on the self-employed or informal activities per se but rather 30 
 
 
on  informal  or  unregulated  economic  relationships  between  the  formal  sector  on  one  hand  and 
downgraded labor, petty commodity producers, and/or disguised wageworkers on the other.  By the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the debate surrounding the informal sector subsided as the concept went out of 
favor in academic circles (Portes et al, 1989). 
The International Labor Movement and the Informal Sector  
Two international conferences in the early 1990s helped to focus the attention of the international labor 
movement on the informal sector. The 1991 International Labor Conference had a general discussion on 
what was called the “Dilemma of the  Informal Sector”, namely, that the informal sector  creates jobs but 
only of  poor quality and that most  employees of informal enterprises are, therefore, unprotected labor. 
Two  years  later,  operating  under  a  mandate  from  the  1991  ILC  General  Discussion,  the  International 
Conference of  Labor Statisticians adopted an official statistical definition of the informal sector,  or more 
precisely, employment in the informal sector, that included: 
•  Employers. Owner managers of unregistered small enterprises with paid workers (below a specified 
number)
1 
•  Own-Account Workers. Owner operators of single person units or family business 
•  Contributing Unpaid Family Workers. In family businesses 
•  Employees. Of informal enterprises 
What  is  notable  is  that  participants  in  both  of  these  international  conferences  recognized  that  those 
working in informal enterprises included not only the self-employed but also their employees, as well as in 
many family businesses, unpaid contributing family members. 
Since the late 1990s, there has been a reconvergence of interest in the informal sector among academics 
and in international development circles.  In  developed  countries, increasing informalization and insecurity 
of labor has led to the concept of “nonstandard work” that includes a whole range of atypical wageworkers 
as well as the self-employed.  In developing countries, in the context of persistent informality and poverty, 
there is renewed attention of the sheer numbers, and the precariousness, of the self-employed (especially 
those  who  work  on  their  own  account  without  hiring  others)  and  of  informal  wage  employment 
(especially those who work as industrial outworkers or homeworkers).  
As part of this reconvergence of interest, some observers—including staff of the International Labor Office 
and members of the global research policy network WIEGO— have encouraged a fundamental rethinking 
of  the  informal  economy.  Their  efforts  have  led  to  a  broader  definition  of  the  concept  and  a  deeper 
understanding  of  informal  economic  activities  and  relationships.  This  new  definition  and  associated 
concepts were endorsed  by the general discussion on “Decent  Work and the  Informal Economy” at the 
2002 International Labor Conference (ILO, 2002a). 
                                                 
1 The upper limit of paid workers varies between countries and branches of economic activity. 31 
 
 
II. THE NEW CONCEPT OF THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
The call for a broader definition and concept reflected the  perceived  need to incorporate the real world 
dynamics in labor markets today; more specifically, to incorporate the whole of informality—including both 
production  and  employment  relations—as  manifested  in  industrialized,  transitional,  and  developing 
economies (ILO, 2002a).   
New Definition 
According  to  this  new  thinking,  the  “informal  economy”  is  seen  as  including  all  forms  of  employment 
without  secure  contracts,  worker  benefits,  or  social  protection  and  as  comprised  of  two  basic 
components:  self-employment  in  informal  enterprises  and  paid  employment  in  informal  employment 
relations. That is, the informal economy is seen to be comprised of the following groups classified by status 
of employment. 
Self-employment in informal enterprises, including: 
•  employer/owner operators  
•  own-account workers 
•  unpaid contributing family member 
Wage employment in informal jobs, including: 
•  employees of informal enterprises 
•  casual day laborers  
•  domestic workers 
•  industrial outworkers
2 
Whereas the old definition of the informal sector included all those who work in informal enterprises, the 
new definition of the informal sector includes, in addition, several categories of informal paid work outside 
of informal enterprises: for formal enterprises,  households, or no fixed employer.  The following pyramid 
graphically illustrates the difference in scope of the two definitions. 
                                                 
2 Developed countries do not use the concept of informal employment, but rather the concept of non-standard work.  It has not been resolved as yet 
which categories of non-standard work – such as   part-time or temporary workers (whose hours of work are below a certain threshold) and sub-
contracted service providers (who are sub-contracted rather than hired for their services) - should be considered  to be informal employment. 
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According  to  this  new  way  of  thinking,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  own-account  workers  from 
microentrepreneurs  who  hire  others  and  manage  their  own  informal  enterprises.  This  is  because 
microentrepreneurs, who are often relatively well off, are seen to constitute a more entrepreneurial class. 
Own-account workers, on the other hand, typically do not have secure contracts or work orders and are 
not  covered  by  social  protection;  and  are,  thus,  seen  to  share  many  of  the  interests  and  concerns  of 
informal paid workers. 
New Conceptualization 
This  new  thinking  has  generated  a  more  nuanced  and  context-specific  perspective  on  the  causes  and 
consequences of informality; the characteristics of informal employment; and the linkages of the informal 
economy with the formal economy and the formal regulatory environment. As such, the new definition of 
informal employment  embodies a major conceptual shift. It gives a new priority in  defining informality to 
employment status rather than, as in the earlier  definition, to  enterprise characteristics.  The old thinking 
associated with the old concept of the informal sector (defined as the self-employed in informal enterprises 
and  their  hired  employees)  assumed  that  informal  entrepreneurs  were  avoiding  formality,  specifically 
registration and taxation.  The new thinking underscores the fact that, in the case of informal wageworkers, 
it is the employer (in either a formal or informal firm) who tries to avoid legal obligations, including payroll 
taxes and employer contributions.  The new thinking also underscores the related fact that many informal 
wageworkers and own-account  workers  do  not  choose to  be informal and would welcome becoming 
formalized provided doing so guaranteed secure contracts, worker benefits, social protection, and the right 
to organize and be represented. 
According to this new way of thinking, the informal economy is not just a feature of traditional economies 
but also a feature of modern  capitalism. Its  persistence and growth is driven variously, depending on the 
context,  by the lack of economic growth;  by jobless patterns of growth, informalization of employment 33 
 
 
relations  in  developed  and  developing  countries;  and  local  reorganization  of  work  and  global 
subcontracting  chains. In addition, the informal economy  has direct links with the formal economy (both 
national  and  global)  and  the  formal  regulatory  environment  (at  local,  national,  and  international  levels). 
These fundamental shifts in thinking are summarized in Box A. 
 
Box A Fundamental Shifts in Thinking: From Informal Sector to Informal Economy 
  Informal Sector  Informal Economy 
Focus  Nature of enterprise  Nature of employment or production 
relationships 
  Self-employed  Self-employed + informal wageworkers 
Causes  Nature of development + Nature 
of bureaucracy Nature of capitalism 
Nature of globalization Context-specific 
Characterization  Lack of regulation  Lack of protection 
Consequences    Costs of informality 
Target of 
Interventions 
Informal enterprises  Formal economy/ formal 
regulatory environment 
 
III. STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
Compiling statistics on the size,  composition, and  contribution of the informal economy is an extremely 
difficult exercise. The most serious limitation is that very few countries have undertaken regular surveys on 
the informal sector and only two or three countries have collected the data that provide for measures of 
informal employment outside informal enterprises. Further, the available data is not comprehensive. Most 
countries exclude agriculture from their measurement of the informal sector and some measure only the 
urban  informal  sector.  In  addition,  there  are  a  number  of  problems  that  limit  the  international 
comparability of data. However, in the absence of reliable data collected directly, various indirect methods 
to estimate the size and composition of the informal economy can be used.   
Developing Countries  
Box  B  presents  a  summary  of  main  findings  from  the  most  recent  and  most  comprehensive  set  of 
estimates of the informal economy in developing countries using indirect methods where necessary.
3 The 
main finding is that informal employment comprises 50 to 75 percent of non-agricultural employment and 
an even greater share of total employment in developing countries. 
 
                                                 
3   This section draws exclusively from a statistical booklet that Joann Vanek and I prepared in 2002 for the ILO. It includes data compiled by Jacques 
Charmes for anywhere from 25-70 countries, depending on the specific estimate, as well as case studies for India, South Africa, Mexico, and OECD 
countries written by, respectively, Jeemol Unni, Debbie Budlender, Rodrigo Negrete and Francoise Carre (ILO, 2002b). 34 
 
 
Box B Summary of Main Findings from “Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical 
Picture” 
Size of the Informal Economy 
•  Informal employment comprises 50 to 75 percent of nonagriculture employment in developing countries. 
Notes: If South Africa is excluded, the share of informal employment in nonagricultural employment rises 
to 78 percent in sub-Saharan Africa.  If data were available for additional countries in Southern Asia, the 
regional average for Asia would likely be much higher.  
•  Some countries include informal employment in agriculture in their estimates of informal employment. In 
these countries the inclusion of informal employment in agriculture increases significantly the proportion of 
informal employment: from 83 percent of nonagricultural employment to 93 percent of total employment 
in India; from 55 to 62 percent in Mexico; and from 28 to 34 percent in South Africa. 
Composition of the Informal Economy 
•  Informal employment is comprised of both self-employment in informal enterprises (i.e., small and/or 
unregistered) and wage employment in informal jobs (i.e., without secure contracts, worker benefits, or 
social  protection).  In  all  developing  regions,  self-employment  comprises  a  greater  share  of  informal 
employment (outside of agriculture) than wage employment. Note: Excluding South Africa, where black-
owned  businesses  were  prohibited  during  the  apartheid  era  and  have  only  recently  begun  to  be 
recognized and reported, the share of self-employment in informal employment increases to 81 percent in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
•  Informal wage employment is also significant in the developing world, comprising 30 to 40 percent of 
informal employment (outside of agriculture). Informal wage employment is comprised of employees of 
informal enterprises as well as various types of informal wageworkers who work for formal enterprises, 
households,  or  no  fixed  employer.  These  include  casual  day  laborers,  domestic  workers,  industrial 
outworkers (notably homeworkers), undeclared workers, and part-time or temporary workers without 
secure contracts, worker benefits, or social protection. 
Women and Men 
•  Informal  employment  is  generally  a  larger  source  of  employment  for  women  than  for  men  in  the 
developing world. Other than in North Africa where 43 percent of women workers are in informal 
employment, 60 percent or more women workers in the developing world are in informal employment 
(outside agriculture).  In sub-Saharan Africa, 84 percent of female nonagricultural workers are informally 
employed compared to 63 percent of male nonagricultural workers. In Latin America the ratio is 58 
percent for women, 48 percent for men. In Asia, the proportion of women and men nonagricultural 
workers in informal employment is roughly equivalent. 
Developed Countries 
Three  categories  of  nonstandard  or  atypical  work—self-employment,  part-time  work,  and  temporary 
work—comprise  30  percent  of  overall  employment  in  15  European  countries  and  25  percent  of  total 
employment  in  the  United  States.  Although  not  all  self-employed,  part-time  workers,  and  temporary 
workers  are  informally  employed,  the  majority  receive  few  (if  any)  employment-based  benefits  or 
protection.  In  the  United  States,  for  instance,  less  than  20  percent  of  regular  part-time  workers  have 
employer-sponsored health insurance or pensions. 35 
 
 
Self-employment comprises 12 percent of total nonagricultural employment in developed countries. Part-
time  work  represented  (in  1998)  about  14  percent  of  total  employment  for  the  Organization  for 
Economic Co-Operation and  Development (OECD)  countries as a whole and more than 20 percent of 
total employment in eight of these  countries. In the  countries of the  European Union, temporary work 
comprises 11 percent of total employment.  
Although  women’s  labor  force  participation  rates  are  lower  than  men’s,  women  represent  the  vast 
majority of part-time workers in many developed countries.  In 1998, women comprised 60 percent or 
more of part-time workers in all OECD  countries reporting data. Women’s share of part-time work for 
specific countries was as high as 98 percent in Sweden, 80 percent in the United Kingdom, and 68 percent 
in both Japan and the United States. 
Global Overview  
A back-of-the-envelope calculation based on the statistics summarized above suggests that the composition 
of the nonagricultural work force in developed and developing countries looks something like this: 
  Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Formal Wage Employment  60-70%  25-50% 
Informal Wage Employment  15-25%  15-40% 
Self-Employment  15%  35% 
Notes: 
1.  If informal employment in agriculture was to be included, the proportion of informal employment in total employment would increase significantly. 
2.  Informal wage employment in developed countries is likely to include a large share of part-time and temporary workers who do not have 
employment benefits or employment-based protection; while informal wage employment in developing countries is likely to include a large share of 
casual or day laborers and industrial outworkers.  
3.  The self-employed in developed countries are likely to include a greater share of professionals and employers than in developing countries; while the 
self-employed in developing countries are likely to include significant numbers of own-account workers and unpaid, but contributing, family members.  
The sheer size of the informal economy and the fact that it is comprised of significant amounts of both self-
employment and informal wage employment presents challenges to current ways of thinking: in particular, 
to mainstream labor statistics, labor law, and labor economics. These allied fields need to catch up with this 
reality. 
IV. RETHINKING LABOR STATISTICS, LAW, AND MARKETS 
Limitations of Existing Statistics 
Although  the  official  statistical  definition  of  the  “informal  sector”  was  adopted  in  1993,  relatively  few 
countries  have undertaken  direct measures of the informal sector so defined.  In addition to the fact that 
these countries have tried to  directly measure the informal sector, there are other limitations to  existing 
statistics.  Firstly,  census  and  labor  force  surveys  tend  to  focus  on  primary  occupation  (to  the  relative 36 
 
 
neglect of secondary occupations). Secondly, census and labor force surveys classify the work force into a 
finite  number  of  employment  status  categories,  namely:  employer,  employee,  own-account  worker, 
unpaid  contributing  family member, and member of  producer cooperative. Other employment statuses 
not  captured  by  conventional  labor  force  statistics,  or  subsumed  and,  thereby,  disguised  under  the 
category of “employee” include, casual day laborers, outworkers/home, contract workers, subcontractors, 
consultants, temporary workers (agency and nonagency), and part-time workers. 
In  brief,  current  national  and  international  statistical  standards  used  to  measure  and  classify  “status  of 
employment”  do  not  have  enough  categories  to  capture  the  range  of  employment  arrangements  in 
today’s world.  This is because all workers are thought to  be  either fully independent (self-employed) on 
the one hand (such as employers and own-account workers) or fully dependent on the other (i.e., as paid 
employees). However, many work situations do not fit neatly into these two basic categories. There is an 
intermediate zone  between fully independent and fully  dependent.  Consider the intermediate status of 
homeworkers as illustrated in Box C. 
Box C Self-Employed, Homeworkers, and Employees 
Characteristics  Self-Employed  Homeworkers  Employees 
Contract  sales contract  Employment contract   employment contract 
Remuneration  from sale of 
goods/services 
for work (typically  
piece rate) 
for work (time or  
piece rate) 
Contract with  self  employer/intermediary  employer 
Means of Production  provided by self  provided by self  provided by employer 
Workplace  provided by self   provided by self  provided by employer 
Supervision  autonomous  indirect or no supervision  direct supervision 
 
The current national and international standards for classifying workers would need to be re examined to 
determine whether existing categories can be subdivided to accommodate these intermediate employment 
statuses or whether whole new categories that cut across existing ones would need to be introduced.  
Illustrative Case: When a trade union organizer in Canada tried to help one immigrant Chinese garment worker 
get her back wages, she found that the garment worker did not know who she worked for, as the man who 
dropped off raw materials and picked up finished garments drove an unmarked van. When the garment worker 
eventually found a tag with a brand label on it among her raw materials, the trade union activist was able to 
trace the label from a retail firm in Canada to a manufacturing firm in Hong Kong and on to an intermediary in 
Canada: in this case, the global value chain began and ended in Canada. When the local intermediary was asked 
to  pay  the  back  wages  due  to the  garment  homeworker  he  replied:  “Put  me  in  jail,  I  cannot pay.  The 
manufacturer in Hong Kong who subcontracted production to me has not paid me in months.” 37 
 
 
Other  complexities  related  to  real  life  employment  arrangements  that  are  not  easily  captured  in  labor 
statistics include: 
flexible or changing labor statuses, i.e., migratory laborers, labor circulants, and  
labor reserves  
dual or multiple labor statuses 
disguised labor, i.e., concealed either by employers to avoid paying benefits and   
making health insurance and pension contributions or, if illegal migrants, by workers themselves 
How To Improve Statistics 
Compounding  these  limitations,  there  is  a  need  to  collect  labor  statistics  on  the  broader  concept  of 
employment  in  the  informal  economy,  as  distinct  from  employment  in  the  informal  sector.  But  the 
question is “How?”  To  begin  with, there is a  need to improve  concepts and measures of employment 
status to incorporate a broader range of potential employment statuses. At a minimum, there is a need to 
capture the eight employment statuses presented schematically below: 
 
  Fully Independent  Semi-Independent  Semi-dependent  Fully Dependent 
Employer  X  X     
Own-Account  X  X     
Employee      X  X 
Unpaid family worker    X  X   
Secondly, there is a need for improved concepts and measures to deal with flexibility or  multiplicity  
of employment statuses. Thirdly, there is a need for further methodological work on the place of work 
variable to capture where informal workers work—on the street, in other public spaces, in their homes, 
in homes of others, and/or in workshops. Fourthly, in order to measure informal employment as a share 
of  total  employment,  there  is  a  need  for  concepts  and  measures  of  for mal  and  informal 
employ ment  in  agriculture.    Finally,  and  most  fundamentally,  there  needs  to  be  an  ongoing  
collection  of  labor  statistics  tabulated  on  a  regular  basis,  in  as  many  countries  as  possible,  using 
improved concepts and methods. Eventually, this would make it viable to have a global data archive on the 
entire work force, both formal and informal.  
In the meantime,  until the above propositions are adopted  by more countries, it is  possible to measure 
employment  in  the  informal  economy  using  indirect  measures  to  obtain  residual  estimates  as 
follows:  
Estimate of Total Work force from population census/labor force surveys  
  -  Estimate of Total Formal Work force  from establishment survey  
         =    Estimate of TOTAL INFORMAL WORK FORCE 38 
 
 
  -  Estimate  of  Employment  in  Informal  Sector  from  informal  sector  survey  OR  Estimate  of    Self-
Employed from labor force survey 
         =     Estimate of TOTAL INFORMAL WAGE WORK FORCE 
Many  of  the  estimates  in  the  recent  ILO  statistical  publication  called  Women  and  Men  in  the  Informal 
Economy: A Statistical Picture were based on the residual method above (ILO, 2002a). 
Labor Laws 
Since  labor  law  distributes  economic  rights  between  employers  and  employees,  it  is  an  important 
mediating force that can both support or combat exploitative conditions in the informal economy. It is thus 
an  important  aspect  of  any  effort  to  improve  conditions  for  informal  workers.  It  is  also  an  important 
dimension of any effort to rethink labor markets and industrial relations. 
Mainstream labor law is premised on a standard definition of the employer/employee relationship and the 
related assumption that all workers are either fully independent employers or fully dependent employees. 
By  its  very  definition,  therefore,  mainstream  labor  law  excludes  certain  kinds  of  informal  employment 
arrangements.  An  employee  is  assumed  to  be  a  fully  dependent  wageworker  for  a  clearly  identifiable 
employer. As with labor statistics, those who are excluded from the ambit of labor law so defined include:  
•  industrial  outworkers  or  homeworkers—who  work  for  either  a  formal  or  informal  firm  under  a 
subcontract  
•  other contract workers working through intermediaries 
•  various forms of disguised wageworkers 
•  workers with no fixed employer 
A further limitation to mainstream labor law is the assumption that the  employee  has a single job and a 
single employer. This assumption limits the capacity of labor law to deal with workers who move across 
employment statuses and sectors (within a given  day, week, month, or year); who are self-employed at 
one point in time and paid workers at another; or who have no fixed employer.  
Finally, labor law  has not  dealt  effectively  with the  whole issue of tripartite or multipartite employment 
relationships.  Whereas  the  employment  relationship  has  traditionally  been  thought  to  concern  two 
persons—the employee and the employer—there are more complex situations in which a third party or 
multiple  parties  are  involved.    In  such  situations,  the  employees  of  one  enterprise  (the  “provider” 
enterprise) provide services or labor to another enterprise (the “user” enterprise).   Such “triangular” or 
"multilateral” relationships  have always existed but seem to be on the rise (ILO, 2003). The best known 
examples are the use of  contractors and private  employment agencies.  Another  popular arrangement is 
franchising under which the franchiser normally exercises substantial control over the franchised business, 
including  its  employment  policy  and  finances.  Whereas  many  such  relationships  involve  a  civil  or 
commercial contract between the user and the provider enterprises, this is not always the case.  
For the  employee in such “triangular” or “multilateral” relationships, the questions become:  who is my 
employer?; what are my rights?; and who is responsible for ensuring them?  From a legal standpoint, it is 39 
 
 
not  always  clear  what  the  answers  to  these  questions  are  because  both  the  “provider”  and  the  “user” 
enterprise  assume  certain  functions  of  a  traditional  employer.    Providing  answers  to  these  questions  is 
further  complicated  if  the  so-called  user/provider  relationship  reflects  an  attempt  to  conceal  the  user’s 
identity as the real employer. For instance, in some such cases, the provider is actually an “intermediary” of 
the supposed user.  
Clearly,  there  are  shortcomings  in  labor  laws  relating  to  how  they  define  and  classify  employment 
relationships;  how  the  definitions/classifications  encoded  in  labor  laws  are  interpreted  and  applied;  and 
whether the laws, as interpreted, are enforced or complied with. Evidently, there are deliberate efforts by 
employers to disguise or mask the employment relationship. And, finally, there are objectively ambiguous 
employment relationships. 
In sum, real world employment relations present challenges for rethinking labor laws. Can and should the 
coverage of labor laws be widened to include all categories of workers, particularly the disguised workers 
and own-account workers in the informal economy? Also, can or should joint- or multiple-liability laws be 
introduced that push legal responsibilities for the wage and working conditions of homeworkers and others 
in the informal economy up the production chain to the subcontractor, contractor, manufacturing firm, and 
multinational  corporation?  Moreover,  can  this  be  done  simply  by  expanding  the  definition  of  term 
employee in the labor laws? While it may be necessary to extend the coverage of the labor laws beyond 
the traditional employment relationship, in order to provide adequate coverage to a diversity of new forms 
of work, basic  protection  can also  be  provided  by family law, social protection legislation or other laws, 
and social security schemes. Any efforts to protect the workers must then view a worker as a worker as 
well as a citizen. 
While it may be necessary to extend the  coverage of the labor laws beyond the traditional employment 
relationship in order to provide adequate coverage to a diversity of new forms of work, basic protection 
might  also  be  mandated  under  commercial  law.  Given  that  one-third  of  the  global  work  force  is  self-
employed and since a large share of informal wageworkers are hired under subcontracts of different kinds, 
it is important to rethink the application of commercial law as well as of labor law. 
Labor Markets  
The  dynamics of  employment relations in today’s world  pose some fundamental  challenges to standard 
models of how labor markets operate. In addition to the twin questions of Who is an employee? and Who is 
an employer?, as  discussed above, the informal economy challenges accepted  notions of  What is a  firm? 
There is a need to understand the  dynamics of family businesses and single  person operations.  There is 
also  a  need  to  look  at  suprafirm  networks  and  chains  in  which  both  local  and  global  lead  firms  often 
contract out their employment function making intermediaries responsible.  What about the whole notion 
of internal labor markets: does this notion apply only within firms, or also within value chains? Who is the 
equivalent of the employer in such chains? 40 
 
 
The notions of unemployment and underemployment are problematic, both as concepts and as measures 
of labor market insecurity, in contexts where a large share of total employment is either self-employment 
or  informal  wage  employment,  especially  in  the  absence  of  unemployment  insurance.  More  relevant 
concepts and measures are needed to capture and measure labor market insecurity in such contexts: e.g., 
what share of workers have paid sick leave, severance  notice, severance pay, employer  contributions to 
health insurance, or old age pensions.  
The notion of control and the associated allocation of risks/uncertainties needs to be rethought, particularly 
in  context  of  value  chain  production.  Employment  relations  in  value  chains  are  characterized  by 
decentralization of wage bargaining, individualization of wage determination, and downloading of risks and 
uncertainties: features associated with various processes of labor market flexibility (Standing, 1999). There 
is a need to rethink workers' rights and  benefits in light of such arrangements.  Commercial relations in 
value  chains  between  dominant  lead  firms  and  subordinate  supply  firms  might  also  be  characterized  as 
product market flexibility. The dominant firms retain flexibility in order to be able to alter production (the 
location and the frequency/size of work orders) in face of fluctuations in market demand or unanticipated 
technological  options.  Lead  firms  effectively  download  risks  and  uncertainty  through  subcontracting  to 
subordinate firms. Often the subordinate firms—especially very small firms—are simply not able to cope. 
In  such  contexts  there  is  a  need  to  rethink  the  rights  and  benefits  of  the  self-employed  under  either 
commercial or labor law.  
Furthermore,  the  informal  economy  presents  challenges  to  claims  about  the  impact  of  protective 
regulations on labor markets. In most cases, these  claims would apply only to regular wage labor: that is, 
to  interventions  to  guarantee  minimum  wages  (such  as  minimum  wage  regulation  and  collective 
bargaining)  for regular wageworkers. But what about situations in which a significant share of the work 
force  never  had  regular  wage  jobs?  Or  where  a  significant  share  of  the  work  force  was  always  self-
employed or always worked in informal wage jobs? What about situations where employers or companies 
deliberately  avoid  minimal  regulations  to  lower  labor  costs—both  wage  and  nonwage  costs?  In  such 
contexts, were wages ever really left to free markets? Also, why overlook policy interventions and business 
strategies to repress wage rates?  
V. INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT, POVERTY, AND SOCIAL PROTECTION 
Informal Employment and Poverty  
The renewed interest in the informal economy, broadly defined, has generated new research on, and an 
understanding of, the linkages between informality, poverty, and gender. 
There is a significant overlap between working in the informal economy and being poor. 41 
 
 
But  there  is  no  simple  relationship  between  working  in  the  informal  economy  and  being  poor.  The 
relationship  between  informal  work  and  low  income  appears  only  when  informal  work  is  analyzed  by 
economic subsectors and by status of employment (employer, own-account operator, wageworker). 
Perhaps the best way to summarize these linkages is to do so graphically, through the following pyramid or 
“iceberg."  This  “iceberg”  depicts  the  various  segments  of  the  informal  economy,  categorized  by 
employment  status:  at  the  tip  is  the  most  visible  or  best  known  segment,  the 
employers/microentrepreneurs; at the base is the least visible and least understood segment, the industrial 
homeworker. From available microsurveys and official statistics, two stylized global facts emerge about the 
links  between  informality,  poverty,  and  gender.  The  first  is  that  around  the  world,  men  tend  to  be 
overrepresented in the top segment while women tend to  be overrepresented in the  bottom segment; 
while the shares of men and women in the two intermediate segments tend to be more equal.   The 
second is that around the world, average income or earnings decline as one moves down from the tip to 
the  base of the iceberg. An additional fact, not reflected in the iceberg, is that women tend to earn less 
even within specific segments of the informal economy due to gender differences in wages and in earnings 
(due to gender differences in the type of activity and the volume of work/output).  The net result, as might 
be surmised, is that there is a significant gender gap in income within the informal economy with women 
earning less on average than men.  
 
 
 
In addition to low average wages, almost by definition, informal workers receive little (if any) employment-
based benefits and protection. Because the working poor in the informal economy often earn so little, few 
are able to save  enough to make  private contributions for their own social protection.  While there are 
informal mechanisms of social protection, the resources available for community-based systems of support 42 
 
 
depend on the relative wealth or poverty of the community concerned. For these reasons, it is important 
to rethink the relationship between informal employment, social protection, and poverty. 
“Speculating” on Poverty Reduction  
Box  D  presents  a  model  for  thinking  about  poverty  reduction  (PR)  as  the  net  outcome  for  any  given 
household, group, or  community of state-based social  protection and  distributive economic  policies  (S), 
private income and savings (P),  employment-based rights and  benefits (E), and  community-based goods 
and services (C).  This might be  called the SPEC model of poverty reduction.  According to the Oxford 
Dictionary, there are two meanings of the colloquial term “spec”: The first meaning is “in hope of success," 
as in “on spec."  The second meaning is “detailed  working  description," as in “specification."  This model 
presents a specification of how four driving forces, S, P, E, and C, interact to  determine whether or not 
the working poor remain poor. 
 
Box D The “SPEC” Model of Poverty Reduction 
Equation: PR = S + P + E + C (SPEC) 
Where, 
PR  =  poverty reduction 
S   =  distributive economic policies and state-based protection 
P   =  private income, savings, and assets 
E   =  employment opportunities and employment-based rights and benefits 
C   =  community-based goods and services 
For most informal workers, 
Value of S  =  low (but varies by country) 
Value of P  =  low 
Value of E  =  nil 
Value of C  =  low (but assumed to be high)   
The hope is that  by specifying more  clearly the interrelationship  between these  driving forces, and their 
impacts on the working poor, more  effective  poverty reduction strategies can be introduced.   What the 
SPEC model calls for is action on all fronts: state-based protection and redistributive economic policies (S); 
increased opportunities, rights, and voice for the working poor (S and E) so they'll be able to increase their 
private  income  and  savings  (P);  employer  contributions  to  social  protection  and  socially  responsible 
employment practices (E); and, if overall poverty is reduced (S, E, and P), enhanced ability of communities 
to provide security and reciprocity (C).  
There  is  simply  no  shortcut  to  poverty  reduction,  especially  for  the  working  poor  in  the  informal 
economy. Most  fundamentally,  no amount of redistribution through social policies will make up  for the 
maldistribution  generated  by  economic  policies,  processes,  and  relationships.  To  effectively  increase 
distribution, and thereby reduce poverty, issues of  distribution and equity  need to  be reintegrated into 43 
 
 
economic analyses,  policies, and  processes. The reconvergence of interest in the informal economy, and 
associated processes of labor market informalization, represents a “window of opportunity” to  promote 
such a reintegration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over  recent  decades,  conditions  for  working  people  in  developing  countries  have  undergone  a  major 
transformation. This has  been  due to the substantial rise in the  proportion of  people engaged in what is 
termed  “informal”  employment,  generating  a  broad  trend  toward  “informalization”  of  labor  market 
conditions in developing countries. Current estimates suggest that informal employment comprises about 
one-half  to  three-quarters  of  nonagricultural  employment  in  developing  countries  (ILO,  2002b). 
Moreover,  and  perhaps  even  more  significantly,  these  proportions  appear  to  be  rising  even  when 
economic  growth  is  proceeding  in  developing  countries,  contrary  to  what  a  previous  generation  of 
researchers and policymakers had anticipated (ILO, 2002a; Benería, 2001; Charmes, 2000; Castells and 
Portes, 1989). 
Informal forms of employment include, for example, agricultural day laborers, urban street vendors,  paid 
domestic  workers,  at-home  producers  of  clothing  or  other  manufactured  goods.  A  high  proportion  of 
informal workers are self-employed. In most countries, women are disproportionately employed in such 
informal jobs (ILO, 2002a).  For the most part, the income workers receive from informal employment in 
developing  countries  is  very  low,  often  consigning  these  workers  and  their  families  to  a  poverty-level 
standard of living, and sometimes to severe poverty (see, for example, ILO, 2002a; Unni, 2001). Informal 
jobs also, for the most part, fall outside the sphere of government’s supervision of labor markets.  That is, 
informal workers do not operate with the types of legal protections concerning working hours, health and 
safety, or with the types of mandated  benefits that would normally be a feature of “formal” employment 
opportunities in large, ongoing private sector firms or the public sector.  
The notion of a distinct informal economy—incorporating more casual, unregulated work arrangements 
and  low  wages—has  long  been  a  feature  of  the  literature  in  development  economics,  and  the  term 
“informal  sector”  itself  was  introduced  in  an  International  Labor  Organization  publication  in  1972  (ILO, 
1972). But what has become increasingly clear since the early 1970s is that informal forms of employment 
are not confined to any single distinct sector of the economy in the sense of a specific industry group or 
economic activity. Indeed, informal forms of employment span across traditional sectoral categories. Thus, 
as  the  most  recent  comprehensive  ILO  examination  of  the  question  explains,  “the  term  ‘informal 
economy’ has come to be widely used instead to encompass the expanding and increasingly diverse group 45 
 
 
of workers and enterprises in both rural and urban areas operating informally (2002a: 2).” Our discussion 
endorses  this  more  recent  understanding  of  the  phenomenon,  and  thus  refers  to  distinctions  between 
formal and informal forms of employment—and the process of informalization as reflecting the increased 
prevalence of informal jobs as a share of total employment—as opposed to clearly demarcated formal and 
informal sectors. 
Informal  work  arrangements  are  able  to  flourish  when  workers  have  few  alternative  economic 
opportunities;  that  is,  weak  fallback  positions  in  bargaining  situations  with  employers.  Considering  only 
formal employment situations, the wage at which workers are willing to accept jobs will  depend in large 
part on the other job opportunities available to them. As such, informalization will also place  downward 
pressure  on  wages  and  working  conditions  in  formal  jobs  as  well.  Thus,  the  process  of  informalization 
proceeds in part through a vicious cycle: a relatively high proportion of informal jobs makes it increasingly 
difficult for workers to bargain for decent wages, working conditions, and social protections, so that what 
had once been formal jobs become increasingly informalized over time. 
There are numerous  parallels  between the process of informalization and more general concerns over 
worsening  employment  conditions  and  the  growing  prevalence  of  labor  abuses.  For  example, 
antisweatshop activism in the countries of the global North in recent years reflects a heightened awareness 
over questions of international labor standards as they pertain to manufacturing and industrial production. 
Similarly, the question of child labor has assumed a greater urgency in international organizations such as 
the  ILO and UNICEF.  In many  cases, the process of informalization is  directly linked to  these  concerns 
over  human  rights  violations,  downward  pressures  on  poverty-level  wages,  or  a  general  erosion  of 
working  conditions.  Sweatshops  and  factories  using  child  labor  often  must  operate  informally  since 
government regulations frequently prohibit many of the most common abuses. 
This  paper  is  concerned  with  considering  ways  of  improving  labor  conditions  in  developing  countries 
through raising the proportion of decent jobs with  core social  protections; that is, through reversing the 
process  of  informalization.  As  we  will  discuss,  two  basic  policy  interventions  exist  for  improving  labor 
conditions in developing countries: increasing the rate of economic growth and improving the regulation of 
labor markets. We will argue that both types of measures are needed in developing countries to reverse 
the process of informalization. But what is the relative importance of growth versus the regulatory regime 
for improving labor conditions? A long-held view was that informal forms of employment would gradually 
disappear as a  consequence of a  higher level of GDP alone. However, as  noted above and as we will 
examine in some detail below, this relationship appears to have not held during the past 20 years in which 
time a commitment to neoliberalism has  dominated economic  policy throughout the  developing  world. 
This  means  that,  in  order  to  reverse  the  trend  toward  informalization  of  employment  in  developing 
countries,  we  must  give  increased  attention  to  improving  labor  standards  and  social  protections  as 
complements to—though certainly not substitutes for—policies that can accelerate economic growth.  
In the next section, we draw on the existing literature to establish more fully our own understanding of the 
terms “informal employment” and “informalization.” In section III, we then consider the existing literature 
on the relationship  between economic growth, labor regulations, and informalization.  We also  present 46 
 
 
two  competing  explanations  for  the  rise  of  informalization—what  we  term  overregulation-centered  and 
neoliberalism-centered  explanations.  In  section  IV,  we  then  present  our  empirical  findings  on  the 
relationship between economic growth and informalization. We draw here on the two major data sources 
available for this purpose—the data base developed by the International Labor Organization office in Lima, 
Peru,  and  recently  updated  estimates  developed  by  Jacques  Charmes  of  the  University  of  Versailles.
1 
Drawing  from  this  evidence,  in  section  V  we  then  present  a  two-pronged  approach  to  reversing  the 
process  of  informalization,  including  policies  to  both  raise  the  rate  of  economic  growth  and  explicitly 
improve working conditions. We conclude with a brief overview of our main empirical findings and policy 
perspectives. 
II. INFORMALIZATION AND LABOR STANDARDS 
Most scholars of the informal economy  define it as the set of remunerative  economic activities that exist 
outside of a formal system of state regulation. Often, activities which involve trade in illicit or criminal goods 
and services are treated separately and therefore are not included in many working definitions. Similarly, 
unpaid  reproductive  labor  performed  in  the  household  is  also  excluded.  We  work  with  these  basic 
definitional distinctions in our discussion here. 
In the early literature, the informal economy was often treated as a single,  undifferentiated amalgam of 
subsistence activities. However, recent research has challenged this image of informal activities. Substantial 
segmentation  and  a  wide  range  of  class  distinctions  are  evident  within  the  informal  economy,  as  is  a 
plurality of relationships with the formal economy, a situation which has forced a rethinking of approaches 
that assign a unified, invariable role to informal activities (Tokman, 1989; Gerry, 1987; Nattrass, 1987; 
Hart, 1973). Some types of informal employment, especially self-employment, provide remuneration well 
above what wageworkers at the low-end of the  pay scale receive in formal employment. For example, 
research  in  the  Dominican  Republic  revealed  that  mobile  vendors  of  fruits  and  vegetables,  called 
lechugueros, would not leave their current  occupation for an  entry-level formal job because they earn a 
monthly  income  substantially  above  the  legal  minimum  wage  (Murphy,  1990).  Clearly,  such  situations 
emerge  in  the  Dominican  Republic  and  elsewhere  not  primarily  because  informal  employment 
opportunities are highly desirable, but rather because the formal jobs are highly undesirable. Nevertheless, 
under most circumstances, formal employment would be preferable to informal work. Average incomes 
earned through informal activities fall significantly below average incomes earned in similar types of formal 
employment (ILO, 2002a; Unni, 2001). 
It is important to recognize that in most economies women account for the majority of informal workers. 
Therefore,  interventions  that  affect  the  level  of  employment,  working  conditions,  or  earnings  in  the 
informal economy will have a gender-specific impact. These effects are not limited to the  direct effect on 
informal workers. They also have implications for gender dynamics more broadly; for example, access to 
                                                 
1   Jacques Charmes generously provided us with the updated (2003) estimates used in this paper. For a discussion of earlier estimates using the same 
methodology, see Charmes (2000). 47 
 
 
money income  can determine women’s relative  bargaining power in the household  (Braunstein, 2002; 
Sen, 1990; Roldan, 1988; Joekes, 1987). Similarly, women frequently  face different constraints to labor 
force  participation  than  men.  These  constraints,  which  vary  between  informal  and  formal  sector 
opportunities, affect women’s access to different forms of paid employment (Balakrishnan, 2002).
2 
Early  conceptualizations  of  what  eventually  was  termed  the  informal  sector  viewed  it  consisting  of  a 
collection  of  subsistence  activities  for  individuals  excluded  from  formal  employment  in  labor  surplus 
economies  (see,  for  example,  Lewis,  1954).  The  informal  sector,  therefore,  was  defined  as  a  residual 
category, akin to unemployment. In early Marxian analysis, the informal sector represented a collection of 
precapitalist activities that provided both a supply of inexpensive wage goods and a reserve army of labor 
from which  capitalists  could  draw as the process of accumulation  proceeded (Gerry, 1987). Similarly, in 
many  neoclassical  models,  the  inclusion  of  the  informal  sector  allowed  the  assumption  of  full-
employment—those  without  formal  sector  jobs  remained  employed,  they  simply  worked  informally. 
Therefore, migrants moving into urban settings who  face rationing in the formal labor market would  be 
absorbed into the unregulated informal sector in which incomes or wages adjust to clear the market (see, 
for example, Hemmer and Mannel, 1989).  
However, viewing informal employment as simply a residual category fails to recognize that these activities 
often  constitute an important link in a more  extensive  chain of  commodity production and distribution. 
Therefore,  the  informal  economy’s  connection  to  the  formal  economy  goes  beyond  the  typical 
characterizations of a supplier of  cheap wage goods, a direct  competitor in overlapping product markets, 
or a repository for surplus labor. Moreover, many informal activities are not automatically open to anyone 
who cannot find formal employment. Social networks and a minimum endowment of economic resources 
can be critical to sustain even a subsistence level of activity in the informal economy (Pahl, 1985; Meagher, 
1995;  Hart,  1973).
3  Those  without  these  minimal  resources  are  unable  to  operate  in  the  informal 
economy.  This  means  that  open  unemployment—experienced  by  those  without  the  minimal  entry 
requirements for the informal economy—can coexist with an  expanding informal economy.
4  All of this 
suggests that the relationship between informalization and economic growth is likely to be contingent on a 
range of additional social forces. 
 
                                                 
2  Responsibility for unpaid labor, concern over the quality of  care, and patriarchal norms can  constitute constraints to women’s access to   formal 
employment. For example, Sathar and Kazi (1989) found that Pakistani households in which women worked in more formal factory  settings had a 
higher incidence of child mortality than households in which women were engaged in paid home-based production: an outcome that could influence 
formal labor force participation. 
3 It is not uncommon for individuals with formal sector jobs to  also participate in the informal sector. In some cases, the income earned by formal 
employment  allows participation in the  informal sector. This phenomenon  of individuals with income generating activities  in both the formal and 
informal sectors is common to developed economies (see Pahl, 1985) and developing economies (see Hart, 1973). 
4 The characterization of such unemployment often varies from situation to situation. In countries with some degree of social protection for people who 
can  not  find  work,  individuals  are  frequently  classified  as  openly  unemployed.  In  economies  without  such  social  protections,  the  unemployed, 
particularly those who are not supported by family and community networks, can be classified as being engaged in subsistent activities, in which case 
they would be grouped as part of the informal economy.   48 
 
 
III. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INFORMALIZATION 
Does the relative size of informal employment expand or contract with economic growth? Addressing this 
question  is  central  to  an  understanding  of  the  connections  between  informalization  and  economic 
development.  Early work in the  history of industrialization and the emergence of the factory system saw 
the  informal  sector  as  a  vestige  from  a  previous  era  (Dangler,  2000).  That  is,  capitalist  economic 
development  meant  the  “formalization”  of  economic  activity  in  which  formal  wage  labor  relationships 
replaced alternative, often less formal, arrangements (e.g., petty commodity  production, the  putting out 
system, or home-based work).  
More recently, the assumption of a  universal negative relationship  between  economic development and 
informalization has been  challenged on a number of fronts. Informal work has been shown to have been 
widespread during
 nineteenth century industrialization in the U.S. and Europe, particularly among women 
and children (Stansell, 1983; John, 1986). While the factory system did expand rapidly, informal activities 
could thrive in the context of ongoing capitalist development and were often directly linked to the growth 
of the  formal industrial economy. Although the relative size of the informal economy certainly expanded 
and  contracted over time, informal activities  did not represent simply a transitional stage on  the path to 
higher levels of economic development. 
In our contemporary era, the growth experience of many developing  economies  has demonstrated that 
sizeable  informal  economies  can  coexist  and  sustain  themselves  side-by-side  with  the  expansion  of  the 
formal economy (Castells and Portes, 1989; Benería, 1989). But these informal activities are not simply 
lingering vestiges  of “backwardness.”  In fact, even the expansion of foreign  direct investment and global 
production  networks has supported informal production  processes. This is because, in many situations, 
multinational firms are seeking low-cost and “flexible” labor relations in their  production-level operations. 
They achieve this through subcontracting many of their production-level activities to firms operating in the 
informal economy. At the same time, workers employed directly by multinationals are much more likely to 
enjoy a more formal working environment. 
Cross-country  comparisons  generally  reveal  a  negative  correlation  between  measured  rates  of 
informalization and the level of  per capita GDP (see, for  example,  Ihrig and Moe, 2000; Loayza, 1996). 
That is, informal employment as a fraction of total employment is smaller for more advanced  industrial 
economies than for developing countries. However, a broad cross-country comparison using levels of per 
capita output tells us little about the relationship between informalization and economic development over 
time  within  a  particular  country.  More  specifically,  such  correlations  reveal  nothing  about  how  informal 
employment  might  respond  to  changes  in  elements  of  the  economic  and  institutional  environment—
including shifts in the rate at which the formal economy is expanding. 
Recent research has begun to document a worldwide resurgence of informalization beginning in the 1970s 
and  continuing on into the 1980s and 1990s (ILO, 2002a; Benería, 2001; Charmes, 2000; Castells and 49 
 
 
Portes,  1989).  The  growth  of  informal  work  was  initially  attributed  to  the  declining  growth  trend  of 
capitalism associated with the end of the “golden age” in the 1970s. But this explanation does not account 
for the sustained presence, indeed the expansion, of the informal economy in many countries, even during 
times  of  economic  growth,  when  the  formal  sector  was  itself  also  expanding.  This  leaves  us  with  a 
perplexing  puzzle:  What  could  explain  the  reemergence  of  informalization  in  late
  twentieth  century 
capitalist development? 
Explanations of the growth of informal employment often focus on the institutional context within which 
informalization  takes  place.  In  particular,  most  current  theories  of  informalization  incorporate  a  role  for 
government  regulations  and  formal  institutional  structures  as  they  impose  costs  and  constraints  on 
economic  actors—particularly  firms  and  the  self-employed.  The  growth  of  the  informal  economy, 
therefore, is the result of the higher costs business firms face through operating formally. 
However,  the  two  dominant  theoretical  approaches  to  informalization  adopt  distinct  interpretations  of 
how these regulatory differences affect informal activities (Weiss, 1987).
5 On one side, informalization is 
seen as a reaction to the excessive distortions caused by government interference in a market economy—
what we will term an overregulation-centered theory of informalization. On the other side, informalization 
is  seen  as  the  outcome  of  normal  profit-seeking  activity  by  capitalist  firms,  in  which  more  flexible 
employment  relationships  produce  cost  reductions  while  they  also  undermine  labor  protections,  social 
security measures, and labor’s  bargaining power.   But what makes these  normal competitive  pressures 
produce a  higher  proportion of informal jobs is the neoliberal policy environment, which  has meant both 
more market-oriented policies and slower economic growth. Slower economic growth, in turn, reduces 
economic  opportunities  and  lessens  the  pressure  to  offer  decent  jobs,  regardless  of  whether  the 
regulatory environment requires  decent work standards.  The alternative approach thus sees the rise of 
informalization as resulting broadly from the corresponding rise of neoliberalism, and we can thus term this 
approach a neoliberalism-centered theory of informalization. 
IIIa. OVERREGULATION AND INFORMALIZATION 
This view is most commonly associated with the work of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto (1989; 
2000).  According  to  this  approach,  informalization  reflects  pent-up  entrepreneurship  that  cannot  find 
expression  in  an  improperly  regulated  economy  due  to  the  high  transaction  costs  of  operating  in  the 
formal economy. Since the informal economy is, by definition, free of these constraints, the expansion of 
these activities is indicative of the distortional  effects of government intervention.  Those working in this 
tradition emphasize the need to develop less costly and intrusive regulatory regimes dominated by political 
groupings seeking special advantages through their government connections. 
                                                 
5   In contrast to the two dominant analyses, Weiss  (1987) herself argues, within the context of the Italian economy, that the viability of  informal 
economic activities depends on the impact of state bureaucracies coupled with aspects of the social and institutional structure, including the degree of 
labor market segmentation, the prevalence of social networks, and the availability of capital among a large number of relatively small firms.  50 
 
 
Within  this  approach,  some  researchers  have  examined  in  depth  the  connections  between  transaction 
costs, the legal structure, and informalization (ILO, 2002a). They emphasize that regulation of economic 
activities  has  dual  characteristics:  (1)  it  imposes  costs  on  individual  firms  and  workers,  but  (2)  provides 
public  goods  and  corrects  for  market  imperfections.  This  distinction  has  been  used  to  explain  why 
informalization is common among small-scale firms or within labor-intensive activities. For small firms and 
the self-employed, the transaction costs of formal regulation are likely to exceed the  benefits these firms 
derive from the legal system. However, as firms grow in size or become more capital-intensive, the need 
to  participate  in  social  institutions  that  protect  property,  enforce  contracts,  provide  access  to  low-cost 
credit, or pool risk expands. When the benefits of formality outweigh the costs, rates of informalization can 
be expected to decline (Levenson and Maloney, 1998; Loayza, 1996; Sarte, 2000; Ihrig and Moe, 2001; 
de Soto, 2000; 1989). 
The  overregulation-centered  approach  does  generate  useful  insights  into  how  a  prevailing  regulatory 
environment  can influence  pressures toward informalization. But this  perspective overlooks some major 
facts about the historical conditions in which informalization has been rising. The most directly salient is that 
government  regulations  in  developing  countries—in  the  areas  of  labor  markets  specifically  but  more 
generally  as  well—have  been  declining  over  the  past  two  decades  as  informalization  has  risen.  The 
incentives to circumvent the government’s regulatory structure should therefore also be diminishing. The 
overregulation-centered  approach  only  sharpens  the  basic  question:  Why  should  informalization  be 
increasing when, on the basis of this perspective, the incentives for doing so are declining? 
IIIb. NEOLIBERALISM AND INFORMALIZATION 
The  rise  in  informalization  has  coincided  not  only  with  the  decline  in  government  regulations  of  labor 
markets  but  also  with  a  broader  transformation  of  the  economic  policy  environment  in  developing 
countries. Economic strategies moved away from the developmental state policies that were dominant in 
the 1950s and 1960s, in favor of what has been termed neoliberalism (Pollin, 2003; 1998). Neoliberalism, 
as its name conveys, is a variant of classical liberalism, the political philosophy that embraces the virtues of 
free  market  capitalism  and  the  corresponding  minimal  role  for  government  intervention.  In  developing 
countries,  neoliberalism  has  involved  privatization,  sharp  cuts  in  government  spending  and  barriers  to 
international trade, and a decline in the regulation of financial markets as well as labor markets. 
The  neoliberal  policy  approach  can  explain  rising  informalization  through  several  mutually  reinforcing 
channels. 
1.  Decline  in  public  employment.  Probably  the  most  stable  source  of  formal  employment—in  many 
advanced economies as well as most developing economies—has been the public sector. Because a major 
premise  of  neoliberalism  is  a  reduction  in  size  of  the  public  sector,  this  correspondingly  means  that 
government  workers  lose  their  jobs  when  such  policies  are  implemented.  The  proportion  of  formally 
employed workers will necessarily fall each time governments cut their work force unless, of course, the 51 
 
 
private  economy  is  increasing  its  supply  of  formal  jobs  at  the  same  rate  that  the  government  sector  is 
contracting. But in fact, as we continue to enumerate, neoliberal policies also encourage a decline in formal 
employment in the private sector as well.  
2. Promotion of trade  and  foreign direct investment.  The  promotion of success in  export markets and the 
ability to attract foreign direct investment is a fundamental element of a neoliberal strategy. Maintaining low 
labor  costs  is  generally  regarded  as  a  central  feature—and  often  the  single  dominant  element—for 
successfully promoting exports and multinational investment. In the name of encouraging trade and foreign 
investment, the  explicit goal of government  policy  under this policy regime will be to limit the ability of 
workers  to  capture  the  benefits  of  productivity  improvements  as  increases  in  employment  income,  to 
reduce social and legal protections, and to weaken workers’ bargaining power—that is, to induce workers 
to accept jobs with lower pay. The competitive pressures resulting from increasing an economy’s degree 
of international integration will further strengthen these tendencies. Furthermore, pressures to increase the 
productivity  of  currently  employed  workers  will  reduce  the  number  of  employment  opportunities 
generated by a given level of output growth, thereby limiting the growth of formal employment relative to 
informal employment.  
3. Macroeconomic policy strategy.  Neoliberal macroeconomic policies have  entailed the abandonment of 
fiscal and monetary interventions  by governments that attempt to explicitly promote the expansion of job 
opportunities—what  used  to  be  termed  “full-employment”  macroeconomic  policies.  Instead,  the 
dominant  priority  for  macroeconomic  policy  has  become  control  over  inflation,  and  indeed,  an  explicit 
policy aimed at “inflation targeting” has become the focus in many developing countries.  The logic of the 
neoliberal  policy  program  argues  that  controlling  inflation  is  the  basis  for  attaining  a  stable 
macroenvironment  in  which  market  forces  will  produce  efficient  allocations  of  economic  resources.  As 
such,  where  governments  in  developing  countries  had  formerly  used  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  to 
increase overall demand and thereby to expand job opportunities, at present governments deploy these 
same fiscal and monetary tools to restrain overall demand—that is, to  deliberately impose slow growth 
and, as considered necessary, austerity—in order to prevent the build up of inflationary pressures (Epstein, 
2002). 
At  the  same  time,  this  neoliberal  approach  to  macroeconomic  management  does  include  a  policy 
mechanism for addressing problems of unemployment. This is the  deregulation of labor markets, i.e., an 
increase in the so-called “flexibility”  of labor markets. As a general  proposition,  when labor markets are 
more  flexible,  workers  have  to  accept  jobs  at  lower  wages  and  under  worse  conditions.  The 
unemployment  problem is thereby “solved” through workers  being willing to accept less  desirable jobs. 
Here is where the parallel phenomena of informalization and neoliberalism  become joined.   From the 
standpoint of neoliberal economic  policy, informalization is  not an  unfortunate side effect of other policy 
initiatives.  It is rather a conscious  policy outcome in itself.  In other words, informalization and increased 
labor market flexibility are simply two ways of observing precisely the same phenomenon. 
4. Increased pressures for engaging in paid employment. When the supply of decent formal jobs declines and 
economic growth slows, households need more people bringing home income to prevent a decline in the 52 
 
 
household’s living standard.  Women constitute a majority of workers in the informal economy. In many 
instances, this form of  employment  for women has  brought an improvement in  overall household living 
standards as well as gains in women’s independence. It is true, moreover, that the informal economy can, 
at times, offer women greater flexibility in terms of both hours of work and the ability to remain at home 
while working. At the same time, women increasingly seek paid employment in the informal economy as a 
means of preventing the downward ratcheting of living standards for households that are already living in 
poverty.  
5. The vicious cycle. The factors listed above, especially as they operate in  combination, strengthen the 
bargaining  position  of  businesses,  enabling  them  to  hire,  or  contract  with,  workers  at  lower  wages, 
benefits,  and  protections  virtually  across  the  board—that  is,  to  increasingly  transform  what  had  been 
formal  work  environments  into  informal  ones.  Of  course,  such  factors  will  not  always  be  dominant, 
especially  when  businesses  need  to  hire  various  types  of  skilled  workers.    But  for  most  types  of 
employment in  developing economies, the rise of informalization will  feed upon itself as the  bargaining 
power of workers weakens. 
How  do  these  general  perspectives  play  out  with  respect  to  the  available  evidence  on  the  rise  of 
informalization? This is the question to which we next turn. 
IV.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE RISE OF INFORMALIZATION  
Reliable  data  on  informal  employment  will  necessarily  be  limited.  The  very  nature  of  the  informal 
economy—representing those economic activities that lie outside of the formal regulatory sphere and that 
remain  largely  unrecorded—implies  that  even  the  most  rigorous  official  techniques  for  measuring 
economic activity are able to only broadly approximate the extent of the informal economy. Estimates for 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  do make allowances for informal activities. But the modeling techniques 
utilized for generating these  estimates  differ  from country to  country (Bloem and  Shrestha, 2000), thus 
diminishing the reliability of any cross-country comparisons. Time series data on informal employment are 
also of limited availability.  This makes it more  difficult to  explore the crucial  connections we  have  drawn 
between informalization and economic growth.  Given all of these factors, the evidence we present here, 
using the available data, should be taken as only provisional. 
We rely on two data sources—time series figures for Latin America in the 1990s generated by the ILO’s 
regional office in Lima, Peru and the research of Jacques Charmes on a broader set of countries, though 
without a year-to-year time-series component. These two sources also  employ different techniques for 
measuring  informal  employment.  And  while  both  sources  have  clear  limitations,  fortunately  their 
weaknesses are distinct, such that, in  combination, we obtain a variegated understanding of the overall 
patterns of informalization. We  first present results using the ILO data, then  consider the evidence from 
Charmes.  53 
 
 
IVa. ILO DATA FOR LATIN AMERICA 
The first data source we draw on comes from the ILO’s regional office in Lima. These figures present 
statistics on informal employment in Latin America over the 1990s. However, these figures work with 
the earlier concept of a distinct informal sector as opposed to a process of informalization applying, at 
least potentially, across sectors.  According to this data set, those employed in the informal sector 
includes all own-account workers, excluding professionals and paid domestic workers, and persons 
working  in  establishments  with  less  than  five  or  ten  employees,  depending  on  the  survey 
methodology used. This data has clear limitations, as the ILO itself now recognizes. Most importantly, 
they do not incorporate in their measure forms of informal employment that occur outside of small-scale 
enterprises.  Home-based  laborers,  for  example,  are  excluded  from  their  definition  The  ILO  has  more 
recently begun to operate with a more expansive approach, reflecting the shift in analytic thinking from the 
notion  that  informal  jobs  are  confined  within  certain  sectors  of  the  economy  to  the  process  of 
informalization  occurring  more  broadly  throughout  a  range  of  sectors  (ILO,  2002b).
  6  Despite  this 
weakness  in  this  data  set,  the  absence  of  alternative  better  sources  means  that  it  is  still  an  important 
resource. So we turn to these figures to obtain a first approximation of changes that have occurred over 
the 1990s in the extent of informal employment. 
Figure 1 summarizes information on changes in informal employment as a percent of total nonagricultural 
employment—which we will term as a country’s “informalization rate”—and the rate of growth of GDP 
for ten Latin American countries from 1990 to 1997.  
The trends presented in Figure 1 contradict the idea of a purely countercyclical explanation for the rise of 
informalization, in which informal employment grows during economic slumps and shrinks during periods 
of growth.  While sharp economic  downturns are generally associated with an expansion of the  informal 
sector (for example, Costa Rica 1996, Honduras 1994, Mexico 1995, Venezuela 1994), this is a relatively 
isolated  phenomenon.  More  generally,  there  has  been  a  trend  in  almost  all  these  countries  towards 
greater  informalization—even  during  periods  of  relatively  rapid  economic  growth.  In  some  cases, 
informalization appears to rise and fall with changes in the growth rate (e.g., Costa Rica). However, even 
in these cases, informalization increases on average over periods of expansion. 
 
                                                 
6   Nevertheless, these measurements are consistent with the approach outlined in 1993 at the 15th International Conference of Labor Statisticians 
(ICLS).  The 1993 ICLS definition of the informal economy adopted an enterprise approach (defining informal activities in terms of production units) as 
opposed to a labor approach (defining informal status on the basis of individual characteristics). This decision was based on a need to measure the 
economic contribution of the informal sector, not simply the level of employment. However, an enterprise approach would not capture all aspects of 
informalization. Therefore, workers would be classified into informal and formal sectors by their status in employment as identified in the International 
Classification of Status in Employment (ICSE). A combination of data on status in employment and enterprise type can be used to map the informal 
economy and the level of employment. 54 
 
 
IVb. THE CHARMES DATA SET 
Jacques  Charmes has  developed a highly innovative but still straightforward methodology for measuring 
trends in the size of the informal economy (see, for example, 
 
 
Fig. 1: Economic Growth and Informalization in Latin America, 1990-97. 55 
 
 
 
Sources: ILO Key Indicators of Labor Markets 2001/2 CD-ROM and World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001CD-ROM 
ILO, 2002b; Charmes, 2000). Charmes measures the number of workers in the informal economy as the 
residual that emerges from two data sets in various countries: (1) labor  force surveys and census, which 
are intended to measure all people engaged in income-generating forms of employment, and (2) business 
registration data, in which businesses are supposed to list all employees in their enterprises. 
According to  Charmes’s definition, therefore, people who are informally employed are those  who  earn 
income from jobs, but they are not employed by a business that officially registers their enterprise with the 
government.  This  definition  may,  in  fact,  underestimate  the  extent  of  informalization,  because  some 
businesses that provide  business registration information to governments may operate  with substandard 
work environments for employees. Moreover, for Charmes to effectively utilize the methodology he has 
developed obviously depends, first, on countries having undertaken both pairs of surveys at least twice in 
recent years. In  Table 1 below, we report the  basic evidence Charmes provides from the countries that 
meet these criteria and he could therefore incorporate into his survey. 56 
 
 
Table 1: Informal Employment in Developing Countries 
a) Countries with Increasing Rates of Informalization 
Country  Years of Data Samples  Informalization 
rate during sample 
years (percentages) 
Aver. annual change 
in informalization 
rate (percent) 
Countries with five years or less as observation period 
1) Argentina  1990–95  47.5 → 53.3  +1.2 
2) Bolivia  1990–95  56.9 → 63.6  +1.3 
3) Brazil  1990–95  52.0 → 57.6  +1.1 
4) Chad  1993–96  72.4 → 90.0  +24.3 
5) Colombia  1990–96  55.2 → 55.5  +0.06 
6) Ecuador  1990–95  51.2 → 53.5  +0.9 
7) Indonesia  1996–98  75.6 → 77.7  +1.4 
8) Mexico  1990–95  55.5 → 59.4  +1.4 
9) Paraguay  1990–95  61.4 → 65.5  +1.3 
10) Venezuela  1990–95  38.8 → 46.9  +4.2 
Countries with six–ten years as observation period 
11) Burkina Faso  1985–94  70.0 → 77.0  +1.1 
12) Guinea  1984–91  64.4 → 71.9  +1.3 
13) Kenya  1990–99  61.4 → 71.6  +1.8 
14) Mauritania  1980–88  69.4 → 80.0  +1.9 
Countries with more than ten years as observation period 
15) Algeria  1977–97  21.8 → 42.7  +4.8 
16) India  1989–00  76.2 → 83.4  +0.9 
17) Mali  1976–96  63.1 → 90.4  +2.2 
18) Pakistan  1975–90  39.0 → 64.6  +3.1 
19) Tunisia  1975–89  38.3 → 39.3  +0.2 
b) Countries with Decreasing Rates of Informalization 
Country  Years of Data Samples  Informalization 
rate during sample 
years (percentages) 
Aver. annual change 
in informa-lization 
rate (percent) 
Countries with six - ten years as observation period 
20) Philippines  1990–97  70.5 → 67.6  –0.6 
21) Thailand  1990–98  54.5 → 50.6    –0.9 
22) Egypt  1976–86  65.3 → 58.7  –1.0 57 
 
 
Countries with more than ten years as observation period 
23) Morocco  1982–95  56.9 → 44.8  -1.6 
As we see, there are 23 developing  countries in the survey.  Among the countries, there are significant 
differences  in  the  length  of  time  period  between  available  data  points.    With  10  of  the  countries,  the 
longest time period over which we  have data is five years or less.  But we do also have a relatively large 
sample of countries for which we have a longer period to examine—six countries for which our time span 
between data points is six to ten years and seven countries with 10 or more years between  data points.  
This range in Charmes’s data set does therefore, in our view, provide sufficient variation, such that we may 
obtain some reliable generalizations from studying it. 
We have organized the data into two  broad groups—those for which informalization has increased over 
time, and those where it  has  decreased.   Within these  broad  categories, we then group the countries 
according to the length of time between the most distant and recent data points from the surveys utilized 
by Charmes. 
IVc. PATTERNS OF INFORMALIZATION 
Informalization is growing over time in 19 of the 23 countries in the sample.   This is  particularly true in 
countries where the observed time  period is five years or  less.   In these  cases, all 10  of the countries 
experienced rising rates of informalization.  In the countries where our data points are between six to ten 
years apart, we have the most balanced situation, in which  four of the countries experienced increasing 
rates of informalization while three  countries experienced declining rates.  Moreover, the three countries 
experiencing declining rates of informalization all have large populations, while three of the four countries 
experiencing increasing rates of informalization are small.  Finally, in cases where our time period between 
data points is more than ten years, we have five countries with increasing rates of informalization, including 
India and Pakistan with large populations, while only one country, Morocco, experienced a decline in the 
proportion of informal employment. 
Overall,  we  can  conclude  (1)  informal  employment  is  clearly  the  predominant  form  of  employment  in 
developing  countries,  and  (2)  it  is  generally  rising  as  a  share  of  overall  employment.    These  broad 
conclusions cut across regions and countries of various sizes. 
IVd. INFORMALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
As we have  discussed above, the rise of neoliberal policies in developing countries has generally led to a 
decline in average rates of economic growth.  We can see this from the aggregated  evidence in  Table 2, 
which  compares average growth rates in two  distinct  eras in  developing  countries—what we may term 
the  “developmental  state”  era  of  roughly  1960–1980  and  the  “neoliberal  era”  from  1981–1999  (and 
continuing to the present).  The figures are presented both in terms of overall GDP data and measuring 58 
 
 
growth  on  a  per  capita  basis.      The  table  also  includes  China  separately  since  it  had  not  pursued  a 
neoliberal policy path by the end of the 1990s.
7  Otherwise, these figures are calculated by adding up the 
overall GDP figures for all low- and middle-income countries.  This way, the patterns for large countries, 
like  India,  Brazil,  or  Egypt  will  carry  more  weight  in  the  calculations  than  those  for  small  countries  like 
Bolivia, Uganda, or Singapore. 
 
Table 2: Two Eras of Economic Growth in Developing Countries  
(figures are average annual growth rates, in percentages) 
  Developmental State Era 
1961-80 
Neoliberal Era 
1981-99 
Low and Middle Income Countries, 
excluding China 
   
Overall growth rate  5.5  2.6 
Per capita growth rate  3.2  0.7 
China     
Overall growth rate  4.5  9.8 
Per capita growth rate  2.5  8.4 
Source:  World Development Indicators 2001 CD-ROM, World Bank 
The overall growth pattern is unambiguous: there has been a sharp decline in growth in the neoliberal era 
relative to the developmental state period, from 5.5 percent to 2.6 percent,  measured on average annual 
basis.    Measured on a per  capita  basis, the downward growth trend is  even more dramatic, with the 
growth rate  in  the  neoliberal  era at only 0.7  percent.   This means that the average increase in overall 
income in the poor and middle- income countries  just  barely stayed ahead of  population growth, after 
having increased 3.2 percent faster than population growth during the developmental state period.
8 
What has been the relationship between growth and informalization?  As an initial consideration of this, we 
show in Fig 2 the relationship between average annual GDP growth per capita and informalization for the 
20 countries in the sample for which adequate  data exists for both informalization and  per capita growth 
over a sufficiently long time period.
9   Of  course, again, these  calculations represent  different periods of 
time within the various  countries.  From the  data plot, we can see that there is an inverse relationship 
between informalization and economic growth.  For the most part, informalization does fall as economic 
growth rises.   The relationship is not statistically significant,  however.   Still, the overall results are  being 
                                                 
7   It is also true that when we include China within the group of low- and middle-income  countries, the overall growth patterns we observe are 
modified but do not change dramatically.    Thus, per capita GDP growth for low- and middle-income countries, including China, is 3.2 for 1961-80 
and 1.4 for 1981-99. 
8   Growth patterns do vary significantly by region, with various parts of Asia, including India, performing much better than Latin America or Africa prior to 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98.  The table also shows the unique experience of China, where the average growth rate more than doubled during 
the 1981-98 period relative to 1961-80.  The general pattern, nevertheless, is clear-cut and it will form a major starting point to our analysis. 
9   The 3 countries excluded from the original 23 are Guinea, because of inadequate per capita growth data, and Chad and Indonesia, because of an 
overly short time series. 59 
 
 
strongly  influenced  by  the  experience  in  Argentina.    From  1990–1995,  Argentina  experienced  a  rapid 
increase in informalization.  But it was also experiencing the most rapid period of economic growth of the 
countries in the sample.  This growth was due to a massive influx of foreign capital into Argentina after the 
country adopted a new  extreme  neoliberal monetary policy whose principal feature was establishing the 
country’s  currency as convertible to the U.S.  dollar on a one-for-one  basis.  The  positive effects of the 
Argentine  monetary  convertibility  plan  were  short-lived.    By  1997,  foreign  capital  began  to  abandon 
Argentina,  and  by  2000,  the  new  monetary  policy  engendered  a  complete  financial  collapse  and 
depression  in  the  country.    But  for  our  purposes,  Argentina  during  1990-95  clearly  stands  as  a  major 
outlier in our sample. 
 
Fig. 2: Average rates of percapita GDP growth and annual changes in informalization 
Source: Updated informalization rates estimated by Jacques Charmes, 2003; World Development Indicators 2001CD-ROM, WorldBank 
If  we  eliminate  Argentina  from  the  sample  as  an  outlier,  and  reestimate  the  regression  line  with  the 
remaining 19 countries, this yields a negative slope estimate (-0.27) with a much higher degree of statistical 
significance  (p-value = 0.0397).  The coefficient value of -0.27 suggests that an increase in the rate of per 
capita  economic  growth  from  the  average  of  0.7  percent  (associated  with  the  neoliberal  era)  to  2.6 
percent (associated with the developmental era)—an increase of 1.9 percent—would reduce the annual 
rate of change in the informalization rate  by 0.51 percent  (see  Table 2).  Taking our median values for 
highs and lows among the countries in the sample, a sustained average increase in economic growth of 1.9 
percent would mean that instead of informal employment rising from an average of 55 to 65 percent of 
the work force, over the  course of a  decade, informal  employment would rise  to slightly less than 60 
percent.  Figure 3 shows  changes in informalization and average growth rates  with Argentina removed 
from the sample and the line in the figure portraying the regression slope of –0.27. 60 
 
 
 
Fig. 3:  Average  rates  ofper  capita  GDP  growth  and  annual  changes  in  informalization  (Argentina 
excluded). 
Source: Updated informalization rates estimated by Jacques Charmes, 2003; World Development Indicators 2001 CD-ROM, World Bank 
Overall, we  can  conclude  provisionally from this  brief examination that increasing  economic growth will 
reduce the rate at which informalization is increasing in developing countries, though it cannot, on its own, 
create an environment in which informalization actually declines.   
Both supply and  demand  factors within the labor market are likely contributing to the diminished rate of 
increase in informalization.  On the demand side, high rates of  economic growth means that  businesses 
are expanding their operations.   To attract  workers, they need to offer  workers better wages,  benefits, 
and social protections, i.e., to formalize jobs, even if the regulatory environment does not require them to 
do so.  On the supply side, better opportunities available to workers  for formal jobs makes them  less 
willing to accept informal employment.  Also, when some household members earn higher incomes from 
formal  jobs,  the  pressures  diminish  for  others  in  the  household  to  also  earn  income  by  entering  the 
informal labor market. 
Considering our examinations based on both the ILO and Charmes's data sets, we are able to form some 
useful,  if  still  necessarily  provisional,  generalizations  about  the  relationship  between  informalization  and 
economic growth.  First, the evidence reported here does not support a purely countercyclical model of 
informal employment, in which the informal economy  consists of the residual reserve army of workers 
that are not employed in formal activities  during periodic slumps. Second, although informal employment 
does  not exhibit a clear  countercyclical pattern, sharp downturns still  emerge as  being closely associated 
with a rise in informal employment. Third, increasing rates of informalization are consistent with positive 
average rates of economic growth. And finally, the weight of evidence does suggest that, after controlling 61 
 
 
for  short-term  cyclical  factors,  high  rates  of  economic  growth  are  associated  with  either  declines  in 
informalization or slower rates at which informalization is increasing.  
V. IMPROVING LABOR STANDARDS IN THE CONTEXT OF INFORMALIZATION 
If we recognize informalization as a process operating throughout an economy rather than as confined to a 
limited  set  of  sectors,  this  implies  that  improving  labor  standards  will  entail  the  reversal  of  this  broad 
process of informalization.  The evidence we have reviewed strongly supports the view that reversing the 
process of informalization will require a substantial shift away from the priorities defined  by neoliberalism; 
in particular, the priorities of targeting inflation over economic growth and the reliance on “flexible labor 
markets,”  as  the  basic  instrument  of  addressing  employment  problems.        What  we  need  are:  (1)  a 
macroeconomic  policy  framework  that  targets  employment  growth  while  still  recognizing  the  need  for 
inflation control, and (2) a set of labor standards that can operate to improve working conditions broadly—
that is to say, which improves conditions for those in both formal and informal employment situations. 
Examining these matters in detail is beyond the scope of this  paper.  But it will be useful to consider the 
matter  of  how  to  effectively  introduce  labor  standards  that  will  have  the  broadest  possible  effects.  
Introducing  standards  that  will  affect  informal  as  well  as  formal  employment  situations  is  of  crucial 
importance,  as  the  overregulation-centered  analysis  of  informalization  itself  makes  clear.    If  regulations 
apply only to forms of  employment that are already more  formalized, this will simply raise the relative 
costs  of  operating  formally  and  increase  the  incentives  for  firms  to  circumvent  regulations—that  is,  to 
informalize their work environment.   
The  first  step  toward  designing  effective  interventions  to  improve  conditions  in  informal  forms  of 
employment is  to recognize the  heterogeneity of informal activities.  For  example,  consider the  case in 
which informal workers are able to capture the majority of the value-added they produce. These activities 
could  include  the  self-employed  producing  directly  for  the  domestic  market  or  community-based 
enterprises  in  which  the  value-added  is  not  appropriated.  Under  such  conditions,  interventions  that 
increase labor productivity in the informal employment will raise living standards, since workers will be able 
to capture the gains of the  productivity improvements.  Targeted  policies to improve  productivity  could 
include  access  to  credit  and  capital,  educational  programs  for  skill  enhancement,  and  infrastructure 
development (e.g., electrification). 
However,  if  the  informal  economy  is  primarily  composed  of  wage  and  pseudowage  (e.g.,  piecework) 
employment  relationships  with  ties  to  more  extensive  commodity  chains,  a  focus  on  productivity 
improvements as a strategy to raise living standards will be far less successful. When the highly competitive 
conditions at the level of  production (or, in some cases, at the  point of sale to consumers) are linked to 
more oligopolistic structures elsewhere in the commodity chain, a situation is created in which the benefits 
of productivity improvements will be captured in the form of higher rents for firms further up the chain or 
in  lower  prices  for  consumers.  This  unequal  distribution  of  the  gains  from  productive  activities  occurs 
because  informal  producers  have  little  bargaining  power  to  protect  their  incomes  relative  to  other 62 
 
 
segments of the  commodity chain (Carr, Chen, and  Tate, 2000). Firms and intermediaries that source 
from  informal  producers,  including  home-based  workers,  can  demand  lower  prices  in  the  face  of 
productivity improvements or simply take their business elsewhere.  
This dynamic is  particularly pronounced in informal activities that  produce low-wage consumer  exports 
with explicit links to global commodity chains. In many respects, the problem of extending labor standards 
to  informal  jobs  is  quite  similar  to  the  more  general  challenge  of  improving  working  conditions  and 
eliminating  sweatshops  internationally.  The  structure  of  global  commodity  chains  is  such  that  highly 
competitive conditions exist at the point of  production  while intermediaries,  brand-name multinationals, 
and  retailers  in  affluent  markets  enjoy  significant  market  power  (Gereffi,  1994;  Carr,  Chen,  and  Tate, 
2000). Under these conditions, informal workers are not just competing with others in the same regional 
labor markets. They are competing with workers in informal workplaces around the globe.  
In such a situation, the only logical strategy is to  extend appropriate social  protections to these  informal 
forms of employment.   However, national governments often lack sufficient capacity to  enforce  existing 
regulations in a globally integrated environment. Moreover, incentives to enforce standards are weakened 
when informal activities are seen  to be  creating jobs and  economic opportunities, while labor standards 
are perceived as creating obstacles to employment growth. 
This means that additional nongovernmental measures should be nurtured to bolster governmental efforts 
at providing a decent regulatory environment.  For example, in  the case of export-oriented  production, 
one alternative would be for the  producers to implement so-called  “codes of conduct” governing a set 
core of  labor standards (e.g., human rights,  health and safety, and a  decent minimum wage).  In global 
commodity  chains,  the  reputation  of  retailers  and  brand-name  corporations  becomes  a  real  asset.  
Correspondingly,  having  one’s  corporate  image  tarnished  through  associations  with  exploitative  labor 
practices will likely  bring more  harm to profitability than the higher labor costs firms would pay to, say, 
clean up sweatshop conditions under which workers produce their goods.  Workers and their supporters 
can leverage this vulnerability  facing  brand-name  producers to create a system of incentives that  would 
encourage multinationals to raise retail prices and share some of their rents in order to improve working 
conditions and pay living wages (Pollin, Burns, and Heintz, 2004). Firms that guarantee that their suppliers, 
affiliates, and subcontractors meet the provisions of a  core  code of  conduct would  enjoy a competitive 
advantage in terms of consumer demand and goodwill. 
Improving  conditions  and  enforcing  standards  in  the  informal  economy  will  naturally  reduce  the 
competitive advantage informal activities enjoy relative to equivalent formal activities. Therefore, we would 
expect  to  see  a  decline  in  the  rate  of  informalization  if  such  targeted  interventions  were  successfully 
implemented. Returning to the informalization-growth curve of Fig 3, we could represent these targeted 
interventions  as  a  downward  shift  in  the  line.  That  is,  we  would  expect  changes  in  the  rate  of 
informalization to be lower at a given rate of growth.   
Figure 4 presents a stylized illustration of the combined  effect of the two-pronged strategy to improve 
average labor standards in the  context of informalization  by illustrating the relationships  between growth 63 
 
 
and informalization  hypothesized in this paper.  The  heavy line, g1, represents a given rate of  per  capita 
growth.  With  no  interventions,  informalization  increases  at  a  rate  of  i0.  The  impact  of  the  shift  to  an 
employment-targeted  macroeconomic  policy  regime  is  represented  by  a  steeper  slope  for  the 
informalization  growth  curve,  since  employment  targeting  would  mean  that  the  rate  of  change  of 
informalization would fall more rapidly as growth expands. This intervention alone would reduce the rate 
by  which  informalization  increases  to  i1.  The  effect  of  targeted  interventions  aimed  at  creating  and 
enforcing better conditions for informal activities is represented by a downward shift in the line—that is, for 
a given growth rate, the rate by which informalization changes would be reduced. This would reduce the 
rate of change in informalization to i2—a negative number. Moreover, if the growth rate increases with the 
adoption  of  an  alternative  set  of  macroeconomic  policies,  then  the  reduction  in  informalization  will  be 
greater still. 
One final complication to note here is that to the extent this approach might succeed in reducing the rate 
of informalization, it could actually  curtail economic opportunities  for some workers,  primarily women, 
who face constraints that prohibit their holding a formal job.  Labor force participation of these workers is 
often constrained to the informal economy because of more flexible work hours and the ability to work 
from their  homes,  even when incomes might  fall  below what is available  from formal jobs.   For these 
workers, the loss of informal employment could produce a reduction of autonomy and bargaining power 
relative to those in their  households who  do hold jobs and earn income. However, it is never the  case 
that formal jobs—i.e., those most likely to offer decent wages, benefits, and protections—must necessarily 
be  inflexible  in  terms  of  hours  of  work  and  possibilities  for  working  out  of  the  home.    The  aim  of  an 
effective  regulatory  regime  would  clearly  be  to  extend  social  protections  along  the  dimensions  of 
employment income, benefits, and working conditions while maintaining in some situations the advantages 
of informal employment in terms of hours, flexibility, and location of work. 
 
Fig. 4: Combining increased growth and improved labor standards to lower the informalization rate. 64 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
It  is  impossible  to  realistically  discuss  policies  for  improving  living  standards  for  the  most  vulnerable 
segments of the work force without understanding the process, proceeding throughout the less developed 
world, of informalization.   In many countries, informal  employment accounts for a majority  of all labor 
force  activity.  Therefore,  the  growth  of  informalization  directly  compromises  average  employment 
conditions,  since,  on  average,  the  quality  of  informal  employment  falls  well  below  that  of  formal 
employment.  A deterioration  in the  expected quality of  economic opportunities will also affect working 
conditions outside of the informal economy by reducing workers’  fallback  positions and  heightening their 
degree of vulnerability. 
The  spread  of  informalization  throughout  the  developing  world  raises  basic  questions  about  the 
relationship  between  informalization  and  economic  development.    The  costs  associated  with  regulating 
market activity do, of course, encourage efforts to circumvent regulations.  All else equal, this factor should 
encourage more informal work environments.  But as we have argued, all else  has not been equal over 
the  past generation in  developing countries.  In fact, the ascendancy of  neoliberal economic policies has 
brought a decline in government regulations, even while informalization has been rising.  This suggests that 
an explanation for the rise of informalization centered on the effects of neoliberal policies provides a more 
robust explanation than one centered on the high costs of regulation.   
Our empirical analysis of informalization and economic growth suggest several interesting, yet provisional, 
relationships.  The most important is that economic growth does encourage a decline in the rate at which 
informal  forms  of  employment  expand.  But  economic  growth  does  not,  by  itself,  produce  an  absolute 
decline in the proportion of people working in informal jobs. Based on these findings, we argue for a two-
pronged  alternative  to  the  neoliberal  policy  regime.    The  first  prong  is  macroeconomic  policy:    to 
substitute  employment-targeted macroeconomic  policies for the neoliberal priorities of inflation targeting.  
This policy shift should raise average rates of economic growth and encourage job expansion.  The second 
prong is a set of labor market and related interventions that can affect working conditions in what are now 
both formal and informal employment situations.  The purpose of these interventions will enable the gains 
from faster economic growth to be shared broadly, including among those  who constitute the growing 
majority of people in developing countries earning their living in informal forms of employment. 
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Labor exclusion in Latin America: 
Old and new tendencies 
1 
Juan Pablo Pérez Sainz 
FLACSO 
 
The  labor  market  may  be  analyzed  in  terms  of  the  dialectic  between  the  dynamics  of  integration  and 
exclusion. Securing  employment implies social integration  with a  number  of  benefits, such as access to 
income for the maintenance and reproduction of the work force, recognition as productive member of the 
community, and others. On the other hand, the labor market has to deal with the surplus labor that the 
accumulation process cannot absorb. This surplus is not fully reflected by recorded open  unemployment. 
An  analysis  of  the  labor  market  focusing  on  this  dialectic  has  the  advantage  of  identifying  those  historic 
trends that incorporate the dynamics of both integration and exclusion, and how they interrelate. Such an 
analysis avoids the reification of obsolete analytic  categories of little  contemporary heuristic value. This is 
particularly  important  in  the  Latin  American  context,  where  the  process  of  nationally  focused 
modernization, based on industrial accumulation through import substitution, has reached its historic limits, 
and has been replaced by the new model oriented towards globalization. 
A characteristic of the  Latin  American  case, and of the  period of modernization that concluded with the 
debt  crisis of the 1980s, was that the dialectic  between integration and  exclusion was  centered around 
formal  employment  as  synonymous  of  modern  employment.    This  dialectic  structured  labor  dynamics 
both in terms of migration flows from rural areas and smaller cities to metropolitan zones (territoriality, par 
excellence, of national modernity), as well as occupational mobility towards the formal sector. Faced with 
the difficulties to reproduce itself, the unemployed  developed self-employment within the urban informal 
sector.  The crisis of the 1980s revealed the historic limits of this  process of modernization.  The ensuing 
structural  adjustment  programs  functioned  as  authentic  primitive  accumulation  for  the  new  economic 
model, this time oriented towards the global market. For labor dynamics, this meant a shift in emphasis 
from integration to exclusion, illustrated  by the consistent rise in levels of  unemployment alongside the 
economic  recovery  during  the  1990s.  The  contraction  of  the  public  sector  and  the  gravitation  toward 
precarious forms of wage labor led to a crisis of formal employment.  
At the same time, unsustainable  forms of self-employment  persist in urban centers and  even more so in 
rural areas. All these phenomena support the hypothesis that tendencies of exclusion  currently dominate 
the labor market.
2 Without idealizing the past, it is useful to bear in mind that the previous modernization 
                                                 
1   A slightly different version of this article was published under the title “Exclusión Laboral en América Latina: Viejas y Nuevas Tendencias” Sociología del 
Trabajo, (47) winter 2002-2003. 
2   This  does  not  imply  that  dynamics  of  integration  have  disappeared  altogether,  rather  they  are  being  transformed.  The  generation  of  formal 
employment by way of public policy is no longer the principal form of labor integration. On the contrary, the capacity of the laborers themselves in   68 
 
 
project  sought  the  construction  of  the  nation,  in  which  the  state  established  itself  as  the  central  actor. 
Although the results leave much to be desired, the project did strive for integration. Under contemporary 
globalization  the  labor  market  only  offers  opportunities  with  restricted  access.  Having  discarded  the 
objective  of  social  integration,  exclusion  has  become  an  integral  element  of  the  new  modernization 
project.  
This  paper proposes the hypothesis that exclusionary tendencies dominate the labor market by analyzing 
five  phenomena.  The  first  deals  with  the  decline  in  public  sector  employment  in  Latin  America,  the 
foremost expression of formal employment and the mechanism of integration  par excellence in the past. 
The  second  concerns  the  tendency  towards  increasingly  precarious  wage  relations,  affecting  not  only 
existing relations but also those emerging with the  new mode of accumulation. The third  considers how 
increasing open  unemployment is taking on a structural nature, and how this affects social  disintegration. 
International migration is the fourth manifestation of labor exclusion that, in addition to territorial expulsion, 
implies  a  globalization  of  the  labor  force.  Finally,  the  fifth  phenomenon  is  the  persistence  of  self-
employment at subsistence level and its generation of an economy of poverty: the poor producing for the 
poor. Each of these tendencies will be analyzed separately. The conclusion reflects on the validity of the 
hypothesis, and identifies which exclusionary tendencies  have carried over from the past and which have 
emerged  with  the  current  process  of  globalization,  in  order  to  determine  how  the  new  mode  of 
accumulation redefines surplus labor. 
 
I. THE DECLINE OF PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 
However one  chooses to  define the phenomenon of formality, public sector employment has  been its 
most developed expression and it serves as its core. As such, it has increasingly lost its importance, thereby 
threatening the central role of  formal employment in the labor market. The  deceleration of the growth 
rate  of  public  sector  employment  since  1983  announced  the  first  effects  of  the  structural  adjustment 
programs (PREALC, 1991).  In particular, the institutional reforms  encouraged a decline in  public sector 
employment, accentuated in the following decade. On a regional average, the proportion of public sector 
employment as a total of nonagricultural EAP (Economically Active Population) declined from 15.5 percent 
in 1990 to 13.0 percent in 2000 (OIT, 2001: table 6A). In the case of Latin America three distinct patterns 
occur.
3 
                                                                                                                                                             
generating employment, or in modifying their labor conditions, is currently emerging as the more viable form of labor integration.  This raises the issue 
of employability as the capacity of labor to manage risks induced by globalization. In this respect see Pérez Sáinz  (2003). 
3   This table shows the evolution of public sector employment within the nonagricultural occupational structure between 1990 and 2000. The rows 
provide the difference between the two situations in 1990: one in which the percentage of public employment is higher than the regional average 
(15.5%) defined as "high" and the other equal or below the average qualified as "low." The columns show the dynamics of the '90s by distinguishing the 
cases where either relative increase or decrease occurred. The resulting matrix reflects the possibility of four different patterns: high and dynamic; high 
and not dynamic;  low and dynamic; low and not dynamic. In brackets the relative size of the public sector in 2000 is given for each country. The 
following two tables are constructed according to the same criteria of combining the initial situation with the evolution during the relevant time period. 69 
 
 
Table 1: Latin America: Evolution of Public Sector Employment (1990-2000) 
1990  Increased  Decreased 
High    Argentina   (12.7%) 
(>15.5%)    Costa Rica  (16.4%) 
    Ecuador      (17.6%) 
    Mexico       (14.5%) 
    Panama       (21.8%) 
    Uruguay      (17.1%) 
    Venezuela   (16.1%) 
Low    Colombia     (7.0%) 
(≤15.5%)  Brazil  (14.2%)  Honduras     (10.1%) 
  Chile   (10.8%)  Peru             (7.0%) 
Source: OIT (2001; Table 6-A) 
Table  1  shows  how  the  majority  of  the  countries  in  the  region  can  be  divided  into  two  groups,  both 
indicating a relative contraction of public sector employment. More striking is the group in which at the 
start of the  decade  public sector employment was  high in comparison  with the regional average.  In this 
group,  both  Costa  Rica  and  Venezuela  show  tremendous  declines  ranging  from  22  percent  and  22.3 
percent in 1990 to 16.4 percent and 16.1 percent ten years later. The most notorious case, however, is 
Panama showing a decline from 32 percent to 21.8 percent during the same decade. Brazil and  Chile 
appear  as  atypical  cases.  Concerning  the  latter,  one  should  bear  in  mind  that  Chile  pioneered  the 
introduction of neoliberal policies in the region, under one of the most authoritarian regimes Latin America 
has known.  The contraction of the  public sector took place  before the 1990s and recovered somewhat 
with the processes of democratization during this decade. 
The  different  patterns result from  conditions  particular to  each country. In this respect, Marshall  (1996) 
identifies three factors that shaped the first wave of public sector reforms. The  first concerns the internal 
composition  of  public  sector  employment  with  regard  to  differences  between  central  and  local 
governments. The reforms intended a strengthening of the local government with a  possible increase of 
employment at this level. Secondly, with the recent climate of democratization  characterizing the region, 
electoral clientalism creating public jobs neutralized fiscal discipline to a certain extent. Finally, the resistance 
of the public employees themselves, and their unions, is the third factor to take into consideration.
3 
The decline in public employment substantially impacts the central role formal employment enjoyed during 
the previous model. The reconfiguration of the public sector, therefore, has both material, such as the loss 
of occupational opportunities, as well as symbolic impacts. Not only does labor lose its core expression of 
                                                 
3   The emphasis on the next (second) wave of reforms (fiscal, electoral, and judicial) will not have a direct impact on public employment even though 
the elimination of occupational stability can affect the level of employment in this sector (Fleury, 1999).  70 
 
 
formal  employment;  the  public  servant  is  stigmatized  as  non-productive  and  viewed  as  being  linked  to 
corruption. 
 
II. THE INCREASING PRECARIOUSNESS OF WAGE RELATIONS 
The  crisis  of  formal  employment  not  only  manifests  itself  in  the  receding  importance  of  public 
employment,  but  also  in  the  increasing  precariousness  of  wage  relations.
4  This  is  a  phenomenon  that 
affects both the existing wage relations and those emerging from the new mode of accumulation.  
The term "precariousness"  has been applied in Latin  America primarily for  empirical  purposes and with 
little analytic precision. For a more conceptual understanding Mora Salas (2000) identifies three dimensions 
of this phenomenon: labor deregulation; productive restructuring and labor flexibility; and the  weakening 
of the unionized worker. Each dimension, and its regional manifestations, will be discussed separately.  
Deregulating  labor  relations  lies  at  the  center  of  the  new  economic  model  inspired  by  the  so-called 
Washington  Consensus  (Bulmer-Thomas,  1997;  Lozano,  1998).  Evaluating  the  process  of  deregulation 
until  1995,  the  World  Bank,  the  institution  that  most  forcefully  argues  for  deregulation,  arrived  at  the 
principal conclusion that labor "rigidities" still prevail in the majority of Latin American countries,
5 with two 
notable exceptions:  Chile and Peru.  Chile  established a  flexible labor market  by the early 1990s, while 
Peru implemented the most radical deregulation of the region during the 1990s. At the other extreme, we 
find Mexico and Nicaragua (Burki and Perry, 1997). The  ILO however, offers a different  perspective on 
the achievements of labor reforms in the region (OIT, 2000). Generally the legal changes have affected 
individual relations, especially in the new modalities of contracting and dismissal. In Peru and Argentina the 
reforms  have  been  drastic,  while  in  Brazil,  Colombia,  and  Panama  they've  accomplished  far  less.  Even 
countries  with a strong  protectionist tradition such as Venezuela and the  Dominican  Republic were  not 
able to escape the wave of reform. In fact, in 11 of the 18 countries studied,
6 representing 70 percent of 
wage employment in the region, labor reforms characterized by deregulation were implemented, thereby 
questioning the assertion that the effort to do so has been insufficient. 
The process of deregulation  can  be observed  by examining the evolution of social security coverage for 
wage labor. 
 
                                                 
4   The formal/informal distinction is understood from a regulationist perspective (Portes, 1995; Itzigsohn, 2000); that is, in terms of type of employment 
rather than production. 
5   It would be interesting if this institution incorporated, alongside its indicators, the percentages of labor inspectors out of the total  labor force; this 
would provide an indication of the extent to which labor legislation can be implemented. 
6   Chile is an exception. The democratic government in 1994 improved the existing legislation introduced by the preceding dictatorial regime, allowing 
for the unionization of public and part-time employees, protecting union leaders from layoff threats, in addition to other labor advantages (Cortázar, 
1997).   71 
 
 
Table 2: Latin America: Evolution of Social Security Coverage for Wage Labor  (1990-2000) 
1990  Increased  Decreased 
High 
(>66.6%) 
Uruguay (97.0%)  Brazil (67.0%) 
Chile (62.8%) 
Costa Rica (74.9%) 
Venezuela (69.9%) 
Low 
(≤66.6%) 
Colombia (66.1%) 
Mexico (66.4%) 
Argentina (55.8%) 
Ecuador (39.2%) 
Peru (50.0%) 
Source: OIT (2001; Table 8-A) 
 
At a regional level, the coverage of social security decreased from 66.6 percent in 1990 to 64.2 percent in 
2000 (OIT, 2001: Table 8-A).
7 Table 2 shows distinct patterns. The two most recurring are those with a 
decrease relative to the size of the wage earning population with coverage. Brazil and Chile show a drop 
from 74.0 percent and 79.9 percent to 67.0 percent and 62.8 percent respectively.  The most dramatic 
case is Ecuador where contribution fell from 55.1 percent in 1990 to 39.2 percent in 2000.  Ecuador in 
this respect  could  be seen as representative of other countries  experiencing late modernization such as 
Bolivia or the majority of the Central American countries. At the same time, we see contrary tendencies in 
the case of Colombia, Mexico, and especially Uruguay that currently shows an almost universal coverage.
8  
The second  dimension  concerns productive restructuring and the flexibility of work. De la Garza (2000) 
evaluated  the  forms  of  flexibility  in  Latin  America  and  reached  the  following  conclusions.  First,  the 
phenomenon of flexibility occurs  primarily in the more  developed  countries of the region. Second, as a 
rupture  in,  or  weakening  of,  corporate  pacts  was  taking  place,  the  firms  tended  to  unilaterally  impose 
more  flexibility.  Third,  even  though  both  functional  and  numerical  flexibility  are  most  common,  wage 
flexibility is gaining ground. Fourth, the state encourages flexibilization, either by introducing the necessary 
legislation  (Argentina  or  Colombia)  or  by  encouraging  neocorporate  pacts  (Mexico).  From  another 
perspective,  taking  the  most  advanced  experiences  of  organizational  innovation  in  the  region  as  a 
reference, Carrillo (1995) clarifies that these innovations are not introduced comprehensively but are the 
result of initiatives taken  by individual firms. Moreover, labor conditions are imposed  unilaterally without 
much negotiation, and with little involvement of the work force.  Nevertheless, Mora Salas (2000) argues 
that not all reorganization processes lead to precarious labor conditions.  
                                                 
7   In relation to the total EAP the decrease has been 29.6% in 1990 to 26.9% in 2000 (OIT, 2000: table 8-A). 
8   With respect to the reforms of the social security system, Tamez and Moreno (2000) point out that it is difficult to speak of regional patterns as each 
national case produces its own peculiarities. Nevertheless, they emphasize one crucial commonality across the region: the prevalence of mixed models 
implying  a redefinition  of the public and the private, where the former finances services and the second provides them. Specifically, for pension 
schemes Mesa-Lago (1999) demonstrates the existence of an inverse relation between the extent of democratization and privatization.  72 
 
 
The third  dimension refers to the debilitation of unionized labor, one of the foremost victims of the crisis 
of the 1980s (Roxborough, 1989). The weakening of labor has primarily been the result of the change in 
the  mode  of  accumulation.  With  the  insertion  into  the  global  market,  wage  costs  became  of  central 
importance and could  no longer  be transferred to the consumers as transpired under the  protectionist 
framework of import substitution industrialization (Murillo, 2001).
9 This  change manifests itself as a new 
articulation  between the  political and  economical, challenging the  previous model in which  union actions 
focused on the state rather than the firm (Zapata, 1993). But two factors condition how these debilitating 
tendencies  generate  different  national  outcomes.  On  the  one  hand,  the  processes  of  democratization 
coincided with the shift towards the new model of accumulation, affecting trade union action since union 
members played an important role in the processes throughout the region (Koonings et al, 1995). In this 
respect, Zapata (1993)
10 signals the  unfolding of a disjunction between the identity of the citizen and the 
class-consciousness of the worker, disconnecting political citizenship (democratization) from solidarity. On 
the other hand, union actors were not passive subjects in the transformation of the mode of accumulation. 
Their historic alliances with populist parties that converted to neoliberalism allowed them to influence the 
process to a certain extent. In this respect, Murillo (2000) suggests a possible interpretation by taking three 
factors into account (party loyalty, internal leadership  competition, and  competition  between unions) to 
generate four types of union action (cooperation, subordination, opposition, and resistance).
11 Obviously, 
underpinning  these  elements  are  also  the  changes  occurring  in  the  occupational  structure,  which  have 
eroded the traditional base of union recruitment (Zapata, 1993; Koonings et al, 1995; Murillo, 2001). The 
crisis of formal employment, analyzed earlier, explains this erosion. 
During the first half of the 1990s, the level of unionization in Latin America, expressed as an average over 
21 countries in the region, was 21.2 percent.
12 During the following five years, this fell to 19 percent. A 
significant increase occurred in Ecuador and Nicaragua, probably related to the migration of non-unionized 
labor  to  other  countries.  Chile,  Venezuela,  and  the  Central  American  countries  reflect  substantial 
decreases (OIT, 2002: Table 3b). The lowest levels occur in the Central American countries, reflecting a 
long history of repression curbing union activity (Pérez Sáinz, 1999). 
Latin  American  unionism  has  been  undergoing  two  trends,  namely,  its  weakness  at  the  political  level 
expressed in the  crisis of so-called populist corporate syndicalism, and its more influential presence at the 
firm level.  However, concerning the latter, there is yet very little documented experience (Lucena, 2000). 
Due  to  productive  restructuring,  two  diverging  strategies  are  emerging  within  the  union  movement  in 
Latin  America  (de  la  Garza,  2000).  One  is  the  neocorporative  in  which  the  union  establishes  itself  as 
“business partner” of the firm encouraging productivity. The other seeks autonomy, recapturing its political 
                                                 
9   This argument demands a more nuanced analysis. On the one hand, we need to know to what extent to which wage costs are reflected in the final 
price and, on the other, and more importantly, the extent to which northern consumers will accept higher prices in return for better labor conditions. 
We are grateful to Bob Pollin and James Heintz for pointing out this nuance in interpretation.  
10  The characterization of Latin Americans as sociopolitical—and not just social—actors (Touraine, 1988), demands rethinking given the contemporary 
context. 
11  See the analysis by this author on Argentina with Menem, Mexico with Salinas, and Venezuela with Carlos Andrés Pérez (Murillo, 2000). 
12  This reflects the percentage of unionized EAP. Included in this group are Jamaica, Surinam, Trinidad, and Tobago.  73 
 
 
orientation  but  establishing  new  alliances,  political  (new  parties)  as  well  as  social  (informal  workers), 
alliances. 
The  phenomenon  of  increasing  precariousness  also  affects  the  new,  emerging  wage  relations.  This 
becomes  apparent  when  evaluating  labor  behavior  in  terms  of  the  wage  gap  under  the  new  mode  of 
accumulation. Export-oriented activities, through which the new processes of proletarianization are taking 
place,  have  become  one  of  the  fundamental  components  of  the  new  mode  of  accumulation.  The 
promotion  of  these  activities  constitutes  a  key  element  in  the  rationale  of  those  who  defend  structural 
adjustment and their assumed benefits for the labor market. From this perspective, it is argued that export 
orientation will generate more employment since tradable activities are characterized by labor intensive 
technology. In terms of employment, the assumption is that this will  benefit the relatively abundant less-
skilled labor force and that this will generate its corresponding redistributive effects.  
To examine the extent to which this assumption is realistic, we can analyze the evolution of wages during 
the  1990s.  The  evidence  shows  three  phenomena.  The  first  involves  the  rise  in  wages  for  the  well-
educated labor force, exacerbating the wage gap between different types of labor. Only a few countries 
have  been  able  to  constrain  this  gap  through  active  wage  policies.  The  second  phenomenon  draws 
attention to wage differentials between large and small firms, which were reduced during the 1980s crisis 
but increased again during the 1990s. The reason for this lies in the reorganization strategies applied  by 
large firms, which led to a reduction of the work force and an increase in their productivity levels, thus 
allowing them to pay higher wages to the personnel they retained. Thirdly, we have observed a reduction 
in the gender wage gap due to the incorporation of more educated  women—relative to men—in the 
labor force, and to the growth of the service sector  heavily oriented towards  female  labor.  In  fact, this 
reduction in wage difference between men and women is the only substantial labor achievement that has 
resulted from structural adjustment policies in the region (Weller, 2000).
13 
Both the  decline in  public employment and the  precariousness of wage relations are  expressions of the 
crisis  of  formal  employment.  In  other  words,  the  change  in  the  mode  of  accumulation  has  clear  labor 
manifestations, commonly interpreted as growing informalization. However, this interpretation ignores the 
change itself that is taking place in the mode of accumulation. From a regulationist perspective, the concept 
of informality is relational; that is, informality exists as long as formality exists and, in this relation, the latter 
is the defining force. Consequently, if informal employment is in crisis then the  distinction formal/informal 
blurs.
14 More adequate would  be to speak of  deformalization—not synonymous  with informalization— 
indicating  that  the  previous  form  of  modernized  labor  is  disappearing  as  a  new  mode  of  accumulation 
emerges with a different labor logic. 
                                                 
13  This  has  served  to  alleviate  the  loss  of  impact  that  the  public  sector  had  in  the  past  on  public  employment  with  respect  to  gender  equity 
(Psacharapoulos and Tzannatos, 1992): a role that is strongly reduced due to loss of importance of this type of employment, as explained in the first 
section.  
14  For  distinct  reasons,  we  also  question  the  alternative  conceptualization  of  informality  used  in  Latin  America  by  PREALC/ILO.  With  the  new 
technological revolution based on microtechnology, one can no longer uphold the Fordist association between size of firm and technology. Therefore, 
we argue that the concept of informality is losing heuristic capacity (Pérez Sáinz, 1998). 74 
 
 
III. THE STRUCTURAL NATURE OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
Open  unemployment, even if  not the  principal mechanism of labor adjustment during the 1980s crisis, 
constitutes one of the more notorious characteristics of current labor dynamics. During the 1990s, high-
unemployment  levels persisted alongside economic recovery.  The region  had an  urban unemployment 
average of 8.3 percent in 2000, identical to that in 1985 when the region found itself in the middle of the 
debt  crisis  (OIT,  2001:  Table  1-A).  Table  3  allows  us  to  see  the  evolving  patterns  of  urban  open 
unemployment. 
 
Table 3: Latin America: Evolution of Urban Open Unemployment (1990-2000) 
1990  Increased  Decreased 
High 
(>5.7%) 
Argentina (15.1%) 
Bolivia (7.4%) 
Chile (9.2%) 
Colombia (17.2%) 
Ecuador (14.1%) 
Nicaragua (9.8%) 
Uruguay (13.6%) 
Venezuela (13.9%) 
El Salvador (6.6%) 
Honduras (5.2%) 
Panama (15.3%) 
Peru (7.0%) 
Dominican Rep. (13.9%) 
Low 
(≤5.7%) 
Brazil (7.1%) 
Paraguay (10.0%) 
Costa Rica (5.3%) 
Mexico (2.2%) 
Source: OIT (2001; Table 1-A) 
The majority of the countries in the table correspond to a pattern of an initial high level of unemployment 
that increased over time. This phenomenon shows that with this new model, unemployment has taken on 
a structural, instead of a  cyclical, nature. A number of  countries, showing an initial  high level,  decreased 
their rate of unemployment over the decade. Several of these have significant transnational migration flows 
as in the case of Ecuador and the Dominican Republic. This suggests that the phenomenon of migration is 
complementary to the adjustment of the labor market in these  countries.  The table also indicates that at 
the  end  of  the  decade,  eight  countries  found  themselves  in  an  alarming  situation  with  two-digit 
unemployment  levels:  Argentina  (15.1  percent),  Colombia  (17.2  percent),  Ecuador  (13.6  percent), 
Panama (15.3 percent), Paraguay 10.0 percent), the Dominican  Republic (13.9 percent), Uruguay (13.6 
percent), and Venezuela (13.9 percent). As in the past, women and especially the young were among the 
most affected labor groups. With respect to the female labor force, the high levels of unemployment are of 75 
 
 
particular relevance as the region experienced a feminization of the labor force  (Tardanico and Menjívar 
Larín, 1997; Stallings and Peres, 2000).
15 
The significance of open unemployment provides four key issues of concern beyond the process of labor 
market  adjustments.  The  first  involves  the  nature  of  the  new  economic  model  and  its  incapacity  to 
generate sufficient employment (Tokman, 1998). In fact, unemployment became the worst labor outcome 
of the  new accumulation model (Stallings and Peres, 2000).  In this respect, two phenomena stand out. 
On  the  one  hand,  with  the  implementation  of  labor  deregulation,  it  can  hardly  be  argued  that 
unemployment  is  an  outcome  of  rigid  labor  markets.  On  the  other,  the  current  generation  of  self-
employment has reached its limits and can no longer play the same role in absorbing surplus labor in the 
way  informal  employment  did  in  the  previous  decades.  More  troubling  is  that  the  opening  of  national 
markets  to  international  competition,  promulgated  by  structural  adjustment  programs,  has  rendered  a 
series  of  self-employment  activities  nonviable.    The  informal  sector  is  no  longer  able  to  perform  its 
previous  anticyclical  function  in  absorbing  the  effects  of  labor  market  adjustments.  In  fact,  certain  self-
employment activities progressively have acquired a more procyclical behavior (Cerrutti, 2000). 
The  second  issue  concerns  the  erosion  of  social  capital,  and  in  particular,  of  the  networks  needed  to 
access labor markets. This reminds us that the resources mobilized by low-income households to confront 
poverty, are not immune to significant social changes and will transform from "resources for the poor" to 
the "poverty of resources" (González de la Rocha, 1999).  
The third issue is related  to the  question of identity.  Labor identities are  central in a society where the 
social  recognition  of  work  is  expressed  in  the  wage  earned.  Those  becoming  unemployed  lose  their 
source  of  identity.  And,  for  the  newcomers  to  the  labor  market,  unemployment  implies  a  lack  of 
recognition. Consequently, processes of identity formation suffer both mutilation and fragility. The result is 
anomic behavior, a recurring phenomenon among the young, the group most effected by unemployment; 
involved in a culture of consumerism, they are often seduced by the escape routes of violence. Identity is 
mediated through  consumption, secured through the transgression of  norms and recourse to violence. 
Individualism is imposed on the collective, competitiveness over cooperation, and a shying away from the 
public sphere to retreat into the private (García Delgado, 1998).  
Finally,  unemployment  is  closely  associated  with  poverty  and  vulnerability.  Its  positive  correlation  with 
pauperization has  been  demonstrated in numerous studies.  This  has taken on a  particularly worrisome 
direction  for the young, as the  dynamics of intragenerational poverty transmission endure and  neutralize 
historic tendencies of poverty reduction (Tokman, 1998). Less studied is the nexus of unemployment and 
vulnerability. Less socially polarized societies  have little use  for the  dichotomous perspective of rich and 
poor but instead demand an analytical and empirical incorporation of a third category: vulnerability. In this 
                                                 
15  Of these eight countries, only  in the Argentinean case the level  of male unemployment exceeds female unemployment. In the case of Ecuador, 
gender disaggregation of unemployment was unavailable. 76 
 
 
type of situation, unemployment implies a potential risk for integrated but vulnerable households to fall into 
pauperization.
16 
IV. THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF THE LABOR FORCE 
If  there  is  an  inherent  tendency  of  labor  exclusion  to  global  modernization,  it  is  clearly  related  to 
transnational migration. But this relation carries a paradox: it globalizes the labor force even as transnational 
migration  involves  an  extreme  form  of  exclusion  that  brings  with  it  territorial  uprooting.  In  terms  of 
employment, two issues merit attention. 
The first concerns the emigration of the work force as an adjustment mechanism of the labor market in 
certain  Latin  American  countries.  Now  that  the  limits  of  self-employment  have  become  evident, 
emigration takes on the function of absorbing surplus labor, previously the  domain of the informal sector. 
Emigration  is  the  current  escape  valve  of  labor  markets  characterized  by  limited  employment 
opportunities.  Furthermore,  remittances  from  abroad  influence  the  levels  of  labor  force  participation, 
unemployment, remuneration, and thus the labor dynamics in the countries of origin (Funkhouser, 1992a; 
1992b). 
The  second  issue  transcends  the  question  of  labor  exclusion,  and  poses  a  great  analytical  challenge. 
Transnational  migration  redefines  the  territoriality  of  labor  markets,  and  more  explicitly  their  national 
dimension. The previous model of modernization carved out clear social territory: urban areas, especially 
metropolitan zones, demographically fed by rural labor migrating to the cities. It was in this sense that the 
focus was on national labor markets. However, globalization alters this spatial configuration. Transnational 
migration questions the position of national labor markets as the only occupational arena. Moreover, this is 
enforced  by the revitalization  of the local, which  paradoxically is often induced by globalization, affecting 
primarily rural areas where local labor markets develop under the direct impact of global forces. 
With  the  globalization  of  the  local,  another  crucial  phenomenon  of  the  new  global  modernity  merits 
analysis:  the  loss  of  centrality  of  agricultural  activities  and  their  territorial  consequences  for  the  national 
labor market. This loss implies that the  classical spatial  distinction between the  urban (modern) and rural 
(traditional)  of  earlier modernity is  being redefined.  Since the  crisis of the 1980s, the ongoing territorial 
redistribution  of  activities  and  employment  renders  the  spatial  distinctions  less  clear  (Tardanico  and 
Menjívar  Larín,  1997).  Contemporary  studies  on  rural  development  show  that  the  local  economy  has 
established itself as the  pertinent  unit of analysis, in which the relation  between  urban centers and their 
rural  surroundings  are  crucial.  This  redefines  the  horizon  of  the  rural  labor  market  in  a  much  more 
complex manner than before. Likewise, one can no longer reduce rural employment to agricultural labor, 
instead,  as  has  been  documented  in  Central  America,  rural  income  is  increasingly  determined  by 
                                                 
16  In the case of Costa Rica, during the  '90s, Pérez Sáinz and Mora Salas (2001) show that the decline in  the percentage of poor households is 
accompanied by an increase of households at risk of pauperization. It has been the risk of poverty, and not poverty itself, that indicates the true barrier 
for upward social mobility. 77 
 
 
nonagricultural  activities  (Weller,  1997).  This  questions  the  continuity  of  the  historic  significance  of  the 
peasant as relevant actor in globalized modernity (Martínez, 1999). 
These spatial alterations also reflect the fact that prototypical activities of globalization, such as the maquila 
industry and the free trade zones, shy away from urban metropolitan sites that were the preferred location 
of import substitution industries.  The northern border of Mexico, the location of  free trade zones in the 
Dominican Republic, or the greenfields in Brazil are exemplary in this respect. At the same time, particular 
industries (agroexports, handicrafts, tourism, etc),
17 have propelled local community-based economies into 
the global market, causing local labor markets to adapt more to global impacts than national ones. 
Consequently, we witness a fragmentation  of  national labor markets as the metropolitan zones are  no 
longer  the  central  locality  for  employment  opportunities,  or  the  inevitable  destiny  of  internal  migratory 
flows.  As  a  result,  national  labor  markets  significantly  lose  their  importance.  This  is  exacerbated  with 
transnational labor migration, a phenomenon that, as mentioned,  proves to  be a principal form of labor 
exclusion. In other words, national labor markets no longer function as the sole force behind employment 
dynamics. 
V. THE PERSISTENCE OF SUBSISTENCE SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
Historically, surplus labor was not reflected in recorded open unemployment in Latin America, but found 
its  principal  expression  in  the  rural  peasant  economy  and  urban  informality.  The  urban  informal  sector 
grew  exponentially  during  the  crisis  of  the  1980s  and  established  itself  as  the  principal  adjustment 
mechanism  of  urban  labor  markets  (PREALC,  1991).  Self-employment  and  employment  in  small 
enterprises gained further importance in the 1990s, incorporating 40 percent of the nonagricultural labor 
force in comparison to 37 percent ten years earlier (OIT, 2001; Table 6A). 
For our purposes, it is interesting to identify forms of self-employment driven by the logic of subsistence, as 
they  exemplify  the  tendency  of  exclusion.    The  predominance  of  the  logic  of  subsistence  implies  a 
convergence of workplace and home, and it is the latter that imposes itself, a logic generally determined by 
pauperization.  Therefore,  we  argue  that  this  type  of  self-employment  corresponds  to  an  economy  of 
poverty:  the  poor  producing  for  the  poor.  Examining  the  relation  between  this  self-employment  and 
poverty  sheds  light  on  both  its  magnitude  and  evolution.  How  this  unfolds  for  the  region,  taking  into 
account both urban and rural manifestations, is shown in Table 4.
18 
                                                 
17  For the Central American case see Pérez Sáinz and Andrade-Eekhoff (2003). 
18  This table, as those following,  is set up differently than the previous ones. The rows reflect whether the percentage of rural employed poor has 
decreased or not during the '90s. The columns show whether the number of self-employed in agricultural (excluding professional and technical staff) as 
a proxy for subsistence farmers, is higher or lower than the total of rural employed in poverty. The percentages of self-employed workers under the 
poverty line are given in parenthesis.   78 
 
 
Table  4:  Latin  America:  Evolution  of  the  Incidence  of  Poverty  of  Self-  Employment  
in Agriculture (1990-1999) 
Evolution of the incidence of poverty of self-employment 
agriculture 
Evolution of the incidence of 
poverty of total employed in 
rural areas 
Greater  Lower 
Decreased  Brazil (55%) 
Colombia (66%) 
Costa Rica (21%) 
Guatemala (69%) 
Panama (42%) 
Chile (21%) 
Honduras (89%) 
Nicaragua (87%) 
Increased  El Salvador (80%) 
Mexico (64%) 
Venezuela (44%) 
Source: CEPAL (2001; table 18) 
 
Characteristic for the majority of the countries in table 4 is a general reduction of rural poverty, with higher 
incidence for agricultural self-employment (i.e., peasants). El Salvador and Mexico deviate from this with a 
general increase in  pauperization, even more  pronounced in agricultural self-employment.  Even though 
the table shows tendencies towards an improvement, two important facts stand out. First, in all countries 
the  level  of  pauperization  of  the  peasantry  is  higher  than  the  level  for  the  aggregate  of  rural  workers. 
Second, in most countries the majority of peasants find themselves in a state of extreme  poverty. These 
levels are very high, as in the case of El Salvador (80 percent), Honduras (89 percent), and Nicaragua (87 
percent).  
The new economic model dramatically affected rural labor markets in two ways. The first is that, in those 
cases where farmers owned communal land, the introduction of policies creating land markets accelerated 
the  proletarianization  of  the  peasantry.  Secondly,  new  capital  intensive  technologies  displaced  workers, 
thereby accentuating the seasonality of agricultural labor (Thomas, 1997). This reinforces a historic trend 
already present in the previous modernization (Gómez and Klein, 1993). 
The  same  exercise  of  relating  poverty  to  self-employment  can  be  repeated  in  the  case  of  urban  self-
employment.  Here,  the  available  information  provided  in  Tables  5a  and  5b
19  allows  us  to  distinguish 
between productive and nonproductive activities.  
 
                                                 
19  An extra column is added to tables 5a and 5b to incorporate those cases that, contrary to the rural context, show an inverse relation between the 
evolution of the poverty of the aggregate of urban employed and the self employed. That is, with an increase in poverty for the urban employed, the 
self- employed shows a decrease, and vice versa. 79 
 
 
Table 5a:  Latin  America:  Evolution  of  the  Incidence  of  Poverty  in  Industrial  and  Construction  Self-
Employment (1990-1999) 
Evolution of the incidence of poverty of self-employed in industry 
and construction. 
Evolution of the incidence of 
poverty of total employed in 
urban zones. 
Greater  Lower  Opposite sign 
Decreased  Chile (11%) 
Colombia (60%) 
Costa Rica (17%) 
El Salvador (43%) 
Panama (24%) 
Uruguay (12%) 
Brazil (33%)  Guatemala (51%) 
Mexico (39%) 
Nicaragua (59%) 
Increased  Bolivia (66%) 
Nicaragua (59%) 
Ecuador (68%) 
Venezuela (33%) 
Honduras (80%) 
 
Source: CEPAL (2001; Table 17). 
 
Table  5b:  Latin  America:  Evolution  of  the  Incidence  of  Poverty  in  Urban  Commercial  
and Service Sector Self-Employment (1990-1999) 
Evolution of the incidence of poverty of self-employed in the commercial 
and service sectors. 
Evolution of the incidence of 
poverty of total urban 
employed   Greater  Lower  Opposite sign 
Decreased  Brazil (27%) 
Chile (9%) 
Costa Rica (16%) 
El Salvador (35%) 
Panama (26%) 
Colombia (54%) 
Uruguay (9%) 
Guatemala (46%) 
Mexico (30%) 
 
Increased  Bolivia (43%) 
Nicaragua (52%) 
Ecuador (62%) 
Venezuela (34%) 
Honduras (72%) 
 
Source: CEPAL (2001:  Table 17). 80 
 
 
Concerning  productive  activities,  Table  5a  shows  that,  for  the  majority  of  the  countries  included,  the 
degree of pauperization of the self-employed  declined more than that of the total urban labor force.
20 In 
certain cases however, the reduction in poverty is considerably less, or worse, the opposite occurs. Similar 
results  are  observed  for  the  nonproductive  activities  in  table  5b.  Nevertheless,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
peasantry, the level of pauperization for both types of employment is higher than that of the total amount 
of urban labor  employed,  Chile  being the only exception. Explicit attention is  warranted for those  cases 
where the majority falls  below the  poverty line. For productive activities, this is the  case  for Bolivia (66 
percent), Colombia (60 percent), Ecuador (68 percent), Guatemala (51 percent), Honduras (80 percent), 
and  Nicaragua  (59  percent),  whereas  for  the  nonproductive  activities  this  is  the  case  in  Colombia  (54 
percent),  Ecuador  (62  percent),  Honduras  (72  percent),  and  Nicaragua  (52  percent).  This  implies  that 
countries characterized by late modernization continue to have an overall urban economy of poverty. 
Thus,  despite a  certain reduction in subsistence self-employment as a result of the  dynamics of  poverty 
reduction  during the 1990s, a serious contingent of an impoverished self-employed labor force  prevails, 
especially in rural areas. 
This type of self-employment is to a large extent a continuation of the past, especially concerning its urban 
component,  the  informality  of  subsistence.  Nevertheless,  certain  new  elements  allow  the  economy  of 
poverty to incorporate the so-called "new  poor." The  concept of the new poor applies to those groups, 
wage earning urbanites in particular, who have their basic needs met by locating in the cities, but the crisis 
of  the  1980s  substantially  reduced  their  income  to  levels  below  the  poverty  line.  Katzman  (1989) 
introduced  this  term  to  distinguish  this  group  from  the  structural  poor  for  two  reasons:  they  are  not 
subjected to the same mechanisms that perpetuate poverty (especially intergenerational mechanisms), and 
they can overcome their distress if the economic climate improves.  
Even though tendencies of  exclusion can be interpreted as a continuation of the  past, the  new mode of 
accumulation  has  introduced  substantial  changes  to  social  integration.  In  the  previous  form  of 
modernization, the integrational process was based on a harmonious triangle that related the labor market 
with  social  policies  and  well  being.  Essentially,  this  triangle  implied  a  mutual  interrelation  of  three 
phenomena: formal employment, state regulation, and social integration. Urbanization and social mobility 
allowed the constitution of social citizenship by way of a formal sector of urban labor, consolidated by the 
state  with  the  coverage  of  social  security.  Obviously,  distinct  modalities  of  modernization  (early, 
accelerated,  and  late)  and  their  corresponding  national  arrangements  determined  different  outcomes  in 
each  country  (Mesa-Lago,  1994;  Roberts,  1996).  Yet,  this  triangulation  of  national  modernity  was 
challenged  by  the  crisis  of  the  1980s.  Two  independent  relations  in  terms  of  social  integration  were 
redefined.  On  the  one  hand,  state  intervention  directed  at  the  construction  of  social  citizenship  is  no 
longer  mediated  through  employment.  Social  policies  of  the  region  have,  for  some  time  now,  been 
focused on specific social groups  (preferably the extreme poor) with particular needs (primarily education 
                                                 
20  Argentina is absent in both tables as the rate of pauperization of the urban employed remained stable throughout the 1990s  (information available 
only for Great Buenos Aires). The same occurred with the self-employed in the service sector (8%) while those in the productive sector show an 
increase from 6% in 1990 to 14% ten years later. 81 
 
 
and housing). On the other hand, with the substitution of the state by the market, propelling the latter to 
the  center of societal construction, the labor market emerges, more than ever, as the primary force in 
shaping the dynamics of social (dis)integration. Therefore the effects of the substantial transformation of the 
structures  of  employment,  in  response  to  the  crisis,  the  subsequent  structural  adjustments,  and  the 
process of globalization will be quite distinct. 
At  the  root  of  this  transformation  lies  the  double  impact  that  globalization  has  had  on  the  process  of 
integration.  On  the  one  hand,  integration  no  longer  presupposes  the  constitution  of  the  state  as  an 
integrated  community,  allowing  certain  sectors  to  be  considered  dispensable.  The  term  exclusion, 
therefore,  takes  on  a  contemporary  analytical  importance  to  the  extent  that  the  integration  of  labor  is 
absent from the  project of globalization.  On the other  hand, with the  displacement of the state  by the 
market, access to employment opportunities  defines the labor market. Fundamental to both is the access 
to knowledge, the key resource of globalization (Sojo and Pérez Sáinz, 2002).
21  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The hypothesis that exclusionary trends dominate labor dynamics in globalized modernization is verified by 
three arguments  developed in this  paper.  The first is  provided  by the deterioration in the  processes of 
integration  prevalent  during  he  previous  modernization,  reflected  by  both  the  reduction  in  public 
employment and the increasing precariousness of wage relations.  
The second argument has to do with the  prolongation of  earlier exclusionary trends, most evident in the 
persistence of subsistence self-employment as a primary product of the  inertia of both  urban informality 
and the peasant economy. Nevertheless, the current extent and composition of poverty is not exactly the 
same. This type of  exclusion is projected on wage laborers employed in small  firms. Even though one 
could argue that labor processes are less hierarchical and that the differences between those who own the 
means  of  production  and  those  who  do  not  are  less  pronounced,  precariousness  is  felt  throughout. 
Furthermore,  hidden  behind  unpaid  family  labor,  a  common  form  of  labor  supply  in  this  context,  are 
gender and age inequalities. 
Third  is  the  emergence  of  new  expressions  of  labor  exclusion.  The  structural  nature  of  open 
unemployment,  as  an  intrinsic  element  of  the  new  mode  of  accumulation,  has  displaced  its  previous 
cyclical  character.  At  the  same  time,  the  propensity  for  transnational  migration  reflects  an  exclusionary 
force that results in the displacement of the work force from its own country.
22 
                                                 
21  In this respect, Filgueira (1999) discerns a historic parallel between disintegrationary impacts of market expansion on precapitalist peasant communities 
and the current process of globalization and their effects on the nation/state and its social protection functions. 
22  Transnational migration also affects domestic labor that, given the high cost of personal services in the global North, has taken on a global dimension. 
The modernization of Latin American societies has not led to the disappearance of domestic labor. In 1990, it represented 5.8% of nonagricultural 
EAP, growing to 6.7% in 2000. This sector remains a highly feminized labor domain, absorbing 15.4% of the women employed in nonagricultural 
activities in 2000 (OIT, 2001: Table 6-A). 82 
 
 
Analytically the most relevant of this predominance of  exclusionary tendencies is the  new nature of the 
nexus of surplus labor and emerging mode of accumulation. The functionality that surplus labor had in the 
past does not hold for today. Surplus labor served a double purpose in the industrialization process based 
on import substitution.  
On  one  hand,  it  exercised  a  downward  pressure  on  wages  and  labor  costs  in  general,  especially  with 
respect to social benefits, as a result of formal firms outsourcing a series of activities to the informal sector. 
On the other hand, and  due to the difficulties inherent to  protected economies, the formal sector  could 
not provide all the goods and services needed for the reproduction of the labor force it controlled. Once 
again, informal activities absorbed this reproductive deficit with their own modalities of goods and service 
provision (Portes and Walton, 1981).  With the new mode of accumulation, this  double functionality of 
surplus labor  has lost its  purpose.  Concerning its  first function,  the precariousness of  wage relations has 
"deformalized"  employment.  The  globalization  of  consumption,  encouraged  by  the  opening  of  national 
economies, has done the same for the second function.  
Consequently, surplus labor is less functional for the current mode of accumulation than before. Yet, as 
this paper points out, exclusion is not foreign to the new model.
23 On the contrary, exclusion finds its most 
explicit  expression  in  the  contingencies  of  surplus  labor  that  have  become  inexpedient,  and  thereby 
dispensable. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The international literature on gender and structural adjustment  describes a general tendency whereby 
increased  deregulation of labor markets and informalization go hand in hand with greater feminization of 
the labor force. One of the consequences of neoliberal reforms around the world has been the erosion of 
job security regulations and other worker protections mostly through increased informalization rather than 
through explicit  deregulation and legal reforms. Informalization involves the evasion and loosening of the 
institutional framework of labor regulation in an attempt to achieve greater flexibility and to avoid the cost 
of social insurance (Castells and Portes, 1989; Meagher, 1995). Far from occurring “outside the state," 
informalization often takes place with the full complicity of the state, which is selectively enforcing its own 
rules.  
The  literature  has  convincingly  shown  that  informalization  has  typically  led  to  an  absolute  and  relative 
growth  in  the  use  of  female  labor  (Standing,  1989;  1999;  Cerruti,  2000;  Cagatay,  Elson,  and  Grown, 
1995; Valodia, 2001; Mehra and Gammage, 1999; Benería, 2003) This increased participation in the labor 
market on the part of women is occurring as a result of the expansion of the sectors in which women have 
been  traditionally  employed,  such  as  sales  and  services,  but  also  through  the  feminization  of  jobs 
traditionally held by men, as these jobs  have undergone wage  erosion, reduced  protection, and greater 
insecurity.  
Like many other developing  countries, Egypt has gone through a far-reaching economic liberalization and 
structural adjustment program since the mid-1970s. As has occurred elsewhere, these reforms have led to 
little explicit deregulation of the labor market, but have been accompanied by significant informalization of 
employment  relations.  As  formal  employment  opportunities  dwindled  in  the  civil  service  and  the  large 
state-owned enterprises, they were increasingly replaced by informal jobs in the private sector, which offer 
no job security or social insurance  protection. Unlike what  happened in other  developing regions of the 
world  however, the  Egyptian labor market, and in  particular its private sector  component, is becoming 
defeminized.  Women  are  experiencing  reduced  access  to  employment  in  the  segments  of  the  labor 
market that traditionally employ women and these sectors are growing more slowly than male-dominated 
segments. Conversely, male-dominated segments are not becoming more feminized. 87 
 
 
The main purpose of the paper is to explain this  unusual  pattern.  The potential explanations I  explore in 
this paper are the effect of oil and oil-related revenues on the supply of, and demand for, female labor. 
Others  have stressed that oil-related revenues strengthen  patriarchal family structures that depend  on a 
single male breadwinner, thus reducing the supply of female labor. I argue that the adverse impact of oil-
related revenues on agriculture and labor-intensive manufacturing, which reduces the demand for female 
labor, is likely to be a more important explanation of defeminization.  
II. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, INFORMALIZATION, AND FEMINIZATION 
A dominant and recurrent theme in the literature on structural adjustment and gender is the increasing 
feminization  of  labor  markets  that  occurs  under  structural  adjustment  as  employment  becomes  more 
flexible,  casualized,  and  informalized.  Structural  adjustment  is  said  to  have  led  to  an  intensification  of 
women’s reproductive work, an increase in female participation, and a deterioration of working conditions. 
The feminization hypothesis was first proposed by Standing (1989) who argued that the increased implicit 
deregulation of labor markets brought about by the need for flexibility and lower costs in global production 
systems  is  leading  to  the  feminization  of  jobs  previously  held  by  men.  There  had  been  considerable 
previous work on the trend toward the informalization of employment (Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987; 
Castells  and  Portes,  1989);  on  the  feminization  of  employment  in  labor-intensive  export-oriented 
industries (Elson and Pierson, 1981; Fernandez-Kelly, 1983); and on the growing participation of women 
in  the  informal  sector  (Benería  and  Roldan,  1987),  but  Standing  was  the  first  to  link  feminization  with 
informalization  in  such  a  direct  fashion.  Subsequent  research  in  a  variety  of  contexts  and  regions  has 
essentially confirmed the feminization hypothesis, while adding a number of refinements to it (see Cerruti, 
2000; Valodia, 2001; Floro and Shaefer, 1998; Benería, 2003).  
Floro  and  Shaefer  (1998)  working  in  the  Philippines  and  Zambia  have  argued  that  the  labor  market 
changes brought about by structural adjustment in these countries has not redressed women’s position of 
subordination in the labor market, but simply altered its form. Shrinking employment in the  civil service 
and  the  dissolution  of  large  state-owned  enterprises  has  severely  restricted  formal  employment 
opportunities for women. This has forced women in both countries to increasingly rely on informal sector 
activity, with many being forced to create their own employment. In Zambia, where industrial production 
never recovered, these jobs were primarily in the services and trade sectors. In the Philippines, the type of 
industrialization that emerged under the structural adjustment process, which basically consisted of export-
oriented labor-intensive  production, has promoted the employment of young women. There was also a 
significant  increase  in  outsourcing  to  female  workers  doing  industrial  piecework  in  their  homes. 
Nonetheless,  even  in  the  Philippines,  most  of  the  increase  in  female  employment  was  in  small-scale, 
informal sales and services activities. 
Other authors confirm that the observed patterns for the Philippines in Floro and Shaefer’s work apply to 
much of Latin America and Southeast Asia, and the pattern in Zambia applies to much of the rest of sub-
Saharan  Africa  (Meagher,  1995;  Cerruti,  2000;  Mehra  and  Gammage,  1999).  In  Africa  women 88 
 
 
predominate in the informal sector, which generates over 60 percent of female employment. However, in 
contrast  to  trends  in  Latin  America  and  Asia,  informal  sector  employment  among  women  has  not 
contributed  to  increased  female  participation  in  manufacturing,  either  as  industrial  workers  or  as 
homeworkers in subcontracting networks (Meagher, 1995). 
III. THE MAIN DATA SOURCES 
The empirical analysis that follows is  based on  nationally representative household surveys for the years 
1988  and  1998.  Both  surveys  used  a  similar  sample  and  questionnaire  designed  to  ensure  the 
comparability  of  the  data.  The  surveys  include  extensive  data  concerning  basic  demographics, 
employment,  unemployment,  occupational history, migration,  education,  earnings, parental  background, 
and women’s  work. The Egypt Labor Market Survey (ELMS, 1998) was carried out exactly ten years to 
the  day after the October 1988 special round of the  Labor Force Sample Survey (LFSS, 1988) to avoid 
any  issues  related  to  seasonal  labor  demand  or  unemployment.
1  The  LFSS  1988  was  conducted  on  a 
nationally  representative  sample  of  10,000  households  that  excludes  the  five  remote  border 
governorates.
2 The  ELMS 1998 was conducted on a similarly designed sample of 5,000 households. All 
results are weighted by the appropriate sampling weights to reflect the characteristics of the population 
IV. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND INFORMALIZATION IN EGYPT 
After  a  period  of  significant  state-control  over  the  economy  in  the  1960s,  the  Egyptian  government 
initiated its “open-door  policy” in 1974, which consisted of significant liberalization of the trade regime, 
encouragement  of  foreign  investment,  and  a  greater  role  for  the  private  sector  in  the  economy.  This 
period coincided with the dramatic increase in the price of oil that followed the October 1973 Arab-Israeli 
war.  As  a modest  oil  exporter,  Egypt  benefited  directly  from  the  higher  oil  prices,  but  the  bulk  of  the 
impact  came from the migration of Egyptian workers to oil-rich countries and the remittances they sent 
back, as well as from foreign aid  flows that the  Egyptian government received from these  newly rich oil-
exporting  countries.  Besides  growing  rapidly  during  the  1970s,  the  Egyptian  economy  experienced  the 
“Dutch disease” phenomenon that generally affects countries that receive a sudden windfall gain in foreign 
exchange  revenue.  The  appreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate,  resulting  from  the  windfall,  causes  the 
nontradable  industries,  like  construction  and  services,  to  boom,  while  adversely  impacting  the 
competitiveness of tradable industries like manufacturing and agriculture (Shaban et al, 2001). Despite its 
overall  inclination  toward  increasing  the  role  of  the  private  sector  in  the  economy,  the  oil  windfall 
temporarily  allowed  the  Egyptian  government  to  “have  it  all”  by  significantly  increasing  government 
                                                 
1   The sampling and questionnaire design of the LFSS 1988 is described in detail in Fergany (1990) and that of the ELMS 1998 is described in Assaad and 
Barsoum (1999).  
2   The excluded governorates are Red Sea, New Valley, Matruh, North, and South Sinai. They constituted 1.4 percent of the Egyptian population in 
1996. 89 
 
 
employment  and  resisting  calls  for  privatization  of  state-owned  enterprises,  while  allowing  the  private 
sector to play an expanded role in a growing economy. 
After  another  boost  in  1979,  oil  prices  began  to  decline  in  1982  and  collapsed  in  1986,  forcing  the 
Egyptian government to seek emergency financing from the IMF. Several attempts at stabilization in the late 
1980s failed to restore external and internal balances, leading to the adoption of the Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) of 1991 (Abdel-Khalek, 2001). The starting point of our analysis, 
1988, is therefore situated after the collapse of oil prices in 1986 but three years before the initiation of 
ERSAP.  As  shown  in  Table  1,  GDP  growth  had  slowed  significantly  in  1986  and  1987,  but  recovered 
temporarily in 1988 when oil prices increased again. The adoption of ERSAP in 1991 forced the Egyptian 
government to significantly reduce its budget  deficit and close the  country’s current account deficit, at the 
cost of much slower growth that year. By 1995 growth had recovered and remained relatively steady at 5 
to 6 percent until 2000.   
 
Table 1: Egypt - Macroeconomic Indicators, 1985-2001 
  1985  1986  1987  1988 1989  1990 1991  1992 1993  1994 1995 1996  1997 1998  1999 2000  2001 
GDP Growth  
Rate (%)  6.6  2.6  2.5  5.3  5.0  5.7  1.1  4.4  2.9  3.9  4.7  5.0  5.5  4.5  6.3  5.1  2.9 
Current Account  
Balance (as % of  
GDP)  –9.3  –9.4  –2.3  –1.6  –1.2  –1.5  10.3  6.4  4.9  0.8  0.6  –0.3  0.2  –3.0  –1.9  –1.2  0.0 
Overall Budget  
Deficit (as % of  
GDP)  –10.4 –12.1  –5.1  –7.6  –5.4  –5.7  –1.0  –3.5  1.7  0.3  0.9  –1.9  –2.0  ––  ––  ––  –– 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003. 
Note:  – = not available 
Although the real exchange rate was significantly devalued in 1991 in the aftermath of the unification of the 
various  exchange  rate  regimes,  the  liberalization  of  the  foreign  exchange  market,  and  the  relaxation  of 
capital  controls, it was allowed to appreciate steadily since then.  By 1999, the real exchange rate  had 
appreciated  by  43  percent  compared  to  its  1991  level,  significantly  undermining  the  country’s  external 
competitiveness (Radwan and Reiffers, 2004: 30). 
Although  there  were  significant  legal  reforms  in  Egypt  during  this  period  in  the  areas  of  trade,  foreign 
investment,  privatization,  and  the  regulation  of  private  sector  firms,  the  labor  code  remained  highly 
restrictive. The labor law that was in force throughout the relevant period for this study (1988–1998) was 
promulgated in 1981 and retained the emphasis on lifetime job security that characterized the labor codes 
of the previous state-led period.
3  Law 183 of 1981 basically  provided  Egyptian workers in regular jobs 
with  lifetime  job  security  after  a  three-month  probation  period.  Layoffs  were  only  possible  under  a 
                                                 
3   A new labor law that significantly reduces these protections was passed by the Egyptian parliament in April 2003. 90 
 
 
restrictive set of circumstances that were rarely realized in practice.  The social insurance law, which was 
promulgated in 1975, imposes significant payroll taxes amounting to approximately 40 percent of the wage 
bill in the private sector (Assaad, 1996). 
With  the  tacit  cooperation  of  the  government,  private  employers  could  routinely  circumvent  the  job 
security provisions of the law. They either refuse to grant their workers the employment contracts that the 
law calls for or force new workers to sign undated letters of resignation upon taking a new job. Although 
these practices are illegal, they are so widely practiced that they have become the norm. According to the 
law all regular paid jobs, with the exception of domestic workers, must  be  covered  by legal contracts. A 
regular job is  defined as a job that is  not  provisional, seasonal, or intermittent.  According to household 
survey data, however, only a small fraction of regular workers in the private sector actually have a legal 
employment  contract. As shown in  Table 2, this  proportion  was 28.6 percent in 1988 and  declined to 
24.4 percent in 1998. Although the  proportion was higher among females than among males in 1988, it 
declined faster, indicating that the female workforce is informalizing more rapidly than the male workforce. 
In  fact the  number of regularly employed  females  with legal employment contracts in the  private sector 
declined in absolute terms during the period. 
 
Table  2:  Share  and  Growth  Rate  (percentages)  of  Regular  Private  Sector  Wage  Employment  
by Presence of Employment Contract and Sex, 1988-1998 
   Male  Female  All 
   Share in 
1988 
Share in 
1998 
Ann. 
Rate of 
Growth 
Share in 
1988 
Share in 
1998 
Ann. 
Rate of 
Growth 
Share in 
1988 
Share in 
1998 
Ann. Rate 
of Growth 
Contract     26.8    23.7  3.6    37.2    29.2  –0.7    28.6    24.4  2.8 
No contract    73.2    76.3  5.2    62.8    70.8    3.0    71.4    75.6  4.9 
All  100.0  100.0  4.8  100.0  100.0    1.8  100.0  100.0  4.4 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from LFSS 1988 and ELMS 1998. 
Note: About 15 percent of the observations in 1988 had missing information on the presence of a contract. These observations were proportionately 
allocated to the “contract” and “no contract categories” based on the distribution of observations whose contract status was not missing.  
 
Another  indication  of  the  increasing  informalization  of  the  Egyptian  labor  market  is  the  increase  in  the 
proportion of new entrants whose first job is informal. In this analysis I use the ILO’s definition of informal 
employment, which is any activity that is  unregulated by the formal institutions and regulations of society 
such as labor laws, registration, and taxation, which govern similar activities in the formal sector. The ILO 
identified three groups of informal workers,  namely owners of microenterprises, own-account workers 
(self-employed), and dependent workers. The third group encompasses wageworkers engaged in full-time 
or casual employment generally without a formal contract, and working on a regular or casual basis and 
unpaid workers, including family members and apprentices. Fig 1 shows the percentage of new entrants 91 
 
 
going  into  formal  public,  formal  private,  informal  and  agricultural  employment  in  Egypt  from  1969  to 
1998.
4 The proportion of new entrants into informal employment rose more or less steadily from nearly 
25 percent in 1969 to 65 percent in 1998, with the fastest increase occurring in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the structural adjustment  period. Formal private employment increased as well, but still accounts 
for under 10  percent of jobs  for  new entrants  by 1998. Most of the increase in informal employment 
came  at  the  expense  of  formal  public  employment  and  agricultural  employment,  both  of  declined 
significantly in the 1980s. 
 
Fig. 1:  Distribution  of  new  entrants  by  type  of  employment  in  first  job  (4-year  moving  average), 
1969-98 
Source:  Wahba and Moktar (2002). 
If the analysis is limited to new entrants who enter the labor market after age 18 to eliminate child workers 
and others who almost by definition enter informal jobs, the picture does not change appreciably. Among 
those who entered at 18 or older, the  proportion entering informal jobs increases more or less steadily 
from about 20  percent in 1969 to 69 percent in 1998. In contrast, the  proportion of those who enter 
formal public employment  declines  from a high of 90  percent in 1973 to less than 20  percent in 1998 
(Wahba and Moktar, 2002). 
When  disaggregated  by sex, the  pattern of informalization among new  entrants reveals some interesting 
differences. Wahba and Moktar (2002) show that although the proportion of new female entrants going to 
informal employment has increased from 9 percent in 1974–78 to 51 percent in 1994–98, it is still lower 
than that of males, which rose from 20 percent in 1974–78 to 57 percent in 1994–98. Toward the end of 
the  period  new  female  entrants  are  relying  much  more  than  new  male  entrants  on  public  formal 
                                                 
4   The figure shows the four-year moving average to smooth out fluctuations due to estimation error. 92 
 
 
employment, which is becoming increasingly scarce. The higher share of public employment among new 
female entrants is simply an indication that they are more willing to queue for these jobs than males rather 
than take private sector jobs where they face significant barriers to entry and low wages.
5  
The  increased  informality  of  employment  among  new  entrants  would  not  be  a  necessary  indication  of 
informalization if new entrants were able to transition  fairly quickly to formal jobs. This is not the case in 
Egypt,  however.  Wahba  and  Moktar  show  that  94  percent  of  nonagricultural  workers  without 
employment contracts in 1990 were still without contracts in 1998. Similarly, 95 percent of those without 
social insurance  coverage in 1990 were still without such  coverage in 1998. Only 6 percent of  informal 
workers in 1990 were able to obtain formal public jobs by 1998 and only 3 percent were able to obtain 
formal private jobs by that year. These high levels of persistence in informal employment confirm that the 
observed informalization of jobs for new entrants is evidence of overall informalization of the labor market.   
Much of the informalization of the Egyptian labor market that took place in the structural adjustment period 
occurred  because of the slowdown in public sector  hiring, without a  commensurate increase in formal 
private  sector  employment.  Because  female  workers  are  still  more  highly  concentrated  in  the  public 
sector, their  proportions in informal  employment are lower than those  of males, but the rate at which 
their  jobs  have  become  informalized  is  higher.  Wahba  and  Moktar  show  that  while  female  informal 
employment has increased by  percent from 1990 to 1998, male informal employment has decreased by 
3 percent (Wahba and Moktar, 2002). 
V. THE DEFEMINIZATION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYMENT IN EGYPT 
A cursory look at Egyptian employment data would show that female employment is rising faster than male 
employment, so there appears to  be at least some feminization of employment. As shown in  Table 3, 
overall employment, according to the "market work" definition increased at an average rate of 3.4 percent 
per year for females and 1.9 percent per year for males from 1988 to 1998.
6  A closer examination would 
reveal however, that the more rapid female employment growth is entirely due to the more rapid growth 
in female  employment in the government and nonwage work, which grew 5.4 percent and 3.5 percent 
                                                 
5   See Assaad (1997a) for a discussion of the queuing for public sector jobs in Egypt. 
6   The employment figures presented here may differ from those based on the same data sets presented elsewhere (Assaad, 2002) because of differences in the 
definition of employment used. The definition of employment that is relevant for testing the feminization hypothesis is either "market work," i.e.,  the production 
of goods and services for purposes of exchange, or even more narrowly, "paid work," which consists of wage and salary employment. The definition used in the 
earlier work is the "extended" definition of work, which also includes individuals engaged in the production and processing of primary goods exclusively for the 
consumption of their own households. Although  estimates of employment based on all three definitions are available from the 1998 survey, the 1988 survey 
only provides estimates based on the "extended" definition or the "paid work" definition. The vast majority of subsistence workers in Egypt are women engaged 
in agriculture, animal husbandry, and/or the production of dairy products. Sixty- three percent of total female employment under the extended definition fell in 
this category in 1998, compared to only 0.1 percent of male employment. Ninety-five percent of nonwage workers who were engaged in agriculture, animal 
husbandry, and the production of dairy products in 1998 were in fact subsistence workers rather than market workers. To approximate the "market" definition of 
employment using the 1988 data and maintain comparability across the two data sets, I assumed that the proportion of female nonwage workers in agriculture, 
animal  husbandry, and the  production of  dairy products, and who are  subsistence  workers, remained the  same across the two years. I then  excluded the 
estimated number of subsistence workers from total employment in 1988 to get an  estimate of "market  employment." I also  present results  based on the 
narrower paid work definition, which is available in both surveys. 93 
 
 
per year, respectively. Female nongovernmental employment decreased at a rate of 1.3 percent per year 
during the ten-year period compared to an increase of 2.3 percent per year for males. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Egypt: Employment Shares and Average Annual Growth of Employment by Sector, 1988-1998   
   Share in total employment  Female Share 
   1988  1998  1988  1998 
Government  19%  24%  29%  31% 
State-Owned Enterprises  9%  5%  14%  12% 
Private Wage Work  23%  25%  14%  10% 
Nongovernmental Wage Work  32%  30%  14%  10% 
Nonwage Work  49%  46%  51%  60% 
Total  100%  100%  35%  38% 
  Av. Annual Growth Rate     
  Males  Females  Total   
Government  4.5%  5.4%  4.8%   
State-Owned Enterprises  –2.3%  –4.1%  –2.6%   
Private Wage Work  3.7%  –0.4%  3.2%   
Nongovernmental Wage Work  2.3%  –1.3%  1.9%   
Nonwage Work  –0.5%  3.5%  1.8%   
Total  1.9%  3.4%  2.5%   
Source: Author’s Calculations based on data from LFSS 1988 and ELMS 1998. 
 
Thus there seems to be no support for the feminization hypothesis in the Egyptian case under any of the 
relevant definitions of employment. Outside the government sector, the female share of paid employment 
declined from 14 to 10 percent.  
The rapid increase in government employment during a period of structural adjustments and budgets cuts 
is  rather  intriguing.  The  trend  has  to  be  seen  against  a  backdrop  of  a  long-term  policy  to  guarantee 
employment for all university and vocational secondary school graduates that, although suspended during 
the relevant decade,  was not  entirely abolished.  By the standards  of the 1970s and 1980s government 
employment  has in fact slowed  down (Assaad, 1997b). Moreover, an  examination of the age  profile of 
government workers in 1988 and 1998, shows that hiring of young workers has in fact slowed  down or 
been delayed significantly, but that older female workers, who would have in the past left the civil service 94 
 
 
upon marriage to start a family are now holding on to their jobs much longer (Assaad, 2002). While young 
men  have  been,  for  the  most  part,  able  to  find  alternatives  to  government  employment  in  the  private 
sector, this does not appear to be the case for young women. With continued emphasis on public sector 
cutbacks, the prospects of further growth of female employment in the government are dim. 
In contrast to employment in the government, structural adjustment has significantly impacted employment 
in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through hiring freezes and, to a lesser extent, privatization. The decline 
in  female  SOE  employment  was  significantly  more  rapid  than  that  of  males,  but  all  SOE  employment 
declined. There is no evidence that this decline is simply due to a reclassification of workers from the SOE 
sector to the private sector as a result of privatization. If that were the case the formal private sector jobs 
would have risen proportionately because all the reclassified workers would fall in this category. As shown 
in Table 3 above, there is no evidence of this, at least for female workers. Paid employment in the private 
sector appears to be particularly closed to women in Egypt. While male  paid  employment in the private 
sector  increased  by  3.7  percent  per  year,  female  paid  employment  declined  by  0.4  percent  per  year, 
reducing the female share in that segment of the labor market from 14 percent to 10 percent. 
The defeminization trend observed above is apparently not unique to Egypt.  Cross country comparisons 
reveal that out of the middle income countries, women's participation rates are not only among the lowest 
in the world in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), but that MENA is the only region of the world 
where they have declined in recent years (Horton, 1999).
7 With the exception of Morocco and Tunisia, 
which  have  seen  significant  increases  in  women's  participation  in  manufacturing,  the  share  of  female 
workers in nonagricultural activities, and in  paid employment, is much lower than other regions of the 
world,  such  as  East  and  Southeast  Asia  and  South  America.  Moreover,  with  the  exception  again  of 
Morocco and  Tunisia, these shares  have been either stable or falling, in  contrast to other regions where 
they are increasing rapidly (Karshenas and Moghadam, 2001).  
Some authors have highlighted the potential reversal of the feminization trend in export industries as these 
restructure  in  a  more  technological  and  capital-intensive  direction.  The  special  skills  required  for  more 
technologically sophisticated production often leads  to reduced demand  for female labor (Ozler, 2000; 
Mehra and Gammage, 1999; Kim and Kim, 1995). By all indications this is not what is going on in Egypt or 
the rest of MENA with the possible exception of Turkey. Manufactured exports have hardly taken off at all, 
for such a trend reversal to be occurring. 
 
                                                 
7   Interestingly Horton shows a significant increase in female participation for Egypt between 1982 and 1992, but her figures reflect a major change in 
data collection and reporting practices that occurred in 1983 in Egypt.  At that time a major effort was made to enumerate women in agriculture and 
animal husbandry. The variety of measurement practices relating to female labor force participation across countries and their occasional change over 
time underscores the difficulty of making any firm conclusions about trends from cross-country time series data on employment. See Benería (2003), 
Anker and Anker (1989), Anker (1990) for a discussion of measurement problems relating to female labor force participation.  95 
 
 
VI. EXPLAINING THE DEFEMINIZATION TREND 
To  understand the defeminization of  nongovernmental  employment in  Egypt,  I  begin  by taking a  closer 
look at the types of paid employment available to women and how these opportunities have changed over 
time. Structural adjustment is said to result in feminization by generating pressures to cut costs in tradable 
goods  sectors,  leading  to  the  substitution  of  cheap  female  labor  for  more  expensive  male  labor.  By 
providing incentives for manufactured exports, structural adjustment also favors industries that traditionally 
hire  women  disproportionately,  such  as  textile  and  garments  manufacturing.  Other  sectors  that  may 
benefit from a more market-oriented economy are retail trade and financial services, both of which tend 
to  hire  women  disproportionately.  On  the  other  hand,  by  increasing  the  relative  price  of  tradables  to 
nontradables,  structural  adjustment  may  harm  women  if  they  are  overly  represented  in  the  declining 
nontradable  sectors,  such  as  community  and  personal  services.  Any  cuts  in  government  expenditures 
would also reduce employment opportunities in the service sector, but much of that decline would occur 
in the government sector. Nongovernmental provision of such services may in  fact increase  under such 
circumstances.  
 
In  a  previous  paper,  my  coauthor  and  I  combined  occupation  and  industry  information  to  generate  a 
number of job types that would be  useful in testing some of the  hypotheses laid out above, as well as 
identify  the  job  types  where  women  were  disproportionately  represented  (Assaad  and  Arntz,  2004). 
Figure 2 shows the change in the female share of employment in all the job types we identified as having a 
higher than average female share in 1988. The “other” category in the figure represents all the remaining 
job types where the share of female employment was below average in 1988.  
 
The defeminization of  nongovernmental employment in Egypt can be  decomposed into two reinforcing 
trends. First, jobs where women are disproportionately represented at the  beginning of the  period are 
becoming defeminized, without a corresponding feminization of male-dominated jobs.  The decline in the 
female share of employment is  particularly large for “blue  collar in agriculture,” “white  collar other than 
trade and services services," “domestic and other services,” and “other.” The only type of job where the 
female share is somewhat stable is production work in textile and garment manufacturing as well as food 
processing.  The decline in the female share in the “other” category, which went  from 3.5 to 2 percent, 
shows  that  female  employment  is  not  spreading  out  into  the  rest  of  the  economy  either.  Thus,  the 
informalization of the labor market we documented above has not led to a feminization of either female- 
or male-dominated jobs. 96 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Female share of nongovernmental wage employment by job type, 1988 to1998 
Source:  Author’s calculations using data from ELMS 1998 and LFSS 1988. 
While the defeminization patterns in Egypt are fairly uniform across job types, the growth trends reveal a 
fairly mixed  pattern.  Employment in trade and services,  blue  collar textile and garments manufacturing, 
blue collar food processing, and professional/manager jobs grew more rapidly than overall employment in 
the nongovernmental wage work; they even grew more rapidly than sectors that do not  proportionately 
hire  women.    Employment  in  agriculture  and  white  collar  jobs  outside  trade  and  services  grew  more 
slowly  than  average  in  both  countries.    In  general,  however,  there  isn’t  an  easily  observed  pattern  of 
growth rates that would  explain feminization/defeminization in either  country.  The  defeminization effect 
seems  to  play  a  more  prominent  role  in  the  decreasing  share  of  female  employment  in  Egypt  than  a 
shrinking of sectors that typically employ women.  A successful structural adjustment program (including an 
adequate  devaluation) was supposed to favor export sectors, such as agriculture and textile and garment 
manufacturing; the former grew at a slower than average rate, while the latter did achieve average growth 
during this ten year period. The liberalization of the economy was supposed to favor trade and  financial 
services, which it did, but in the  case of trade, rapid overall growth (which is expected to favor women) 
was counteracted by defeminization; the sector, which had been disproportionately female, decreased the 
proportion of women it employed.  Expectations of the  effect of structural adjustment on the other job 
types are more ambiguous. Although manufacturing activities  outside textiles and garments should  have 
been helped by the currency devaluations that are integral parts of structural adjustment programs, some 
of  these  industries  may  have  previously  been  highly  protected  and  would  therefore  be  hurt  by  trade 
liberalization. The manufacturing sector outside textile and garments did grow more rapidly than average, 
but  also  experienced  defeminization.  The  remaining  sector  to  have  experienced  higher  than  average 
growth is domestic and other services, but it too had a declining female share.  97 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Average annual growth rate of nongovernmental wage employment in Egypt, 1988 to 1998 
Sources:  Author’s calculations based on data from ELNS 1998 and LFSS 1988. 
The  question  remains  as  to  why  Egypt,  and  possibly  other  MENA  countries,  are  at  odds  with  the 
experience  elsewhere  in  the  world,  despite  similar  processes  of  economic  restructuring  and 
informalization. I will discuss two possible explanations having to do with the impact of oil-related revenues 
on the economy.
 8 The first explanation is a supply-side argument about the effect of oil revenues on the 
preservation  of  patriarchal  family  structures  where  a  single  male  breadwinner  supports  the  family.  The 
second is a  demand-side argument about  changes in  the structure of the  economy due to the so-called 
Dutch Disease  effect that reduces demand for  female labor.  I  will  consider each of these arguments in 
succession.  
The first argument is that oil-related revenues  during the oil boom  period have reinforced the  prevailing 
“patriarchal gender  contract” in the Middle  East and  North African region. Oil and oil-related revenues, 
such  as  worker  remittances  (in  Egypt’s  case),  are  argued  to  reduce  female  labor  force  participation  by 
reducing  female  labor  supply.    By  accruing  male  household  members,  they  reduce  labor  supply  by 
reinforcing a “patriarchal gender contract," where men are the primary wage-earners and women assume 
the  role  of  homemakers  (Moghadam,  2001;  Karshenas  and  Moghadam  2001).    According  to  this 
argument, the relatively high income levels made possible by the oil boom, either directly or by means of 
remittances, contributed to the preservation of the patriarchal family structure by making it unnecessary for 
women to seek paid employment outside the home. According to this view, the oil boom occurred at a 
crucial stage of the development of MENA  economies when large-scale  urbanization and diversification 
away  from  traditional  agricultural  activities  was  occurring.    This  stage  would  have  normally  been 
accompanied  by  increasing  female  participation,  a  process  that  was  interrupted  by  the  oil  boom.  The 
                                                 
8   Oil-related revenues include revenues from exporting oil directly, as well as revenues from remittances sent by Egyptian workers working in oil-rich 
countries, and foreign aid received from these countries. 98 
 
 
argument  basically  hinges  on  the  idea  that  oil  raises  women’s  reservation  wage  and  thus  restricts  their 
labor supply. 
There is  considerable evidence from  Egypt,  however, that casts  doubt on this supply-side argument for 
low,  and  possibly  falling,  women’s  employment  rates.    Women  in  Egypt,  especially  young  unmarried 
women, are willing to work at very low wages. After  correcting for  human  capital  characteristics, female 
wages in the  private sector are about half as high as those of males (Assaad, 1997a), suggesting that an 
explanation that hinges on the restriction of supply is not sufficient. Moreover, female unemployment rates 
are significantly higher than those of males, suggesting that many young women are keen to find paid work, 
but are unable to get it, again casting doubt on an argument relying on a restriction in supply. Women are 
in fact  crowding into the few segments of the labor market that are open to them, leading to depressed 
wages  in  these  segments.    Moreover,  the  supply  restriction  argument  hinges  on  increasing  oil-related 
incomes  flowing to men through migrant remittances and other oil-related employment.   As shown in 
Figure 4  below, oil remittances as a share of GDP grew from 1975 to 1985 and have been declining ever 
since.  Exports of oil (the bulk of fuels, ores, and metals exports) also peaked as a share of GDP during the 
oil boom era of 1975 to 1985 and then declined sharply in 1986 and remained low until 1998, the end of 
the period under consideration. 
The explanation for low and stagnant  female  participation in paid employment seems to hinge therefore 
on the structure of labor demand (what jobs are in fact available) as well as the  prevailing gender norms 
determining what jobs and employment situations are suitable for women. The patriarchal family structure 
argument can still be salvaged if the “patriarchal gender contract” not only restricts female labor supply, but 
also determines what occupations and jobs are acceptable for women (Moghadam, 2001). However, to 
do so, the “patriarchal gender contract” would have to involve much more than the patriarchal family itself, 
since the suitability of various types of  employment for women is  determined by  employers, society-at-
large, as well as a woman’s own family.  
I  argue  that  the  effect  of  oil  and  oil-related  revenues  on  the  structure  of  labor  demand  is  a  more 
compelling  explanation of feminization/defeminization of the labor force.    The literature on gender and 
structural adjustment  has linked the feminization of employment specifically to the emergence of labor-
intensive, export-oriented manufacturing industries (Joekes, 1982; Hein, 1984; Joekes 1987; Cagatay and 
Berik, 1991; 1994; Ozler, 2000). The appreciation of the real exchange rate that occurs in oil-exporting 
countries,  or  in  countries  receiving  other  revenue  streams  related  to  oil,  such  as  worker  remittances, 
reduces the international competitiveness of these industries, leading to a reduction in their exports and an 
increase in  competing imports on the domestic market.  Even after the  decline in oil  prices in 1986, the 
structure of Middle Eastern and North African economies had been altered so fundamentally by the Dutch 
Disease  phenomenon,  that  with  the  exception  of  Morocco  and  Tunisia,  agricultural  and  manufactured 
exports did not constitute much of their foreign exchange earnings  (Shaban et al., 2001). 
As shown in Fig. 4, Egypt’s export sector from 1977 to 1985 was dominated by the export of fuels and 
minerals  (basically  crude  oil)  and  service  exports,  made  up  primarily  of  tourism  and  Suez  Canal  toll 
revenues.  After the collapse of oil prices in 1986, the share of oil declined, though remittances remained 99 
 
 
high throughout the 1980s.  Service exports became dominant, with their share in GDP rising to a peak of 
18  percent  in  1991–92,  right  after  the  institution  of  the  structural  adjustment  program.    The  share  of 
agricultural exports declined from about 6.5 percent of GDP in 1977 to a low of 0.6 percent in 2000, with 
only a few modest recoveries in that period.   Though the share of manufactured exports increased from 
1.3 percent of GDP in 1982 to 4 percent in 1990, they fell back to just over 2.5 percent of GDP by 2002.  
The post-1991 structural adjustment period, which is marked by an initial devaluation of the real exchange 
rate in 1991 and then a steady appreciation of its value through 1999, is also associated with a decline in 
agricultural  and  manufacturing  exports.    Total  goods  exports  declined  sharply  as  a  share  of  GDP  from 
1991 to 1998, largely but not totally explained  by the decline in the value of oil  exports.  Exchange rate 
misalignment  during 1991 to 1999  had  clearly contributed to  Egypt’s poor export performance during 
that period (see Domaç and Shabsigh [1999] for further analysis of the role of the real exchange rate in 
Egypt). 
 
 
Fig. 4: Exports and Remitttances as a Share of GDP, 1977-2002 
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003. 
As oil-related revenues declined in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, they were replaced for the most part 
by service exports.   Service exports expanded significantly in the post-oil boom era, reflecting a growth in 
tourism revenues, but like other exports, they were negatively affected by the appreciating real exchange 
rate  in  the  1990s.  Unlike  other  parts  of  the  world,  where  the  tourism  industry  provides  a  lot  of 
employment for women, few women work in tourism in Egypt.  Tourist sites tend to be either in remote, 
sparsely  populated  areas,  such  as  the  Sinai  and  the  Red  Sea  coast  or  in  Southern  Egypt,  a  socially 
conservative region, where there a few possibilities for women to work outside the home.   As a result, 
tourism jobs, including some typically female jobs, such as housekeeping jobs, are mostly taken by men.   100 
 
 
A final explanation, albeit one not fully explored here, is whether there has been an ideological change in 
gender  behaviors  over  the  past  two  decades  that  might  be  limiting  women’s  participation  in  the  labor 
market.  It is not clear whether social conservatism regarding women’s role in the public sphere has been 
on the increase in recent years.  Admittedly, extensive migration to the socially conservative oil-rich Gulf 
countries may have brought with it a turn toward more conservative social norms in the 1970s and 1980s.  
However,  there  is  no  systematic  evidence  as  to  the  direction  of  change  in  this  regard  in  more  recent 
years.   
CONCLUSION 
Despite  significant  similarities  between  Egypt  and  other  developing  countries  in  terms  of  the  structural 
adjustment measures and the accompanying informalization of labor markets, the feminization of the  paid 
labor force that typically accompanies these measures did not materialize in Egypt. In fact, the paid labor 
force  outside  the  government  sector  experienced  considerable  defeminization  over  the  structural 
adjustment  period.   Egypt shares the pattern of fairly low and stagnant female participation in paid labor 
with  other  countries  in  the  Middle  East  and  North  African  region.  With  the  exception  of  Tunisia  and 
Morocco, the MENA region stands out in the  world in that particular respect. I seek explanations of this 
unusual  pattern in the  effects of oil-related revenues on the structures of labor supply and  demand.  By 
raising  income  flows  to  male  household  members  through  labor  migration  and  remittances,  oil-related 
revenues  can  potentially  strengthen  patriarchal  family  structures  based  on  the  single  male  breadwinner 
model, thus reducing female labor supply.  On the demand side, oil-related revenues result in structural 
changes that bias labor demand against female paid workers.   
I find that the effect of oil-related revenues on the structure of labor demand more  compelling than its 
effects on the structure of the family and therefore labor supply. Significant flows of rent-based external 
revenues, through their effect on the real exchange rate, tend to disadvantage the very sectors that have 
accounted for much of the feminization of employment in a large number of  countries,  namely  export-
oriented manufacturing. Egypt has relied very little on this kind of activity for its foreign exchange earnings, 
leading to  fairly modest growth for that sector.  Employment growth has occurred  disproportionately in 
male–dominated  activities.  Moreover,  several  of  the  important  activities  where  women  are 
overrepresented were defeminized during the structural adjustment period.  
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Jaitunbibi has been sewing ready-made garments from her home for 20 years. She sews sari petticoats and 
is paid a  piece rate of 24  Indian rupees  (Rs) or U.S.$.50 per  dozen. She  collects the  cut pieces from a 
trader in Ahmedabad’s Revdi Bazaar and returns the neatly sewn petticoats the  next morning. She earns 
Rs 48 or U.S.$1.00 per day. Over the past two years, Jaitunbibi has seen major changes in her world of 
work. She explains:  
Earlier  we  earned  little  but  had  plenty  of  work,  especially  in  the  Divali  Festival  season. 
Then  we organized into our own  union, SEWA.  We struggled for minimum wages and 
finally, after numerous rallies, meetings, and  negotiations we got an increase in our piece 
rate.  
But  now  sewing  traditional  garments  from  the  home  is  in  decline.  There  are  new 
demands  for dresses, shorts, jeans, and other garments  which we’ve  never sewn.  Also 
much of garment making is done in factories these days with new machines. The clothes 
are for export  now.  The factories prefer to  employ men—they say that they are better 
workers!  
Then what should home-based garment workers do? How should we feed our children? 
We are ready to learn to sew  new  products,  but from the home. Nowadays I don’t get 
enough work. So I’ve started rolling incense sticks at Rs 5 per 1000.    
In the recent violence, Jaitunbibi’s house was damaged.
1  She was insured through SEWA Insurance.  She 
received her claim and has repaired her home. 
Madhuben is a construction worker. Ever since she came to the city from the countryside after marriage, 
she joined her husband at the ‘Kadia naka’ or street corner where construction workers wait everyday for 
a contractor to select them. For a day’s worth of labor she earns Rs 70 a day and her husband earns little 
more: Rs 80 for the same work.  
                                                 
Editor’s note: This chapter is a transcription of Mirai Chatterjee’s keynote address at the Conference on October 11, 2002. The only changes we have 
made is to use standard American spellings of words and to regularize the formatting of Ms. Chatterjee’s notes to reflect the style sheets used in the 
volume. Footnotes have been added where terminology was not clear. 
  
1  Editors’ note: the “violence” referred to was the result of the communal riots that broke out in Ahmedabad in 2002. 104 
 
 
But lately many  changes have swept the  construction industry. First,  over the past two or three years, 
machines have begun to replace local labor. Large multinational construction firms have come in, displacing 
workers. Where required, as in Jaitunbibi’s case, the employers hire men to work the machines. Next, the 
earthquake of 2001 resulted in a slump in the industry, as zoning laws and  basic construction standards 
introduced by the government resulted in curbs on construction. 
Now Madhuben and her husband stand at the ‘naka’ and are lucky to get ten days’  worth of work. So 
Madhuben has begun to scour the streets for waste paper and plastic which she sorts and sells to traders 
of the recycling industry. Her  husband tries to get work loading and unloading vegetables in the market. 
Madhuben developed tuberculosis.  SEWA’s health center put her on medication and she is back at work 
now. 
Raniben Ahir is an agricultural worker, dairy farmer, and  embroiderer. She lives in the dry and  drought 
prone Patan district in north Gujarat.  She explains: 
We have land but it’s as good as having none, as most of the time it doesn’t rain here. We 
are the last village  bordering the  desert.  Water is  brought in  by tankers for  us and our 
animals to drink, so where is the question of agriculture?  
We  have  been doing  embroidery work  for our  own use—the  ‘ghaghras’ we wear and 
bags and torans  for  decorating our homes  for festivals or marriages.  Over the last ten 
years,  we  have  developed  embroidery  into  our  main  economic  activity.  Now  it  is  our 
mainstay. We have begun to export our products and sell them overseas too! 
Raniben’s  house  collapsed  during  the  earthquake.    Luckily,  no  one  was  hurt.    Then  through  her 
embroidery  earnings,  Raniben  rebuilt  her  house  and  insured  herself  and  her  husband  with  SEWA 
Insurance. It came in handy when her husband suddenly had appendicitis and had to be rushed off to the 
hospital. 
Jaitunbibi,  Madhuben,  and  Raniben  are  all  informal  workers.  Their  lives,  like  millions  of  others  in  the 
informal economy in India, are full of toil and struggle. They work hard and, are economically very active 
but earn barely enough to keep their families going.   
In India, we now know that almost 93 percent of all workers are engaged in the informal economy, with a 
net  contribution of about 63 percent of GDP. Among Indian women workers, the vast majority—more 
than 94 percent—are in the informal economy.  
The current trends in the world of work in India suggest further informalization as the formal work force 
shrinks  for  several  reasons,  including  closures,  lay-offs,  and  new  contract-based  production  systems. 
Perhaps one of the  biggest examples of this shift from formal to informal work systems comes from our 
own home  city of Ahmedabad. In the late seventies and  eighties, more than 60 textile mills shut down, 
rendering more than 80,000 workers jobless. Most of these workers obtained reemployment in the city’s 105 
 
 
informal economy as street vendors, construction workers, loaders and unloaders in the marketplace, and 
ragpickers.  
The trend towards informalization preceded globalization and liberalization in  India but  certainly has been 
expedited  by  these  economic  changes.  Export-oriented  garment  units  and  mechanization  have  already 
affected the employment of women like Jaitunbibi and Madhuben. Supply of raw materials like cotton to 
world  markets  has  increased  their  prices  domestically,  adversely  affecting  the  profitability  of  the  textile 
sector within India. 
Disasters like the  earthquake and  persistent  droughts also affects  women’s work, not only  because they 
always suffer the most in terms of losses and damage, but also because it alters their world of work. We 
have seen the impact of the earthquake on the construction industry. Similarly, drought forces thousands 
of  families  to  migrate  to  cities  in  India,  where  they  seek  some  informal  employment.  Finally,  human 
disasters  like  sectarian  violence  also  results  in  shifting  of  employment  and  new  work  systems  as  both 
workers and contractors, or employers, can no longer freely move in different neighborhoods. Of course, 
the changes are more in the nature of a continuum with formal systems giving way to contractual ones and 
often one worker moving in and out of formal and informal work. 
All of the rapid changes in employment and work systems have a direct bearing on how social protection 
can be organized for informal workers. In any case, these workers barely had any social security. But in the 
new  context,  with  the  struggle  for  work  and  work  security  more  acute,  with  the  increasing  trend  of 
multiple economic activities undertaken by one worker and continued migration in search of employment, 
social protection poses both a challenge and an opportunity, as we shall see later, to organize workers.  
But first the challenges. Perhaps the most vexing issue of all is that of identifying informal workers who are, 
especially if they are women, still invisible, geographically  dispersed, and moving in and out of  different 
economic activities. Unions in India, including SEWA, have been pressing for the issuance of identity cards 
by the labor department. Not only does this give each worker a name and a face, but it also gives her or 
him recognition as a worker.  
This brings us to the next issue—how does one classify her work when she is engaged in multiple activities 
or trades? At SEWA we did a study, which revealed that most of the women were involved in at least two 
economic activities and up to four or five were not uncommon. So, for example, do we call Raniben an 
agricultural worker, dairy farmer, or embroiderer? And is Madhuben a construction worker or ragpicker?  
In trade  unions organizing formal workers  was never an issue, as by definition they were organized on 
trade  lines.  But  for  us,  the  multiplicity  of  work  and  occupations  does  pose  some,  though  not 
insurmountable, issues.  These come up when we try to  create structures  or platforms where workers, 
government officials, and employers come together to design, implement, and monitor social protection 
programs.  Resources  and  financial  contributions  are  involved  and  employers  generally  do  not  want  to 
contribute from their earnings to a worker who is not wholly identified with their particular industry. For 
some it is also an easy way to circumvent responsibilities—why contribute for the social protection of one 
whose work status is not clear-cut?    106 
 
 
The  changes  in  the  world  of  work  also  challenge  our  existing  concepts  of  employment  and  work.  An 
example of where this leads us in terms of social protection for workers is that of salt workers in our state. 
These are among the poorest of informal workers manufacturing 80 percent of India’s salt by pumping out 
brine from the dry desert. Entire families live in the desert for eight months of the year and return to their 
home villages for agricultural work when it rains.  
When SEWA organized these workers, child-care emerged as a strong need. This was then provided with 
the support of the Salt Workers Welfare Board, which decides on social security programs and resource 
allocations  from  a  fund,  developed  from  a  cess  levied  on  large  merchants  in  this  industry.
2  The  board 
approved  crèches  for  children  for  only  eight  months  of  the  year,  arguing  that  for  the  remaining  four 
months, when they worked as agricultural laborers or small farmers, these women  were no longer salt 
workers!
3  Since  child-care  is  a  perennial  need,  SEWA  stepped  in  to  fill  the  gap  and  we  continue  to 
negotiate with the Board to change their approach. 
Despite the maze of issues we have to  pass through to provide social protection  to informal workers, 
unions,  cooperatives, and  NGOs in India have developed  new ways and  used various opportunities to 
meet workers needs and to organize them. To continue with the example of child-care, Mobile Crèches, 
an  urban-based  NGO,  is  providing  quality  child-care  and  early  childhood  education  to  children  of 
construction  workers.  They  obtain  support  from  building  contractors,  the  government  and  others, 
organizing child-care at the construction sites. When a building is complete, the crèche picks up and moves 
to the next site, following the children there.  
In our own work at SEWA, we have also incorporated this mobile approach, providing child-care for salt 
workers’ children in the desert and then following them to their home villages in the monsoons. For other 
informal  workers,  most  of  whom  have  no  fixed  workplace,  child-care  is  organized  by  workers’ 
cooperatives in women’s urban  neighborhoods or in villages in rural areas. The  crèches are run  by the 
workers themselves, usually neighbors and friends of the women who go out to work.  And all  crèche 
timings are adjusted to the working hours of the mothers in a particular area. While run by the women, 
contributions for the crèches in cash and kind come from parents, employers, government programs, and 
the union.  
As most informal workers  have no access to protective insurance—for sickness, accidents, assets, work 
tools,  and  even  life—organizations  working  with  these  workers  have  developed  various  risk  coverage 
systems. In an insurance program for agricultural laborers in central India, insurance premiums are paid in 
kind—in kilograms of millet harvested, which are then converted into cash. The ‘millet premia’ are fixed 
village-wise  and  according  to  landholding.  The  workers  then  get  health  insurance  coverage  through  a 
linkage with the local hospital run by the medical college nearby.  
                                                 
2   Editor’s note: a “cess” is the term used in India for tax or levy. 
3   Editor’s note: “crèches” are day care centers for children. 107 
 
 
From  the  very  beginning  at  SEWA,  we  saw  that  our  members  faced  frequent  risks  and  even  major 
disasters.   These not only  caused immense suffering but also  eroded their carefully accumulated assets, 
resulting in indebtedness and their sinking deeper into poverty.  A woman had hardly saved enough to buy 
her house or reclaim mortgaged lands through a loan from SEWA Bank, when she had to sell or mortgage 
it again to cover the costs of a new crisis. 
SEWA began to experiment with insurance as a buffer and support to plug the economic leakage women 
experienced  during crises. Initially, our nationalized insurance  companies were wary of collaboration. But 
as  we  organized  and  grew  in  strength,  a  partnership  developed,  and  by  1992,  we  had  a  full-fledged 
insurance program. 
Today we have 93,000 insured members, both women and their husbands.  As the unfamiliar concept of 
insurance  becomes  acceptable  to  our  members,  SEWA  Insurance  or  VimoSEWA,  as  we  call  it,  is 
expanding. This growth has been achieved through an organization–wide campaign. It has involved door-
to-door canvassing, small and large meetings on the concept of risk sharing through insurance and public 
meetings or "gram sabhas" in the villages. Each worker was engaged in a discussion or dialogue at least two 
or three times before she decided to put down her hard-earned money as an insurance premium. Many 
of  those  who  are  insuring  themselves—roughly  one  third,  are  first-time  members  of  SEWA.  Thus 
insurance offers a new way of organizing informal workers around a concrete economic benefit. 
Today VimoSEWA or SEWA Insurance operates on the basis of a cooperative, working closely with local 
insurance companies. The insurance sector has been privatized recently in India, and there is a mandatory 
condition, which requires all the  new companies to insure rural workers. As a result, they are trying to 
develop competitive products that potentially could be useful to informal workers. 
Our insurance offers a package to cover life, accident, widowhood, sickness, and  damage to assets, i.e., 
homes and work tools.  Husband’s life, accident, and sickness coverage are also an option.  From 2003, 
coverage for  children’s illnesses will also be offered as an option to our members. In addition, we  have 
linked insurance to other financial services like savings and credit. Women save through their village-based 
savings and credit groups, and then sets aside some of their savings to pay for their insurance premiums. 
Of our currently insured members, 30,000 have saved enough to put down a lump sum as a fixed deposit 
in SEWA Bank. The interest accrued on this deposit then goes towards the premium every year, ensuring 
continuous  and  long-term  coverage.  Thus,  building  on  existing  solidarity  networks  and  the  fact  that  all 
informal  workers  need  insurance  regardless  of  their  nature  of  work,  SEWA  Insurance  has  grown  quite 
rapidly with spin-off effects that we shall see later. 
Health care is the most widespread of services provided to informal workers everywhere today. Despite 
considerable public health infrastructure in  India, informal workers  do not have access to services for a 
whole host of reasons ranging from poor quality, inappropriate or inadequate services and sheer absence 
of  these,  especially  in  remote  rural  villages.  The  upshot  of  this  is  that  most  of  the  working  poor—an 
estimated 80 percent or more—seek care from  private  practitioners.  While the services may  be more 
prompt, they are  not  necessarily of good  quality and are always three to five times as expensive as the 108 
 
 
public health services. Small  wonder then, that there is a  huge  demand  for affordable and good  quality 
health care for workers at their doorsteps. This demand has given rise to thousands of community-based 
health  programs  run  mainly  by  NGOs  but  also  by  some  workers  organizations,  both  unions  and 
cooperatives. In the Rajasthan desert, an NGO URMUL, has organized primary health care, and especially 
tuberculosis  care,  for  nomadic  shepherds,  craft  workers,  and  agricultural  laborers,  bringing  down  TB 
prevalence in this endemic and remote area.  
In  Gujarat,  thousands  of  traditional  midwives  or  "dais"  have  been  organized  by  SEWA  and  have  even 
formed four, district-level cooperatives.  Through these, they are both providing their health services and 
obtaining some fees as income.  
Housing and  basic services like  water, sanitation, and electricity is yet another area of social protection 
where organizations of informal workers have broken new ground. Since informal workers cannot always 
be organized on  the  basis of one trade, the alternative is to organize in their own  neighborhoods, and 
around basic needs like housing, water, and sanitation. After years of  pressing for these services  for the 
urban  poor,  SEWA  joined  hands  with  the  local  municipal  authorities  to  develop  a  program  aimed  at 
transforming  urban  neighborhoods  by  providing  basic  amenities:  water,  sanitation,  individual  toilets, 
garbage  removal,  street  lighting,  landscaping,  and  paving.  This  program,  called  ‘Parivartan,’  meaning 
change, is one  based  on a partnership between government, workers, and the corporate sector, with 
each also  contributing  funds towards basic services in a neighborhood.  Currently, through this  process, 
families  all  engaged  in  informal  employment,  have  not  only  obtained  basic  amenities  but  also  have 
organized  their  own  neighborhood  committees  for  maintenance  and  overall  community  development. 
They have also joined the union. This is still a small but growing initiative in urban renewal and organizing. 
In the villages of four districts, we have linked workers with government housing programs enabling them 
to  have  a  solid,  disaster-proof  roof  over  their  heads  for  the  first  time.  In  the  process,  several  informal 
workers were introduced to SEWA for the first time as well.  
‘Parivartan’  and  our  rural  housing  program,  are  both  examples  of  SEWA’s  approach  to  organizing—
organizing  workers  both  area-wise  and  trade  or  occupation-wise.    This  ensures  that  regardless  of  her 
exact  work  status,  every  worker  is  organized,  both  through  her  local  organization—either  an  urban 
community-based  organization  (CBO),  as  in  'Parivartan,'  or  her  district-level  association  of  village-based 
producers’ groups, in the rural areas.  In this way, more than 3,000 small workers’ groups and district-level 
cooperatives and associations have been organized with a combined union strength of 530,000.  
My  final  example  of  organizing  social  protection  comes  from  our  government  labor  department.  As  a 
response to organizing by workers and also to offer some  protection to them, several workers' welfare 
boards  have  been established in  India.  The resource  base  for these has  been a cess levied on the  final 
products, which  employers must contribute to a fund. The fund is administered  by the government, but 
the approach is tripartite, with government, workers’ and employers’ representatives on the board. This is 
then a forum  for planning, developing, and monitoring the implementation of social protection including 
maternity benefits, health insurance, child-care, and housing to mention a few. Often the implementation 
is undertaken by unions, as in our example of salt workers’ crèches. The responsibility of identification and 109 
 
 
registration of workers, ensuring that social protection actually reaches them, and also the monitoring of 
their working conditions, rests with the  board. The largest example of this workers’ fund approach is the 
bidi workers (Indian cigarettes) welfare fund. But there is also the salt workers’ fund, one for coir workers, 
head loaders, and others.  
Studies commissioned by the Indian Labor Commission recently showed that these boards do serve their 
purpose—to  support  workers  and  encourage  organizing—to  a  considerable  extent.  Since  concrete 
economic and social security benefits are offered, workers are encouraged to identify themselves or join 
unions that help to ensure they get access.  
These varied, some small and some fairly large, experiences in social protection offer us some lessons to 
meet the challenges in the changing world of work. First, these approaches are a good way to organize 
informal  workers.  While  categorization  of  workers  by  occupation  and  following  them  in  their  different 
workplaces  is  challenging,  the  provision  of  social  security  services  is  actually  an  opportunity  to  identify 
workers and promote their organizing. Since they get a useful service, workers have an incentive to come 
forward to identify themselves, register, get an identity card, and even join a union, cooperative, or other 
local organization.  
We saw how providing insurance services, health care, child-care, and housing meant that workers were 
registered and  even developed  new forms of organizing and solidarity—like neighborhood  committees, 
such as the ‘Parivartan’ urban infrastructure program and the midwives' cooperatives for health care. 
Second, social security services, when  provided, offer a way for informal workers to link  up with formal 
systems  and  government  and  employers.  Whether  we  recall  our  example  of  crèches  for  salt  workers' 
children, insurance, health care,  or basic amenities in urban areas,  workers interface, many for the first 
time,  with  the  mainstream.  This  recognition  and  inclusion  is  vital  for  their  own  self-worth  and  also  for 
building their organizations, for  ‘voice’ and representation.  
Third, running their own social  protection programs is empowering,  builds  up workers’  confidence and 
leadership, and ensures that all services remain relevant and affordable to all  working  people.  Over the 
years,  we  have  watched  in  admiration  as  our  sisters,  midwives,  crèche  teachers,  and  insurance  and 
housing  promoters  have  developed  into  strong  leaders.  They  have  served  their  communities  and  also 
became  organizers,  struggling  against  injustices  and  developing  alternative  constructive  activities,  for 
workers.      They  have  also  built  and  led  their  own  representative  organizations  like  cooperatives  and 
producers’ association. 
Fourth, many of the social protection programs can be sustainable—both financially and in terms of human 
resources—in the long run. Our experience with SEWA  Insurance shows that with a large membership 
base  and  risk-sharing  measures  like  reinsurance,  coverage  normally  considered  “too  risky,”  like  health 
insurance,  can  be viable.   In fact,  health is the most financially viable of SEWA’s Insurance plans and has 
been  so  from  the  beginning.  Further,  if  contributions  from  government,  employers,  private  trusts,  and 
workers  are  collected,  then  social  protection  programs—whether  health  or  child-care,  insurance,  or 
housing—can be sustainable indefinitely. 110 
 
 
The key is that these services must be appropriate, timely, affordable, flexible, and managed and owned by 
the people themselves.  Once local people see that these services work and are useful, they are ready to 
pay  from  their  earnings  towards  such  social  protection.  However,  one  should  also  note  that  the 
developmental  costs  or  inputs,  especially  in  terms  of  capacity-building  and  technical  inputs  for  service 
providers  are  considerable.    And  they  are  not  low  cost.    This  is  because  seeking  out  and  organizing 
informal workers is a labor-intensive and time-consuming process. To return  to the  example of SEWA 
Insurance, we learned that it takes two or three visits or “contacts” with women individually, or in a group 
setting,  before they actually  pay out  premiums.   These costs are often initially as much as the premium 
paid out per member, but do decrease with time.  Also, these costs cannot be absorbed by the workers 
alone.    Clearly,  start-up  funds  are  required  from  government,  employers,  and  other  sources  for  this 
purpose. 
Fifth, social security  programs, must be developed according to workers’ varied and multiple needs and 
include elements that hitherto may not always be included in social protection, like child-care, for example.  
Our experience is that informal workers want as comprehensive an approach to social security as possible.  
Thus, along with  health insurance, they want life and accident insurance and also their work tools and 
assets to be insured. Further, there are several ways in which informal workers have built  up their own 
social security systems, including savings, risk funds, and grain  banks.  These  need to be  understood and 
built upon.  Asset building through savings and credit is one of the most important ways in which workers 
secure  their  lives.    The  burgeoning  microfinance  movement  worldwide  is  strongest  among  informal 
workers and is already well-established.  As it is a subject that warrants study in and of itself,  I have  not 
elaborated on it here. 
Sixth, special organizations and institutions must be created for the social protection of informal workers.  
Multiple  and  varied  forms  of  organizations  exist  in  different  countries.    At  SEWA  we  have  found  that 
unions, village-based producers and/or savings groups and their district-level associations, cooperatives and 
their state-level associations, and urban neighborhood committees or associations are ideal for organizing 
workers, especially for social protection. These organizations are membership-based, worker-owned and 
managed, leading to credibility, accountability, increased solidarity, and also leadership of the workers. In 
addition, once informal workers  have their own representative organization, they  can bargain,  demand, 
and  set  up  linkages  with  the  outside  world.    When  traditional  midwives  or  "dais"  formed  their  own 
cooperative, they could ask for user fees from their own communities, identity cards, and a more active 
role in the governments’ public  health system.  The latter can then be molded or even recast in favor of 
mechanisms and systems more suitable to  poor  communities.  Thus, while the type of social protection 
organizations serving the poor may and should vary according to local conditions, they must be controlled 
and owned by informal workers themselves. 
Seventh,  we  have seen that work security and social security, or social  protection, are two sides of the 
same coin.  Each  cannot be attained without the other.  If informal workers are to be strengthened and 
supported in their struggle for justice and against poverty, then work security is essential.  Without regular 
work  and  income,  they  cannot  feed  themselves  and  their  families,  nor  have  any  measure  of  health 111 
 
 
security,  insurance  coverage,  or  housing,  for  example.  At  the  same  time,  work  security  can  never  be 
achieved without meeting the social security  needs  of informal workers.  In sum, it is an integrated and 
holistic approach to informal workers’ overall well-being that will minimize the risks they face, strengthen 
them economically, and help lead them to a better future. 
Eighth, there are several spin-off  effects, some  quite  unexpected, when organizing social  protection for 
informal  workers.  The  services  themselves  can  provide  self-employment,  or  at  least  additional 
employment, and income to workers. Now midwives trained in a special program that we run at SEWA, 
are earning an extra couple of hundred rupees per month from women in their villages. This upgraded skill 
training has resulted in an elevated status in their villages and people’s willingness to pay for their services. 
Further, when we organized crèches, we found that 70 percent of the older children went to school for 
the  first time, as they were relieved of child-care responsibilities. And, of  course, women  were able to 
earn up to 50 percent more because of child-care services being available.  
Finally,  since  many  of  the  examples  of  social  protection  involved  partnerships—with  government, 
employers, and other outside agencies—workers became visible, legitimate, and even respected for their 
significant  economic  contributions.  They were able to  enter the  national mainstream on  equal terms in 
many  instances.      For  the  first  time,  workers  got  representation  and  voice  on  state-  and  national-level 
boards and committees for social protection. When our state constituted a special task force to develop a 
policy for  urban  development, informal workers themselves were on the executive committee, guiding 
and molding the process according to their needs and priorities. 
We  have seen at  SEWA that we cannot  leave the entire responsibility  for social protection and service 
delivery  on  government.    While  government  undoubtedly  has  the  primary  responsibility—especially  in 
terms  of  developing  appropriate  policies  and  programs  with  suitable  resources—it  is  the  active 
involvement of workers, and others, right from the conceptualising stage to the planning, implementation, 
and monitoring stages that makes all the difference. 
Tripartite or multipartite structures,  processes, and  partnerships are called for today to meet the growing 
challenges for social protection.  These include public and  private decision makers, as well as workers’ or 
people’s  representatives.    Multiple  forums:  boards,  committees,  task  forces,  and  commissions  lend 
themselves to partnerships.   It is in these groups  that modalities and  constraints to  full coverage of the 
poorest of workers can be discussed and worked out. 
Coming together to work on concrete programs is of course a win/win situation for all involved.  And we 
have seen that most of all it strengthens workers and their movements, and gives them hope, energy, and 
courage to face the challenges that lie ahead in the changing world of work. 
 112 
 
 
Social protection and informal employment  
in Latin America: from the weak to the strong?
* 
Armando Barrientos 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
 
As conventionally measured, informal employment accounts  for around  one-half of the  employed labor 
force in Latin America, and this share has been rising steadily since the 1980s. There are many unresolved 
issues regarding the  definition,  function, and measurement of informality, but a  common  feature among 
informal  workers  is  the  lack  of  social  protection.  Regardless  of  their  employment  status  and  earnings, 
informal  workers  show  a  significantly  greater  exposure  to  the  risk  of  poverty,  unemployment,  and 
hazardous  working  conditions.  Yet,  they  are  usually  excluded  from  access  to  formal  social  protection, 
public  programs,  and  market  insurance.  This  paper  examines  the  factors  behind  the  vulnerability  of 
informal  work,  and  identifies  and  evaluates  potential  means  of  extending  social  protection  to  informal 
workers. 
Over  the  last  two  decades,  conditions  in  the  labor  market  have  deteriorated  in  Latin  America,  while 
structural  adjustment  and  globalization  have  reduced  the  capacity  of  governments  to  respond  to  rising 
uncertainty and risk. In most developing countries, existing programs to prevent and ameliorate the risk of 
poverty and unemployment have proved inadequate. The extensive social sector reforms in Latin America 
have not, on the  whole, improved matters. Against this context, there is an  emerging  consensus around 
social  protection  as  an  effective  agenda  for  social  policy  in  developing  countries.  This  paper  discusses 
whether  social  protection  can  prove  to  be  more  inclusive  of  informal  workers,  and  more  effective  in 
addressing their vulnerability.  
The  factors  behind  the  vulnerability  experienced  by  informal  workers  are  many.  Their  employment  is 
irregular and precarious, formal social  protection programs and market insurance usually exclude them, 
their households are poorly diversified in terms of  employment, and informal social protection  networks 
are weak. Reducing the vulnerability of informal workers is a significant  policy challenge because, in most 
cases,  the  conditions  responsible  for  their  greater  vulnerability  also  operate  to  constrain  policy 
interventions.  A  number  of  recent  examples  of  interventions,  which  have  successfully  extended  social 
protection to informal workers, are considered. These show that a wider spread of solidarity values  can 
create conditions favorable to the extension of social protection to informal workers.   
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Following  the  introduction,  Section  I  outlines  and  discusses  new 
approaches  to  social  protection.  Section  II  briefly  reviews  key  measures  and  trends  in  informal 
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employment in Latin America, while Section III considers the factors that explain limited social protection 
among informal workers. Sections  IV and V focus on  how to extend social protection to these workers, 
followed  by  a  brief  discussion  of  political  economy  issues  involved  in  extending  social  protection.  The 
paper ends with a summary of the main conclusions.  
I. A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL PROTECTION  
Social  protection has  been traditionally  defined in terms of a range of  public and occupational  programs 
protecting  individuals  and  their  households  from  poverty  and  deprivation.  These  include  programs 
covering life cycle contingencies such as maternity and old age, and work-related  contingencies such as 
unemployment  or  work-related  injuries.  In  the  1990s,  social  protection  underwent  a  significant 
transformation.  Within  the  context  of  economic  crises,  structural  adjustment,  and  globalization,  social 
protection has come to define an agenda for social policy in developing countries.
1 
Globalization has been a significant factor in the emergence of social protection. The greater openness of 
developing economies implies a rising vulnerability to changes in global markets, and a concentration of risk 
on the more vulnerable sectors (IADB, 2000). Globalization increases the need for social protection, while 
at the same time reducing the tax base of national governments (Rodrik, 1997).
2 Globalization undermines 
the capacity of governments, especially in developing countries, to respond to increased demand for social 
protection.  A  wide  range  of  providers  and  stakeholders  are  increasingly  involved  in  social  protection, 
mostly  led  by  national  governments,  but  involving  international  organizations,  NGOs,  employers,  trade 
unions,  and  community  organizations.  The  involvement  of  a  wider  set  of  providers,  and  the  need  to 
assess,  develop,  and  combine  interventions  into  an  integrated  response,  are  key  factors  behind  the 
redefinition of social protection. 
Social  protection  has  been  redefined  as  consisting  of  “public  actions  taken  in  response  to  levels  of 
vulnerability, risk, and deprivation which are deemed socially unacceptable within a given polity or society” 
(Conway,  de  Haan,  and  Norton,  2000).  As  such,  it  is  broader  than  social  security,  which  is  normally 
associated  with  compensatory welfare state programs existing in advanced  economies.  It is also broader 
than  social  insurance,  defined  as  contributory  programs  covering  a  specific  range  of  contingencies.  It  is 
broader than social safety nets, which are mainly short-term interventions in response to food or income 
crises.  Social  protection  focuses  on  poverty  and  vulnerability  (de  Haan  2000).  It  seeks  to  address  the 
causes of poverty, which are to be found in the multiple risks faced by the poor in their vulnerability to the 
impact  of  the  realization  of  these  risks,  and  in  their  behavioral  response  to  them  (World  Bank,  2001). 
Social  protection  prioritizes  poverty  prevention  and  focuses  attention  on  facilitating  forward-looking 
responses  to  risk  by  the  poor  and  vulnerable.  An  important  implication  is  that  public  interventions  are 
evaluated as investments (World Bank 2001). While acknowledging the important role of public provision 
                                                 
1   For a discussion of the transformation of social protection within the World Bank, see World Bank (2001), and for a restatement of social protection 
within the ILO see ILO (2001b).  
2   For example through the migration of highly skilled workers, the restrictions on tax policy brought  about by  the need to remain competitive in 
international markets, and the growth in e-commerce (Tanzi, 2000). 114 
 
 
of social protection, and the important role of governments in supporting and strengthening other forms of 
provision, social protection acknowledges the wider range of providers involved in the production of social 
protection in developing countries. 
This  new perspective on social  protection  has implications  for informal workers. These  will be explored 
below, but the next section provides a brief outline of the growth of informality in Latin America. 
II. THE GROWTH OF INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
Two measures  of informal employment are commonly used. The ILO measure  below, defines  informal 
employment  as  including  workers  in  microenterprises  (five  employees  or  less),  the  self-employed 
(excluding professionals), workers in  domestic employment, and unwaged family workers. An alternative 
measure defines informal employment as including workers not covered by social insurance programs or 
labor  market  regulations.  This  is  referred  to  as  the  uncovered  measure  below,  and  measures  the 
dependent workers not contributing to social insurance programs as a proportion of the labor force. 
The two measures of informal employment for Latin America in 1990 and 2000 are shown in Table 1  
 
Table 1:  Urban Informal Employment in Latin America as a Proportion  of the Total Labor Force, 2000 
(1990 Figures in Brackets) 
  Men  Women  Total 
ILO measure
1  44.5   (39.4)  50.3  (47.4)  46.9  (42.8) 
of which:             
self-employed  25.3  (21.6)  23.7  (23.2)  24.6  (22.2) 
microenterprise  18.7  (17.3)  11.2  (10.4)  15.6  (14.7) 
domestic  0.6  (0.5)  15.4  (13.8)  6.7  (5.8) 
Uncovered measure
a  
(excludes self-employed) 
34.4   (31.6)  37.5  (34.9)  35.8  (33.4) 
ILO measure
b excluding self-employed  19.3  (17.8)  26.2  (24.2)  22.3  (20.5) 
Uncovered measure plus self-employed
c  51.1  (46.3)  52.3  (50.0)  51.6  (48.1) 
Data Source: ILO (2001a) based on household survey and official data. 
a  Includes workers in enterprises with five workers or less, the self-employed and unwaged workers, and domestic workers, as a proportion of the total 
labor force. Figures are a weighted average of 12 countries. 
b  Share of employees not contributing to social insurance programs. Figures are a weighted average of 10 countries. 
c  Uncovered measure recalculated to include the self-employed and as a proportion of the total labor force. 115 
 
 
The figures in Table 1 show the high incidence of informal employment in Latin America. Roughly one in 
two  workers  in  Latin  America  are  in  informal  employment.  The  incidence  of  informal  employment  is 
higher among women than men. One in every four workers is self-employed, and  close to one in every 
six works in enterprises employing between two and five workers. Nearly one in every six women works 
in domestic employment. 
The  ILO  and  the  uncovered  measure  are  not  directly  comparable  because  the  latter  excludes  the  self-
employed.  To  enable  comparison,  two  other  measures  were  constructed.  Firstly,  subtracting  the  self-
employed  from the ILO measure, yields a measure of informality comparable to the uncovered measure 
(they  both  focus  on  dependent  employment).  This  shows  that  the  latter  is  much  higher  because  a 
significant share of workers in formal employment are not contributing to social insurance  programs. In 
2000,  the  proportion  of  dependent  workers  in  medium  and  large  enterprises  (formal  employment 
according to the ILO measure) contributing to social insurance programs was 79 percent (down from 80.6 
percent  in  1990).  Alternatively,  the  self-employed,  who  are  predominantly  outside  social  insurance 
programs, were added to the uncovered measure yielding a measure of informality as a proportion of the 
total labor force. It shows the  highest incidence of informality at 51.6 percent of  the total labor force in 
2000.
3  This  is  the  most  appropriate  measure  in  context  of  this  paper,  as  the  absence  of  formal  social 
protection  is  taken  as  the  defining  characteristic  of  informality.  This  measure  places  the  emphasis  on 
vulnerability as a key indicator of informality, especially as in Latin America noncontributory social insurance 
or social assistance programs are largely absent. 
There is evidence of a close association existing between informality and income poverty. This is not to say 
that all informal workers are poor, or that poverty is limited to informal workers and their households,
4 but 
the incidence of poverty is significantly higher among informal workers compared to formal workers. In a 
study  based  on  household  survey  data  for  the  mid-1990s,  Orlando  and  Pollack  estimate  the  share  of 
earners who live in poor households at 25.6 percent among informal workers, compared to 12.7 percent 
among formal workers (Orlando and Pollack 2000: 29).
5 The ratio of the share of workers in  informal 
employment who live in poor households to the share of workers in formal employment who live in poor 
households rises from 1.8 percent to just over 2 percent between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. They 
conclude that the gap in poverty incidence across these two groups of workers appears to be rising. Other 
studies have also shown that informality is an important  determinant of poverty. Freije Rodríguez (2001) 
provides  a  review  of  literature  on  this  issue,  which  finds  that  informal  workers  in  poverty  show  lower 
probabilities of transitions out of poverty especially when engaged in lower productivity activities. 
                                                 
3   There is a general consensus that informal employment has risen significantly in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s (Turnham, Salomé, et al., 
1990; Charmes, 1992; Weller, 1998b). Both Mezzera (1989) and Charmes (1992) measure informal employment in the period between 1950 and 
1980 using data from National Censuses. They find that urban informal employment remained more or less stable throughout this period. Keeping in 
mind the lack of comparability of data from before and after 1980, it would appear that this trend was swiftly reversed after the 1980s (the "lost 
decade" strikes again!). A rapid rise in informal employment followed in the 1990s (Barrientos, 2004). 
4   There is also considerable cross-country variation in the incidence of poverty among informal workers. 
5   They use a USD 2 a day poverty line, and adjust earnings by the average dependency ratio of population to earners. Informal employment, or the 
microenterprise sector as they refer to it, includes employers and employees  in establishments with five workers or less but excludes unwaged 
workers. 116 
 
 
In sum, the incidence of informal employment in Latin America is significant, and it rose in the 1990s. The 
close association existing  between informality, vulnerability, and income  poverty  underlines the  need to 
address the lack of social protection among workers in informal employment. 
III. WHY DO INFORMAL WORKERS LACK SOCIAL PROTECTION? 
It  is  important  to  review  the  reasons  for  the  lack  of  social  protection  among  informal  workers.  It  is 
postulated that the lack of social protection among informal workers is a consequence of the orientation of 
formal social  protection,  conditions in the labor market, and the limitations of informal social protection 
networks. These are discussed below. 
Why Do Informal Workers Fail to Participate in Formal Social Protection? 
As a general rule, formal social protection  programs exclude informal workers and their  dependants. In 
Latin America, the development of social protection programs followed a social insurance model, in which 
workers, and their employers, make payroll contributions into a fund, from which benefits are paid when 
designated  contingencies  materialize  (Mesa-Lago,  1991;  Barrientos,  1998).  The  social  insurance  model 
excluded  workers  in  informal  employment,  because  of  their  irregular  employment  and  earnings,  and 
because these constituted high-risk groups (Barrientos, 2004b).
6 Social insurance funds seldom encourage 
the participation of workers in informal employment. 
During  the  1990s,  a  number  of  Latin  American  countries  replaced  their  social  insurance  funds  with 
individual savings plans, in the form of retirement savings plans (nine countries), health insurance plans (four 
countries),  and  unemployment  savings  plans  (three  countries)  (Barrientos,  2004a).  At  the  time  of  the 
reforms, proponents  predicted these savings plans  would operate to reduce informal employment. This 
was to be a consequence of savings plans generating greater  benefits with lower  contribution rates, and 
also of a more direct link between  contributions and  benefits. In any event, these  expectations have  not 
materialized. Social insurance reforms have made very little impact upon informality, and the labor force 
coverage of  the new savings  plans  has shown a steep decline among both  formal and informal workers 
(Barrientos, 2004a). Individual savings plans are proving to be even less friendly to informal workers. 
Some  design  features  of  existing  social  protection  programs  discourage  the  participation  of  informal 
workers (Barrientos and Firinguetti, 1995; Barrientos, 1996a; 2002b; 2004). Individual savings plans have 
few solidarity and insurance  properties. Basically, a worker only gets  what s/he saves, and the uncertain 
returns from investing these savings. This makes them unattractive to low-income groups who are close to 
the  breadline and  unable to save. Moreover, savings  plans are highly illiquid.  Accumulated  pension  plan 
                                                 
6   There are few examples of informal workers being incorporated into formal social insurance programs, most of which failed. In Argentina, a special 
social insurance fund was set up for the self-employed, the Caja de Autonómos, but it soon ran into financial deficits and was dissolved in the 1994 
reform of pensions. There were greater opportunities for the self-employed to participate  in mature social insurance programs, as in Chile and 
Uruguay, where access to benefits did not require a long contribution record. Participants tended to be the better off among the self-employed. 117 
 
 
savings, for example, can  be accessed only  by reaching the age of retirement or dying. For households 
with irregular incomes, or where livelihoods depend on periodic investment  in stocks or  capital goods, 
pension savings  plans are singularly unattractive. Furthermore, the insurance  coverage  provided  by these 
plans is bundled in ways that deter informal workers from participating. Existing social protection programs 
have  not  been  designed  with  informal  workers  in  mind,  demonstrating  the  failure  of  formal  social 
protection in Latin America to include informal workers.
7  
The Labor Market: Friend or Foe? 
The capacity to access paid employment is crucial to avoiding poverty, as earnings from work are the most 
important source of income for low-income households. The labor market is also an important source of 
insurance  against  shocks  to  household  income  and  consumption.  Faced  with  unemployment  or 
unexpected  health  expenditures,  households  will  often  attempt  to  protect  their  standards  of  living  by 
encouraging hitherto inactive members to seek paid work  (the added  worker effect), or  by encouraging 
already active members to work overtime or find a second job.  In addition, many instruments of social 
protection  such  as  maternity  leave  and  benefits,  disability  pensions,  and  employer  provided  health 
insurance, are dependent on employment. To this extent, the labor market is a friend. At the same time, 
the labor market is a source  of significant risk of unemployment, work-related accidents,  health hazards, 
and disability. The labor market can also be a foe (Barrientos, 2003a). Workers in informal employment 
are significantly more exposed to labor market risk, and at the same time are much less likely to benefits 
from  employment-related  social  protection  instruments.  Among  workers  in  informal  employment,  the 
labor  market  is  predominantly  a  foe  to  the  extent  that  they  are  exposed  in  full  to  the  risks  from 
unregulated  employment  without  being  in  a  position  to  benefit  from  the  insurance  provided  by 
employment-based social protection.  
Gaviria  (2001)  uses  household  survey  data  from  seven  countries  in  Latin  America  to  investigate  the 
sources of adverse income shocks to households and their strategies in coping with these. Interestingly, he 
finds that unemployment is by far the dominant source of adverse income shocks. Working from a sample 
of representative households he finds that 30 percent reported income shocks arising from unemployment 
affecting  one  of  their  members.
8  The  next  most  important  category  consists  of  business  failures  (15 
percent of households reported it). The study also investigates the strategies used by households to cope 
with income shocks, and finds that the dominant strategy is the entry of household members into the labor 
market.  These  findings  confirm  the  importance  of  the  labor  market  as  both  a  source  of  risk,  and  an 
insurance instrument.  
Poor employment diversification  among informal workers’ households adds to  their vulnerability.  Orlando and 
Pollack use 1994 data from household surveys collected by ECLAC for six Latin American countries, and define 
microenterprise households as those in which earnings from informal work account for  at least one-half of the 
                                                 
7   The interesting issue why social insurance eventually covered the whole population  in European countries, while it never went beyond formal 
workers in Latin America, will be explored in Section 5 below. 
8   The countries involved are Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Ecuador, Venezuela,  and Colombia. The sample  includes around 1000 
households per country. The data was collected in 1999, and the respondents were asked retrospective questions about the impact of the crisis. 118 
 
 
total  household  income  (Orlando  and  Pollack,  2000).  They  find  that  informal  households,  thus  defined, 
"specialize" in microenterprise activity, such  that  few households in the sample appeared  to receive income 
from  both  informal  and  formal  earnings.  As  they  note,  this  “is  somewhat  unexpected  since,  theoretically, 
striking a balance between microenterprise and nonmicroenterprise activities within the same household could 
be a way to cope  with income uncertainty by reducing  risk” (Orlando and Pollack, 2000: 20). Other studies 
confirm the lack of employment diversification among informal workers’ households.  
The effective operation of the labor market is key to the capacity of Latin American households to protect 
their  consumption.  This applies with greater force to low-income  households who  depend to a greater 
extent  on  informal  employment.  Increasingly,  it  is  accepted  that  efficient  labor  markets  require  well-
designed and effective labor market institutions (Freeman, 1993; Nickell and Layard, 1999). Effective labor 
market institutions are an important factor in reducing the vulnerability experienced by workers in informal 
employment. There has been much discussion on whether informality is a product of weak and imperfect 
labor market institutions, or whether it is a factor of excessive and costly regulation (Cox Edwards, 1997; 
Weller,  1998a).  For  most  Latin  American  countries,  labor  standards  enshrined  in  legislation  explicitly 
exclude most informal workers. Moreover, ineffectiveness in their monitoring and  enforcement  ensures 
labor standards remain largely aspirational. Many labor market institutions have weakened in the last two 
decades. Trade union  density and the incidence of  collective bargaining  have declined significantly from a 
low base. Improved market institutions are needed in Latin America to ensure they perform their role in 
reducing vulnerability among workers, and especially among informal workers.  
The Limitations of Informal Social Protection Networks 
It  has  been  argued  that  informal  workers  are  absent  from  formal  social  protection  programs  in  part 
because  they  develop  informal  social  protection  networks  of  their  own.  The  scant  evidence  on  this 
suggests the sustainability of informal networks, and their capacity to extend coverage, is limited. A study of 
11 microhealth insurance projects in Latin America supports this conclusion (CLAISS, 1999). The sampled 
projects  have  a  variety  of  sources  of  financing  and  governance  structures,  but  their  common  aim  is  to 
extend  health  insurance  coverage  to  poor  and  excluded  groups  which  to  a  large  extent  overlap  with 
informal  employment.  These  projects  show  a  measure  of  success  in  extending  coverage  to  otherwise 
excluded  groups,  but  they  reach  only  a  fraction  of  their  target  population.  The  indicators  of  financial 
sustainability  of  the  sample  projects  were  poor,  and,  projects  were  mostly  sustainable  only  where 
significant government subsidies or support from international donors could be secured. The key problem 
faced  by these schemes  was that the  combination of  high  health risk and low income characterising the 
target population made insurance pooling, and hence self-financing, unlikely. This study echoes the findings 
of similar studies which underline the limited capacity of informal networks to provide social protection for 
high risk, low income groups.
9 
                                                 
9   See the review in Morduch (1998). 119 
 
 
IV. HOW TO EXTEND SOCIAL PROTECTION TO WORKERS IN INFORMAL 
EMPLOYMENT 
Lists and Their Limitations 
The heterogeneity of informality suggests that policy interventions should be focused on the specific needs 
of groups that make up informal employment. This involves consideration of the factors behind the limited 
social protection of informal workers, as was done in the previous section, and identification of policy areas 
where improvements can be made. A number of papers set out desirable policy interventions along these 
lines  (Mesa-Lago, 1992; ILO, 2000b; van  Ginneken, 2000; Freije Rodríguez, 2001; Mesa-Lago, 2001). 
This  literature  concludes  that  the  following  interventions  would  improve  social  protection  for  informal 
workers: reform of existing  formal social  protection to include informal workers;  development of social 
assistance  programs; improved access to credit, technology, training, and marketing for microenterprises; 
extension and enforcement of labor standards; and support for informal social protection schemes. This is 
a valuable exercise in identifying what avenues need to be investigated in order to extend social protection, 
but it takes us only  part of the way.  This is because it should  be acknowledged that the conditions that 
have  led  to  the  growth  of  informal  employment  in  Latin  America  at  the  same  time  constrain  the 
implementation of many of these policy interventions. The  de  facto liberalization of labor markets in the 
region  has  led  to  deterioration  in  the  quality  of  jobs  created  and  to  the  growing  informalization  of 
employment. These labor market changes make it difficult to extend and enforce labor standards, and to 
widen  formal  social  protection.  An  extension  of  labor  standards  to  include  informal  workers  would 
indisputably improve their access to social protection, but it is hard to see how this is likely to come about 
while  the  weight  of  public  policy  is  on  liberalizing  the  employment  relationship.  Along  similar  lines, 
reforming  existing  formal social  protection, e.g.,  pension  plans and  health insurance, to include  informal 
workers makes a lot of sense, but runs counter to recent social sector reforms which emphasize individual 
saving  as  the  main  instrument  of  formal  social  protection.  It  is  important  to  appreciate  that  the  same 
conditions that have led to the growth of informal employment also make it harder to put in place policy 
interventions to extend social protection to workers in informal employment. 
The  list  of  policy  interventions  includes  all  areas  where  social  protection  deficits  can  be  observed  for 
specific groups of workers, but a considered assessment of their likely effectiveness is lacking. In the view of 
the ILO, “country studies have shown that it is impossible to effectively reach out to the informal sector as 
a whole through the extension of formal sector insurance schemes. It has been estimated that only about 
50  percent  of  the  target  group  can  be  reached  via  existing  schemes”  (ILO,  2000a).  Others  argue  that 
formal social protection may not suit informal workers. For example, James (2001) argues that the scope 
for extending coverage of pensions and health insurance to informal workers is marginal, and could  be 
undesirable.  As  she  puts  it,  many  “workers  may  be  better  off  outside  the  formal  retirement  old  age 
security system, with higher take-home pay, which would be reduced by social security contributions. And 120 
 
 
the  economy  may  be  better  off  with  more  jobs  coming  from  lower  labor  costs,  if  employers  operate 
outside  the  social  security  system”  (James,  2001:  155).    These  prescriptions  should  not  be  accepted 
uncritically,  there  is  much  that  can  be  done  by  formal  social  protection  programs  to  include  informal 
workers, but the point is that the effectiveness of these  policy interventions cannot be taken for granted. 
The  same  applies  to  other  policy  interventions  in  the  list.
10  Further  work  is  needed  to  provide  a 
considered  assessment  of  the  effectiveness  of  policy  interventions  recommended  for  extending  social 
protection to informal workers. 
What Works in Extending Social Protection to Informal Workers? 
It may be  productive to approach this issue from a different angle, and to ask what works in  extending 
social protection to informal workers. In this section a handful of selective examples are discussed.
11 
Previdência Rural in Brazil  
In  1988,  a  new  Constitution  in  Brazil  signalled  a  new  social  contract  after  two  decades  of  dictatorship 
(Brumer,  2002).  The  new  Constitution  extended  social  protection  rights  to  workers  in  informal 
employment  in  rural  areas.  Before  1991,  the  FUNRURAL  program  provided  pensions  to  poor  rural 
workers, but the  benefits were limited to one per household thus excluding many older women. In the 
new Previdência Rural program implemented in 1991, all men aged 60 and over, and all women aged 55 
and over who  can demonstrate  having  engaged in informal work  can access a  pension equivalent to a 
minimum  wage.  On  paper,  beneficiaries  must  have  a  contribution  record,  but  in  practice  a  simple 
certification  by  producer  organizations  or  trade  unions  is  sufficient  to  establish  entitlement.  Previdência 
Rural absorbs around 0.8  percent of GDP and is  financed through a tax on the first sale of agricultural 
produce (covering around 10 percent of  pension  benefit expenditure) and government transfers to the 
social insurance funds (covering the residual 90 percent). Access to entitlements does not require inactivity 
or  means  tests.  In  2000,  there  were  7  million  beneficiaries  (of  which  4.3  million  received  an  old  age 
pension). Studies have shown that coverage rates are high among the target groups, and especially among 
informal  workers  and  their  households  (Delgado  and  Cardoso,  2000),  and  that  the  program  has  had 
significant  and  positive  effect  on  poverty  and  vulnerability  of  informal  workers  and  their  households 
(Delgado and Cardoso, 2000; Barrientos, 2003b). 
                                                 
10   Social assistance and safety nets are rare in Latin America, and because their financing is procyclical they are not a reliable source of social protection 
to informal workers (Hicks and Woodon, 2001). A study by Duryea and Pagés suggests that “education, by itself, has a positive, but limited, potential to 
increase wages above a minimum level in the short run” (2002: 6) and echo well-established findings from the literature to the effect that “extensive 
investment in training the unskilled would have only a limited role in increasing earnings and reducing poverty” (Duryea and Pagés, 2002: 26). 
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Health Insurance for Temporary Workers in Chile  
Public service provision to informal workers is potentially a fruitful avenue for extending social protection to 
informal  workers.  In  Chile,  workers  are  required  to  contribute  7  percent  of  their  earnings  to  a  health 
insurance  plan  with  a  public  insurer  (FONASA),  or  a  private  insurer  (ISAPREs).  As  health  insurance 
premiums  are  dependent  on  the  level  of  earnings,  high-income  workers  are  able  to  purchase  more 
comprehensive  plans.  The  public  insurer  is  an  insurer  of  last  resort,  and  covers  the  unemployed  or 
inactive, and the poor. However, these people have access to public  health  care only, which  provides a 
limited range of basic interventions. Temporary workers in agriculture who manage at best four months of 
employment in the year had few incentives to join  because they  could get full health insurance  coverage 
only while employed (Barrientos and  Lloyd-Sherlock, 2002).  Health hazards are very significant among 
temporary workers in agriculture because  of  poor working  conditions in the  farms, packing houses, and 
cold storage facilities and  because of pesticides and  other chemicals. Media  exposure during the recent 
presidential election secured a  change in the regulations extending  full health insurance coverage for 12 
months for temporary workers in agriculture with 3 months  contributions to the public  health insurance 
plan. This ensures they have access to outpatient and secondary health care through the year. Later on, 
the contribution requisite was lowered to two months and the  cover was  extended to all workers on 
temporary or fixed-term contracts (Barrientos, 2002). 
12 
Mexico’s Temporary Employment Program  
The Programa de Empleo Temporal in Mexico targets small communities (less than 2,500 inhabitants) in 
areas  of  extreme  poverty.  It  is  specifically  aimed  at  temporary  workers  and  creates  employment 
opportunities out of season in activities associated  with  building, improving, and maintaining physical and 
social infrastructure. The  unemployed and the low paid find  employment at 90  percent of a minimum 
wage for a maximum of 88 days in the year to engage in selected projects. The program aims to improve 
the skills base of beneficiaries. A small component of this program targets communities affected by natural 
disasters.   
Colombia’s Subsidized Regime for Health Insurance   
In  1995,  Colombia  reformed  its  health  insurance  and  care  system.  Prior  to  the  reform,  Colombia 
exhibited  a  segmentation  in  health  insurance  common  to  Latin  American  countries:  the  wealthy  self-
insured used private health care; workers in formal employment relied upon social insurance to reimburse 
health  care  expenditures;  and  informal  workers  and  the  poor  accessed  basic  health  care  from  public 
providers or financed direct purchases. An objective of the reform was to integrate these three sectors and 
extend  coverage.  Under  the  reformed  system,  workers  in  formal  employment  join    the  Contributory 
Regime and contribute 12 percent of their earnings to a health insurer, plus an  extra 1 percent solidarity 
contribution  if their earnings exceed four minimum wages. The insurers include for-profits and  not-for-
profit providers.  The government sets the  cost of an annual  basic  health  care package, and insurers with 
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high earners redistribute  contributions in excess of this value to insurers with low earners. The solidarity 
contribution plus direct government subsidies are collected into a Solidarity Fund which is used to finance 
health insurance for informal workers and those with low incomes or out of work by affiliating them to the 
Subsidized  Regime.  Municipalities  and  NGOs  provide  additional  subsidies.  The  Subsidized  Regime  has 
been successful in  extending health insurance coverage in Colombia. At the end of 2001, there were 13 
million people in the Contributory Regime and 11 million in the Subsidized Regime, covering two-thirds of 
the  population  with  unsatisfied  basic  needs.  Colombia  is,  as  a  result,  one  of  the  few  countries  in  Latin 
America  managing  to  extend  health  insurance  coverage  to  its  vulnerable  population  (Yepes,  2000; 
Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock, 2002). 
Codes of Conduct and Labor Standards  
Increasingly,  producers  in  the  South  are  integrated  into  global  production  and  distribution  value  chains 
(Gereffi and Kaplinsky 2001). Northern firms are dominant in these value chains and are able to exercise 
control over southern producers. Northern firms are coming under pressure from NGOs, and from labor 
and  consumer  organizations  to  require  southern  producers  to  introduce  labor  and  environmental 
standards.  A  study  on  export  horticulture  finds  that  these  global  value  chains  can  provide  an  additional 
channel through which labor standards can be applied to workers in informal employment (Barrientos and 
Barrientos,  2002).  Labor  standards  are  applied  through  voluntary  codes  of  conduct,  are  designed  by 
northern firms, and are implemented  by southern  producers as a condition of supply.  Codes of conduct 
normally  include  minimum  standards  of  pay  and  working  conditions,  and  some  include  representation 
rights (S. Barrientos, 1996).  These examples of programs extending social protection coverage to workers 
in  informal  employment  provide  some  valuable  insights.  They  demonstrate  that  governments  have  a 
central role in leading and orchestrating the extension of social protection, but also that the involvement of 
a wider range of stakeholders is  important.  These include  national and international  NGOs,  private and 
autonomous  welfare  providers,  and  community  organizations.  The  role  of  international  stakeholders  is 
growing  in  importance.  An  issue  underlined  by  the  cases  above  is  the  need  for  social  protection 
instruments to focus on insuring consumption, or more broadly livelihoods, as opposed to providing solely 
income  insurance.
13  The  cases  also  draw  attention  to  the  wide  range  of  policy  interventions  that  are 
needed, and could work. As a group, the examples demonstrate the relevance of the emerging consensus 
around social protection for informal workers. Most importantly, the cases demonstrate that the extension 
of  social  protection  to  informal  workers  must  go  beyond  a  discussion  of  specific  risks  and  instruments, 
important though this is, and target the  broader political  economy issue of  extending solidarity values to 
encompass informal workers. This is examined in the next section.       
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V. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EXTENDING SOCIAL PROTECTION: FROM THE 
WEAK TO THE STRONG? 
It is commonly stated that the spread of social protection in advanced economies involved, in most cases, the 
extension of programs originally set up for specific groups of workers to all organized workers, and eventually 
to vulnerable groups.  This  process of  progressive universalization of social  protection spread, it is argued, 
"from the strong to the weak” (Gough, 2000). Whether this  characterization accurately reflects the actual 
processes at work in advanced economies  can  be open to question (Cutler and Johnson, 2001), but it is 
accurate  in  describing  expectations  among  policy  makers  in  the  region  (Mesa-Lago,  1991).  These 
expectations have failed to materialize for all but a handful of countries.
14 In fact, social protection coverage, 
both in terms of population and contingencies, has declined throughout the region in the 1990s (Barrientos, 
2004a). The "from the strong to the weak" model of the growth of social protection has failed to take root in 
the  region,  and  welfare  production  remains  strongly segmented.  Informal  workers,  and  other  vulnerable 
groups remain firmly outside formal social protection.
15  
Whereas  advanced  economies  have  managed  to  set  in  place  social  protection  institutions  securing  a 
measure of homogeneity in risks and welfare outcomes, Latin American  countries  have  been unable to 
overcome  their  strong  segmentation  in  welfare  production.  Extending  social  protection  to  informal 
workers involves  breaking out of this segmentation in welfare, but  how is this to  be accomplished?  The 
examples  reviewed  above  suggest  reversing  the  process  observed  in  advanced  economies.  What  is 
needed is to focus social protection initiatives on the more vulnerable, mainly informal workers, and to 
create  the  conditions  for  the  spread  of  social  protection  from  the  "weak  to  the  strong."  The  ethical 
foundations  for  this  approach  can  be  found  in  the  work  of  Rawls,  for  whom  public  policy  must  be 
evaluated in terms of its likely effects on the most vulnerable (Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1999). It is the political 
economy of this approach that requires more detailed consideration.  
Structural changes in the region have replaced an "import substitution" model of development with an "export-
oriented"  one.  In  political  economy  terms,  the  import  substitution  model  was  sustained  by  alliances  of 
industrial  interests  and  urban  industrial  and  public  sector  workers.  This  development  model  in  turn 
strengthened  its  support  base  through  mechanisms  for  capturing  and  distributing  economic  rents.  Among 
these, state support for occupational insurance funds played a significant role. The crisis in the 1980s brought 
to an end the dominance of this development model and also the supremacy of the alliances that sustained it. 
Public sector and industrial employment and unionization have all declined significantly in the aftermath of the 
crisis. Employment growth has been focused in microenterprises, services, and nontraditional exports, with a 
rising  share  of  women  (Barrientos,  1997;  Benería,  2001).  These  trends  are  reflected  in  the  growth  of 
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informality, and  in  the  increasing  overlap  existing  between  formal  and  informal  employment.
16  With  the 
growth  of  informal  employment,  and  the  generalized  deterioration  of  labor  market  conditions,  it  can  be 
postulated  that  exposure  to  risk  and  vulnerability  associated  with  informality  is  now  more  widely  spread 
through the labor force making it possible to gather support for public interventions targeted on the most 
vulnerable groups. 
The  examples  above  provide  some  support  for  this  hypothesis.  The  incorporation  of  informal  rural 
workers into the pension system in Brazil, the health insurance in Chile and Colombia, and the expansion 
of  labor  standards  in  export  horticulture,  demonstrates  the  benefits  from  focusing  social  protection 
interventions on the most vulnerable. In all these cases, the interventions reflect a widening of solidarity to 
incorporate informal workers,  encouraged in most cases by  collective action.  The majority of the  cases 
reviewed  here involve a range of stakeholders, national and local government, social insurance agencies, 
trade unions, employers, and NGOs under the leadership and  coordination of  public agencies. In some 
cases, gains for vulnerable groups are later extended to cover other groups. In Chile, the social protection 
gains for women temporary workers, the temporeras, were later extended to all fixed-term and temporary 
workers.  In  Brazil,  the  success  of  Previdência  Rural  has  led  to  consideration  of  improvements  to  basic 
pension provision for urban informal workers. There are encouraging signs that the extension of solidarity 
values in Latin America can support the spread of social protection from "the weak to the strong."   
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This  paper has attempted to consider key issues relating to the  extension of social protection to informal 
workers  in  Latin  America.  The  paper  began  by  discussing  the  emergence  of  social  protection  as  the 
dominant agenda for social policy in developing countries. Consideration of the factors explaining the lack 
of social protection among informal workers, and of examples of recent extension of social protection in 
the region,  demonstrated the relevance of the social protection agenda.  The  new  perspective on social 
protection  can  provide a valuable framework for the extension of social protection to informal workers. 
Social protection mainstreams informal workers in a way that social security, social insurance, and safety 
nets do not.  
Analysis of trends in informal employment in the region shows there  has been a sustained and significant 
growth  in  informal  employment.  Whether  the  focus  is  on  occupational  status,  or  on  social  insurance 
coverage,  measures  of  informal  employment  show  a  rising  trend.  One  in  every  two  workers  in  Latin 
America is in informal employment. The correlation existing between informality, vulnerability, and poverty 
makes the extension of social protection to these workers an urgent issue. 
An examination of the reasons for lack of social protection among informal workers pointed to the failures 
of  formal  social  insurance  programs,  growing  labor  market  liberalization,  and  the  limitations  of  informal 
insurance  networks,  as  key  factors.  Interventions  aimed  at  these  would  improve  the  capacity  of  these 
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households  to  protect  their  livelihoods  from  risk.  However,  the  conditions  leading  to  the  growth  of 
informality also act to limit the feasibility and effectiveness of these interventions.  
A brief review of some recent extensions of social protection to workers in informal employment in the 
region suggests that interventions focusing on the most vulnerable, engaging a wide range of stakeholders, 
and targeting the protection of household consumption, can be successful. These also point to the fact that 
a  widening  of  solidarity  is  fundamental.  Compared  to  the  spread  of  social  protection  in  advanced 
economies, in Latin America the challenge is to extend social protection "from the weak to the strong."     
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‘Improvisational Reform’: building collective  
voice and security in Silicon Valley 
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Motivated,  sustained,  and  cumulative  tinkering  with  institutional  arrangements  is  an 
indispensable  tool  of  democratic  experimentalism,  of  improvisational  reform,  of  jazzlike 
public action…. (Unger and West, 1998: 11).  
INTRODUCTION 
Processes of labor market informalization are most frequently examined in the context of poor countries 
and  marginalized  workers.  Yet,  one  of  the  consistent  themes  in  the  study  of  informal  work  is  that 
informalization is  fundamentally shaped by processes of economic restructuring in the  formal economy. 
Changing  corporate  structures;  the  rise  of  complex  outsourcing  arrangements;  the  decline  in  the 
institutionalized  tripartite  social  compact  between  labor,  capital,  and  the  state;  and  increasing  volatility 
associated  with the rise of an information economy, all contribute to the informalization of labor in both 
developed and developing world contexts (Portes et al., 1989). This economic restructuring has resulted 
in a growing number of workers in formal sector labor markets in the  core of the global economy facing 
increasingly tenuous employment and  high levels of insecurity.   Therefore,  examining  new strategies to 
build collective voice and security for workers that address these processes of restructuring in  core labor 
markets can provide useful lessons that might be relevant in a variety of other contexts as well. 
This  paper explores strategies for building economic security that have emerged in response to the  high 
levels of insecurity workers face in Silicon  Valley.
1 The region, with its high  concentration of information 
technology industries, arguably reflects fundamental changes in work and employment practices associated 
with a shift from an industrial to an information economy (Benner, 2002; Castells, 1996). There are two 
fundamental features of  Silicon Valley labor markets that have  contributed to the high levels of insecurity 
that many workers there experience. First is a high degree of labor  flexibility, with rapidly changing work 
requirements,  and  high  levels  of  subcontracting,  temporary,  and  contract  employment.  Second  is  the 
importance of labor market intermediaries—a wide range of organizations that mediate work practices and 
broker  employment  relationships  between  workers  and  employers.  The  increasing  flexibility  and 
intermediation that characterizes Silicon Valley labor markets means that traditional institutions and policies 
                                                 
1   Silicon Valley is generally understood to refer to the southern San Francisco Bay region, comprising Santa Clara County and portions of neighboring 
San Mateo, Alameda, and Santa Cruz counties.  It  is home to some 2.4 million people and 1.3 million jobs heavily  concentrated in  information 
technology and related industries (see JV:SVN, 2003). 129 
 
 
that promote  collective voice and social protection for workers, which are  based on a model of a stable 
workplace with clear employer/employee relations, are largely ineffectual.                   
In  response  to  the  ineffectiveness  of  traditional  institutions  in  this  context,  two  broad  alternative 
approaches may provide some promise in addressing the problems of intermediation and flexibility. First, 
there is significant potential for improving the functioning of labor market intermediaries. These institutions 
have received relatively little attention in labor market policy, which tends to focus primarily on the supply 
and  demand side of the labor market. The growing importance of intermediaries provides opportunities 
for  innovative  policy  interventions  that  can  assist  more  positive  aspects  of  intermediary  activity  while 
hindering their more pernicious elements.   
Second, policies for addressing labor flexibility can be improved by understanding the distinctions between 
flexible  employment  and  flexible  work,  and  trying  to  transform  the  growing  individualized  employment 
relations so they are more aligned with widespread collective work practices.  The rapidly  changing work 
demands that are inherent in the region’s rapidly changing, knowledge-driven industries—such as changing 
tasks,  shifting  skill  requirements,  and  varying  work  colleagues  both  within  the  firm  and  in  cross-firm 
business relationships—requires high levels of social interaction. This social interaction  frequently  crosses 
firm boundaries, and the social networks that are built in the process of performing these work activities 
are critical in shaping individual career trajectories and trajectories of regional competitiveness. In essence, 
these collective work practices are a critical component of Silicon Valley’s labor flexibility. At the same time, 
however,  workers  face  increasing  fragmentation  and  individualization  of  employment  relations,  with  no 
collective representation, diverse individual mobility paths, varied compensation packages, and widespread 
use  of  subcontracted,  temporary,  and  contract  employment.  This  employment  fragmentation  makes 
workers more isolated and vulnerable to employer malfeasance and labor market shocks.  It is  possible, 
however, to promote more  collective employment relations that can  build  on and reinforce the social 
networks and social support  built through the  collective work practices.  This  can  be done, for instance, 
through improving multi-employer collective representation for workers within similar occupations, helping 
to create a better balance between workers’ and employers’ needs in the labor market, and by promoting 
more diverse and  collective  compensation systems; thus, flattening out the  inevitable ups-and-downs in 
earnings and providing workers with greater resilience in the face of inevitable labor market shocks.  
Together,  improving  intermediaries  and  promoting  more  collective  employment  relations  provide 
opportunities for restructuring labor market processes in ways that would expand the workers’ collective 
voice and build greater security for many workers. Though the specific approaches discussed in this paper 
are exploratory, they directly address aspects of growing insecurity that are associated with the rise of an 
information economy, and thus are likely to have relevance in other regions as well.   
This paper proceeds first by discussing key features of labor markets in Silicon Valley and their relationship 
to  broader  processes  of  labor  market  informalization.  Of  central  concern  here  are  the  ways  that  the 
growth in labor flexibility and intermediation reflects a mismatch  between  fundamental  "new  economy" 
labor market processes and the existing legal and social institutions regulating labor markets. I then move to 
a  more  detailed  discussion  of  strategies  for  influencing  the  activities  of  labor  market  intermediaries, 130 
 
 
followed by a discussion of policies aimed at collectivizing employment relationships. In the final section, I 
discuss some of the strengths and limitations of these strategies for addressing a broader process of labor 
market informalization and building greater security for workers. 
LABOR MARKET INFORMALIZATION IN SILICON VALLEY 
The term "informal economy" refers to a  diverse and  heterogeneous range of economic activity, which 
Portes et al. (1989) define as "a process of income generation  characterized by one  central feature: it is 
unregulated  by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are 
regulated” (Portes et al., 1989). The process of labor market informalization, therefore, is a  process in 
which  changes in  the institutional  environment and  changes in  production practices create  conditions in 
which a significant portion of economic activity is unregulated. From this perspective, only a small portion 
of economic activity in Silicon Valley is entirely "unregulated" and therefore fully "informal," though there is 
anecdotal  evidence  of  some  truly  informal  activity  in  the  area,  including  street  trading  (primarily  by 
immigrants),  unregulated  home-based  work,  and  casual  subcontracting  relations  between  software 
programmers (LaGuerre, 1993; Zlolniski, 1994; Lozano, 1989). More important than full informality in the 
region, however, is the ways that work practices and employment relationships are only poorly regulated 
by existing labor market institutions and legislation. 
Silicon  Valley  labor  markets  are  characterized  by  high  levels  of  labor  turnover,  and  widespread  use  of 
nonstandard  employment,  including  the  use  of  temporary  agencies,  independent  contractors,  and 
subcontracted employment systems. In the late 1990s, the Silicon Valley region had two times the national 
percentage  of  the  workforce  employed  in  temporary  agencies,  with  up  to  40  percent  of  the  region’s 
workforce, and up to 80 percent of all job growth between 1984 and 1998, in nonstandard employment 
relationships. Median  job tenure in the region is only three years, and rapid turnover  has  become the 
norm (Benner, 2002). In a California statewide survey, it was estimated that only 33 percent of the labor 
force, ages 18-64, have "traditional" employment (single job, full-time, day-shift, permanent employee, not 
working from home or as an independent contractor) and only 22 percent had held such a job for three 
years or longer.
2 
Such labor flexibility would not be a major social concern if it resulted in widespread economic prosperity. 
Even during the  booming '1990s, however, wages stagnated for the bottom half of the labor market and 
inequality increased (Benner, 1996; Benner, 2002). In 1996, as the  cost of  housing skyrocketed in the 
region,
3 an estimated 55 percent of jobs in the Valley paid less than $15.72 an hour, the threshold of pay 
in full-time work needed to sustain a family of four without public support (Rosner and Benner, 1997). In 
addition, with  high levels of temporary and  contract  employment, Silicon Valley workers are  particularly 
vulnerable to economic downturns, as firms are able to shed workers rapidly. The unemployment rate in 
                                                 
2   California Work & Health Survey, 1999, Ed Yellin, Principal Investigator.  University of California, San Francisco.   
3   Between January 1996 and January 2001, the median house price in Santa Clara County, the core of Silicon Valley, more than doubled, rising from 
$251,000 to $577,500.  Source:  www.penwest.com, accessed 05/2001. 131 
 
 
Santa  Clara  County  (the  heart  of  Silicon  Valley),  for  instance,  soared  from  a  low  of  1.3  percent  in 
December 2000, to 7.7 percent in the space of just 13 months, and  peaked at 8.9 percent in October 
2002: more than 3 percentage  points higher than the national average at the time. By 2003, the region 
had lost a total of nearly 20 percent of all jobs and average pay declined by 22 percent (Sylvester, 2003). A 
survey of Silicon Valley workers in June 2003 found that more than a quarter of adults in the valley—a full 
25.6 percent—had been laid off at least once since January 2001, and that 34.7 percent had at least one 
person in their household out of work for more than three months in  that time (Steen, 2003; JV:SVN, 
2003). 
The insecurity and inequality that workers experience in Silicon Valley are not the result of being entirely 
unregulated, a sign of true informal employment.  They are, however, at least in part the result of  being 
poorly protected  by existing labor market regulations and institutions. Nearly all of these regulations and 
institutions
4  either  explicitly  or  implicitly  assume  relatively  stable,  long-term,  full-time  employment  for  a 
single employer who largely controls the conditions of employment (Benner et al., 1999; Osterman et al., 
2001). They largely ignore the needs of workers who are in nonstandard employment contracts or who 
move  frequently  from  employer  to  employer.  The  system  for  ensuring  collective  representation  for 
workers,  for  instance,  based  on  well-defined  "communities  of  interest"  in  stable  workplaces,  makes  it 
nearly  impossible  for  workers  in  unstable  work  conditions  to  have  collective  representation  (Friedman, 
1994;  Gould,  1993;  Stone,  2004).  Self-employed  workers,  independent  contractors,  and  temporary 
workers are largely ineligible for unemployment insurance (U.S. Department of Labor, 1998). Workplace 
antidiscrimination and health and safety legislation largely assume legal employers have the ability to control 
employment  conditions,  which  frequently  does  not  apply  to  workers  in  subcontracted  employment  or 
employed by temporary agencies.
5   
What is needed to address these problems is a sustained public dialogue aimed at a comprehensive reform 
of  labor  market  institutions  so  they  are  more  in  line  with  these  information  economy  labor  practices. 
Efforts made in recent years to spark such a debate have had little effect.
6 While the success of such efforts 
will depend on political leadership and political will, it will also depend in  part on a clear understanding of 
policies  that  can  address  fundamental  new  labor  market  dynamics.  In  an  effort  to  contribute  to  that 
understanding,  what  follows  are  some  exploratory  proposals  for  institutional  reforms  that  are  built  on 
fundamental  dynamics  evident  in  Silicon  Valley  labor  markets  related  to  the  widespread  use  of  labor 
market intermediaries, and the problems of insecurity associated with labor flexibility.  
                                                 
4   Including the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Social Security Act of 1935 (which also established the 
unemployment insurance system), Title VII Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and so 
on.  
5   In one particularly poignant example in 1999, an assembly worker who was employed by Manpower Temporary Services in a warehouse packing 
Hewlett Packard printers became concerned about respiratory problems. He discovered that one of the chemicals in the ink cartridges used in Hewlett 
Packard printers had been linked to respiratory irritation and was a possible carcinogen. When he asked that an air quality check be conducted in the 
warehouse, he lost his job. He filed a complaint with the California Industrial Relations Board, which took more than 20 months to determine whether 
to fine Hewlett Packard or Manpower or both. Ultimately,  the  California  labor commissioner ruled that Manpower, as the legal employer, had 
violated the employee’s right to express health safety concerns at work. In this case, however, Manpower had no power to order an air safety check at 
the plant or to improve air circulation systems in the facility (Jayadev, 2000). 
6   Example given,  the 1994 Dunlop Commission’s efforts to promote labor law reform ((U.S. Department of Labor, 1994)), or the MIT-sponsored 
Task Force on Reconstructing America’s Labor Market Institutions (Osterman et al., 2001). 132 
 
 
LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES 
One of the more striking characteristics of Silicon Valley labor markets is the prominence of a wide range 
of intermediaries that help  both  employers and workers navigate through the complex and unpredictable 
labor market. Workers turn to intermediaries to help find jobs and to deal with  changing information and 
skill requirements. Employers turn to intermediaries to  help find workers and to help address fluctuating 
work  demands.  Intermediaries  themselves  have  taken  advantage  of  these  needs  of  both  workers  and 
employers, and have actively expanded their activities, helping to further reinforce their importance in the 
regional  labor  market.  Intermediaries  respond  to  critical  problems  that  are  prevalent  in  flexible  labor 
markets,  such  as  high  search  costs,  imperfect  information,  and  increased  risk.  Intermediaries  are  thus 
emerging  as  critical  institutions  shaping  the  dynamics  of  flexible  labor  markets  and  thus  labor  market 
outcomes for both workers and employers (Benner, 2003b). 
There  are  broadly  three  different  types  of  labor  market  intermediaries  that  are  active  in  Silicon  Valley, 
distinguishable by organizational structure and origins. These include: 
•  Private  sector  intermediaries.  Temporary  agencies,  contractor  brokers,  web-based  job  boards,  and 
professional employer organizations all place workers with many different skill levels across a range of 
occupations and industries, from assembly and  clerical positions to high-end  computer  programmers 
and  engineers.  What  distinguishes  all  private  sector  intermediaries  is  that  they  are  market-based 
organizations dependent on selling their services and ultimately making a profit in order to survive. As a 
result, private sector intermediaries are  primarily oriented towards meeting the needs of employers. 
While they may provide some assistance to job seekers,  their revenue and thus their profits  come 
from employers. While they clearly contribute to the profitability of their client firms, the implications 
of their activities for workers’ career paths or the long-term sustainability of the regional  production 
complex  is  much  more  contradictory.  Private  sector  intermediaries  rarely  engage  in  significant  skills 
development  or  training  for  the  workers  they  place.    Though  many  temporary  agencies  offer  self-
paced  computer  courses,  this  training  serves  largely  as  a  screening  device  to  identify  workers  with 
significant initiative, rather than a substantial investment in worker training (Autor  et al, 1999). In an 
environment  where  skills  and  ongoing  learning  are  so  essential  for  workers’  career  paths,  private 
temporary  agencies  do  little  to  improve  labor  market  outcomes  for  workers.  Furthermore,  to  the 
extent to which they  contribute to an under-investment  in training by their client  firms—because of 
more  limited  attachment  to  their  workforce—these  private  sector  intermediaries  may  actually 
undermine the long-term competitiveness of the region as well. 
•  Membership-based intermediaries. These are intermediaries whose organizational base is rooted in the 
membership of individual employees. This category includes professional associations, guilds and guild-
like organizations, and various  union initiatives, which  have become increasingly prominent in recent 
years  (Benner,  2003a).  The  activities  of  these  organizations  range  from  creating  job  listings  and 
organizing  networking  opportunities  to  providing  skills  training  and  building  learning  communities. 133 
 
 
Many,  though  not  all,  also  engage  in  advocacy  activities,  such  as  promoting  codes  of  conducts  or 
lobbying  for  particular  legislation.  Overall,  their  activities  help  build  ties  between  workers  and 
employers, and shape the nature of that relationship in ways that are primarily aimed at improving the 
labor market outcomes of their members. Membership-based intermediaries are typically rooted in 
particular  occupations,  in  which  the  skills,  knowledge  base,  work  practices,  and  labor  market 
experiences  associated  with  each  occupation  provide  organizational  coherence  and  shape  the 
structure and activities of the association. The skills and knowledge development that occurs in these 
occupational  communities  is  as  important  for  the  region’s  long-term  competitiveness  as  it  is  for 
individual workers' outcomes (Benner, 2003c). 
•  Public  sector  and  nonprofit  intermediaries:  There  are  a  number  of  public  sector  programs  and 
educational institutions that  directly  play an intermediary role in the  labor market as  well.  In recent 
years, these programs have expanded their activities and grown more explicit in building their role as 
intermediaries.  These include three types: first, a wide range of  public workforce development and 
training organizations that have become increasingly integrated into a "one-stop career center system" 
aimed at improving their effectiveness as intermediaries; second,  education-based institutions, which 
have  become  more  active  in  providing  adult  education  and  customized  job  training  for  employers 
(including  developing specialized  curriculum and training programs geared to employers’ needs, and 
providing a wide range of on-site custom training for employers); and third, community and nonprofit 
organizations that engage in job training and placement activities, and are more strongly integrated into 
particular communities  of  disadvantaged workers than  public workforce  development institutions. As 
the  public sector  has become more aware of the importance of intermediaries in the labor market, 
these initiatives have expanded in size and become more conscious about being more comprehensive 
and strategic in their approach. 
All three types  of intermediaries are  quite  widespread in Silicon Valley. A recent survey of  workers’ job 
search experiences found that one out of four people had held a job that they got through an intermediary 
in the previous three years (Pastor et al., 2003). This is likely a conservative estimate of the impact of 
intermediaries in the labor market since it doesn’t include jobs found through web-based intermediaries, 
and  doesn’t examine the  extent to which social  networks, which account for the largest single means of 
job search, were built through intermediary activity.   
Intermediaries  have  contradictory  impacts  on  labor  market  outcomes  for  workers,  in  some  cases 
undermining  opportunities  for  upward  mobility,  and  in  other  cases  helping  build  those  opportunities. 
There  has been little sustained  public attention,  however, to affecting the activities of intermediaries as a 
whole.  Typical  approaches,  such  as  reforms  of  public  sector  workforce  development  activities,  or 
strategies  to  reduce  temporary  employment,  tend  to  be  fragmented  and  ineffectual.  There  is  growing 
attention  being  paid  to  what  are  being  called  “workforce  intermediaries,"  a  subset  of  all  labor  market 
intermediaries that are more specifically focused on helping disadvantaged workers (Giloth, 2004; PEERS, 
2003; Fischer, 2005; Fitzgerald, 2004). These  newer initiatives are providing useful insights, but have yet 
to  be  integrated  into  a  more  comprehensive  approach  to  influencing  all  types  of  labor  market 
intermediaries.   134 
 
 
Intermediaries and Labor Market Policy 
Most labor market  policy has  been  directed  either towards the  demand side of the labor market (e.g., 
subsidizing  particular  types  of  development,  or  regulating  employment  practices)  or  to  the  supply  side 
(typically through promoting skills development). It is possible, however, to develop public policy directed 
at  intermediaries.  One  approach  clearly  is  to  attempt  to  regulate  temporary  help  firms  and  other 
intermediaries that act as legal employers of contract workers (e.g., employee leasing firms and contractor 
brokers). This may include such  provisions as limiting the length of time someone  can  be employed in a 
"temporary status"; trying to ensure equal pay for equal work; clarifying provisions for collective bargaining 
and  coemployment  status;  improving  access  to  health  care;  and  so  on  (Theodore  and  Mehta,  1999; 
NELP, 1999). Such provisions are relatively weak in the United States, though they have been somewhat 
stronger  in  Europe  (Messmer,  1994;  Overman,  1993;  Houseman  and  Osawa,  1995).  While  such 
regulatory efforts are important, they sometimes  have unintended consequences that tend to undermine 
their overall impact on improving labor market outcomes. For example, a legal case arguing that Microsoft 
should make their  contract workers eligible for the same employment  benefits  provided to permanent 
workers  actually  resulted  in  Microsoft  strengthening  the  distinction  between  permanent  and  contract 
workers  rather  than  making  contract  workers  eligible  for  their  generous  benefits  (De  Haas,  1998). 
Similarly, a Flexicurity Act in the  Netherlands  with a provision requiring temporary firms to give many of 
their workers "permanent status" after a certain period of time, resulted in many temporary workers being 
laid  off  prior  to  the  law  taking  effect.
7  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  regulating  intermediary  activity  is  not 
worthwhile, but simply to suggest that where firms have a high demand for labor flexibility, they are likely 
to find ways of subverting many kinds of regulation.  
Another perhaps more promising approach is to put significant resources into promoting the development 
of positive intermediary models that can then replace more negative intermediaries. With adequate public 
assistance,  many  nonprofit  and  membership-based  intermediaries  could  find  win-win  opportunities, 
meeting the needs of firms while also providing better career outcomes for workers. For intermediaries to 
be  effective in  building such win-win  opportunities, they must move  beyond the short-term, placement 
orientation that characterizes most intermediaries today—an orientation that is reinforced by most publicly 
funded  programs  which  emphasize  placement  to  the  detriment  of  retention  and  advancement  issues. 
Longer-term, more in-depth relationships with both employers and workers are important for developing 
effective  understanding of employers’ labor force  needs, providing effective formal training and  informal 
learning opportunities, and contributing to improved competitiveness of  firms over time. Developing the 
capacities, relationships, and resources to do this effectively, however, is not easy. It requires sophisticated 
knowledge of labor market and  economic trends, access to a range of skill training, the ability to  build 
trusting relationships with multiple employers often with very different labor force needs, and the ability to 
provide  opportunities  for  workers  with  a  range  of  backgrounds,  skill  levels,  and  career  aspirations. 
Developing this capacity will require a significant and sustained commitment of public funds, including funds 
to  support  networks  of  relationships  between  different  intermediaries  who  may  specialize  in  different 
                                                 
7   See http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/1999/01/feature/nl9901117f.html. Accessed 10/1/2005. 135 
 
 
activities,  thus  promoting  greater  coordination  and  cooperation  between  the  variety  of  different 
intermediaries in regional labor markets.  
Even  promoting  existing positive intermediary activities, however,  is limited when intermediaries simply 
accept  the  demand  side  of  the  labor  market  as  given.  In  this  context,  intermediaries  may  be  able  to 
improve  workers’  mobility,  but  don’t  affect  the  quality  of  jobs  or  working  conditions  being  offered  by 
employers. It is possible, however, for intermediaries to have a more direct impact on the quality of jobs, 
though in both positive and negative ways. Private sector temporary agencies, for example, typically act as 
the legal employer and thus have some leeway in setting wages, benefits, and working conditions. This is 
especially true with the growing trend of larger temporary help agencies moving to on-site arrangements 
with their client  firms. There they take on direct  personnel management responsibilities and in the most 
developed  cases  even  responsibility  for  managing  work  flow  and  productivity  (Bernhardt  et  al.,  2001; 
Staffing Industry Review, 1997). For the majority of workers, wages in temporary help agencies are lower 
than those  for comparable workers in client firms, and what they offer their workers is limited by  what 
their client firms are willing to pay (Houseman et al., 2001; Erickcek and Houseman, 1997). Yet, there are 
cases where temporary agencies will advocate for higher wages for  particular workers, and an increasing 
number of nonprofit and membership-based intermediaries are experimenting with becoming "employer 
of  record"  for  the  workers  they  place,  as  a  way  of  trying  to  improve  their  placements  and  give  them 
greater leverage for paying higher wages (Neuwirth, 2004; Carre et al., 2003). Some membership-based 
intermediaries  have  also  been  promoting  codes  of  conduct  and  other  advocacy  efforts  as  a  way  of 
improving job quality (Bernhardt et al., 2001). Finally, in the cases where union hiring halls are linked with 
multi-employer collective bargaining units, these intermediaries can maintain high wages and employment 
security, at least when high-skill levels contribute to greater productivity to help union firms be competitive 
against nonunionized  competitors (Wolf-Powers, 1999). At the moment, under U.S. labor laws, pre-hire 
agreements (important for maintaining hiring halls) are only allowed in the construction industry and multi-
employer  bargaining  units  are  rarely  approved  outside  the  building  trades  and  entertainment  industry 
(Friedman, 1994).  
Specific  policy  mechanisms  that  might  be  pursued  to  move  intermediary  activity  in  a  more  positive 
direction might include the following:
8 
•  Incentive structures.  Any public funding or subsidies of intermediaries, including possible tax structures, 
should  be  explicitly  geared  towards  meeting  two  fundamental  objectives:  providing  long-term 
opportunities to all employees and meeting the  needs of  disadvantaged workers. Achieving this will 
require reforming existing funding streams, which neglect training and career mobility in favor of rapid 
placement,  even  if  it  is  a  dead-end,  temporary  job.  Funding  instead  could  be  focused  on  career 
advancement  services  such  as  planned  mentorship  relationships,  annual  “follow-up”  contacts  with 
career  planning  objectives,  or  ongoing  “alumni”  services.  Intermediaries  of  all  types  could  be 
encouraged  to  design  their  own  innovations  through  funding  bonuses  based  on  the  demonstrated 
                                                 
8   Pastor et al., 2003. 136 
 
 
long-term  income  growth  of  clients.  In  addition,  support  could  be  provided  for  membership 
associations that are currently generally excluded from public training funds. 
•  Public  disclosure.  Legislation  should  increase  public  knowledge  of  the  services  provided  by 
intermediaries, the benefits received by their employees, and the economic consequences that follow 
placement for the short term and long term. While some advocacy groups attempt to rate temporary 
agencies  based  on  their  willingness  to  agree  to  codes  of  conduct,  adequate  information  to  inform 
potential users is unlikely to become available without government regulatory requirements.  
•  Performance targets.  Intermediaries that are recipients of either direct or indirect government support 
(such as training funds) should be required to meet performance standards based on job quality as well 
as  success  in  placement.  Local  and  regional  requirements  could  be  based  on  existing  formulations 
including living wage ordinances, prevailing wage laws, or local self-sufficiency standards.  
•  Networking  and  coordination.  High  performance  intermediaries,  such  as  community  colleges  and 
unions, can  become more effective if they  coordinate their activities and form  networks with  public 
and  nonprofit  organizations  that  offer  support  services.  Public  policy  should  encourage  innovative 
forms  of  collaboration  both  between  these  standard-setting  intermediaries  and  between  them  and 
other intermediaries that may profit from their experience and philosophy.  
Whether  restricting  negative  intermediary  practices  or  providing  support  for  positive  practices,  the 
underlying premise of these  proposals is the recognition that intermediaries  have become a fundamental 
component of the structure and dynamics of labor markets.  Efforts to entirely get rid of intermediaries and 
build  a  stronger  direct  tie  between  workers  and  employers  are  likely  to  prove  ineffective  and  possibly 
detrimental to the vitality of regional economies. The best approach is to accept intermediaries as a reality 
in contemporary labor markets, do our best  to understand the forces  contributing to their activities, the 
impact of their efforts, and influence their activities in ways that lead to desired outcomes.   
LABOR FLEXIBLITY AND THE SOCIAL WAGE 
In addition to the widespread importance of intermediaries, the second fundamental characteristic of labor 
markets in Silicon Valley is the high level of labor flexibility. As many analysts have argued, some aspects of 
this labor flexibility have been critical for the region’s economic success. The region’s open labor markets, 
with rapid  circulation of workers, information, and knowledge between firms, has contributed significantly 
to the region’s remarkable 40-year record of innovation and dynamism (Saxenian, 1996; Saxenian, 1994). 
The widespread use of independent  contractors and temporary workers, combined with the  ease with 
which firms hire and fire workers and restructure their subcontracting relationships, facilitates their ability to 
adjust  to  rapidly  changing  technology  and  competitive  conditions.  Yet,  as  pointed  out  previously,  labor 
flexibility also has a significant downside, evident in the high levels of insecurity and inequality that workers 
in the region experience.  137 
 
 
The challenge for labor market policy in this  context is to develop strategies that can help improve labor 
market outcomes for workers while also promoting competitiveness throughout the region. In attempting 
to meet these  dual goals, it is useful to make a distinction  between flexible work and  flexible employment. 
Flexible work refers to the actual activities workers perform, the skills, information, and knowledge required 
to  perform  those  activities,  and  the  social  interaction  involved  in  the  process  of  performing  that  work. 
Flexible  employment,  on  the  other  hand,  refers  to  the  contractual  relationship  between  employer  and 
employee, including compensation systems and management practices. Rapid changes in flexible work—in 
the  quantity of work; in the skills, information, and knowledge required to  perform that  work; and the 
social interactions involved in that work—are largely rooted in the dynamics of competition in information 
technology industries,  where  continual innovation is  central for competitive success  (Shapiro and Varian, 
1998). This importance of innovation is related to the increasing importance of information and knowledge 
in the economy, and the rapid change inherent in producing information and knowledge as commodities. 
These dynamics are particularly evident in information technology industries but also have applicability in a 
wide range of other industries as well—wherever information (both in analytical and aesthetic form) is an 
important  part  of  the  value  of  the  commodity  or  service  being  produced  (Lash  and  Urry,  1994).  In 
essence, flexible work is an essential component of competitive success in the information economy.   
In  contrast,  rapid  changes  in  employment—including  high  levels  of  turnover,  shorter  periods  of 
employment,  and  widespread  contingent  employment  contracts—are  only  partly  shaped  by  the 
importance  of  flexible  work.  The  nature  of  the  employment  relationship  is  also  shaped  by  the  legal, 
institutional,  and  organizational  environment  that  is  deeply  rooted  in  an  older  industrial  economy,  as 
described  previously. This mismatch  between  contemporary employment  practices and outdated labor 
market institutions allows many firms to pursue flexible employment relations for a variety of reasons, such 
as simply cutting costs or shifting risk, that have little to do with promoting long-term competitive success. 
The recognition that  flexible employment is  primarily shaped by the institutional and legal environment, 
rather  than  underlying  economic  changes,  suggests  significant  scope  for  intervention  strategies,  without 
threatening economic dynamism. 
In  developing  these  intervention  strategies,  I  want  to  argue  the  value  of  promoting  an  increased  social 
wage. In essence, a social wage provides compensation on a broader more equitable basis, based not on a 
worker's  individual  contribution  to  profitability,  but  based  instead  on  their  membership  in  a  broader 
society. Frequently the term is used  to refer specifically to  public  expenditures, in which tax revenue is 
used to provide benefits to  citizens through such programs as education, subsidized health  care, housing 
assistance, and the like (Moudud and Zacharias, 1999). It is important to recognize, however, that direct 
public  expenditures  are  not  the  only  mechanism  through  which  compensation  can  be  "socialized"  or 
spread through a broader  community of workers. During much of the twentieth century, for instance, it 
was  large  corporations  with  well-developed  internal  labor  markets  who  implemented  compensation 
systems that  had the  effect of socializing the wage  distribution within the  corporation. In these systems, 
compensation was not based solely on an individual’s direct contribution to the firm’s profitability, but was 
instead partially based on seniority, with systems that tended to raise workers' wages at the  bottom and 
limit them at the top. This wage compression was further reinforced through the training practices of these 138 
 
 
firms.  With  a  high  value  of  firm-specific  knowledge,  new  hires  were  frequently  given  lengthy  training 
programs, with firms willing to forego immediate contributions to the firm’s activities in the knowledge they 
would  reap  ample  rewards  over  the  long  period  of  time  employees  would  stay  with  the  firm. 
Compensation for new employees was greater than their contribution to the firms’  profitability, but firms 
would  gain  in  the  long  run  from  their  employees’  increased  productivity,  given  compressed  wage 
structures. In  essence, these  compensation systems were not  based on individuals,  but  were structured 
based on the relationship between different groups of workers in a firm—a limited social wage within the 
corporate community.   
Ironically,  during  this  time  that  the  employment  contract  for  many  workers  was  socialized  across  large 
firms,  work  itself,  at  least  in  classic  blue-collar  jobs,  was  in  many  ways  more  individualized.  Taylorized 
management practices and assembly lines ensured that much (though not all!) of the control over the pace 
and  intensity  of  work  was  removed  from  the  workers’  control.  Traditional  assembly  line  work  tied 
workers to a particular space on the shop floor, making it difficult to have social interactions with anyone 
more  than  a  few  feet  away.  Specific  work  tasks  were  often  proscribed  by  long  and  complex  job 
descriptions and bureaucratic rules, further limiting the room for worker initiative. Overall, then, during 
much of the twentieth  century,  broad sectors of the U.S. labor market could be characterized as having 
individualized work practices but socialized employment contracts. Clearly this representation is not accurate 
for  all  types  of  work  and  employment,  but  it  is  a  useful  characterization  of  the  dominant  labor  market 
practices that existed in the largest, most dynamic sectors of the U.S. industrial economy in much of the 
twentieth century. 
In contrast, in Silicon Valley, which represents the largest and most dynamic sectors in the contemporary 
information economy, labor markets can be broadly characterized as involving an increased socialization of 
work, and an increased individualization of the employment contract. With high levels of self-employment, 
temporary  and  contract  labor,  rapid  mobility  between  firms,  and  the  near  absence  of  unions  in  high 
technology industries, employment contracts in the region are largely driven by individuals’ negotiating skills 
and the market value of their skills, experience, and relationships. In contrast, however, work tasks (and 
the  information  and  knowledge  they  involve)  depend  on  high  levels  of  social  interaction  and 
communication,  not  just  in  the  workplace  but  across  firm  boundaries.  Complex  production  networks 
mean  that  workers  frequently  collaborate  with  colleagues  in  other  firms  in  the  course  of  their  work 
activities. Much of the knowledge required for work is not firm specific, and workers gain the required 
knowledge through their participation in dense social  networks and their interactions with colleagues in a 
variety  of  different  contexts.  Furthermore,  long-term  career  success  for  workers  is  also  increasingly 
dependent on social interaction, as the strength and character of  people’s social networks fundamentally 
shapes their work trajectories.   
By  recognizing  the  central  importance  of  these  social  work  processes  to  overall  economic 
competitiveness,  and  acknowledging  the  existence  of  socialized  compensation  systems  in  the  past,  it  is 
possible to develop arguments for innovative new compensation systems that can result in a greater social 
wage and thereby  help minimize  the insecurity that workers face in volatile labor markets. Social wage 
systems could either be built through formal public sector programs, or they could be encouraged through 139 
 
 
building  on  collective  work  processes  to  help  formalize  collective  representation  amongst  occupational 
communities  of  workers,  or  workers  within  industrial  clusters.  Below  I  will  discuss  some  ideas  for 
innovative compensation systems that can increase the social wage and build on these work practices. Sahll 
I look first at those that have emerged in information technology industries; then innovative compensations 
systems  that  have  emerged  in  the  entertainment  industry  (which  has  similar  work  and  employment 
practices at the IT sector); and finally at government  policy initiatives. First, however,  I will turn to some 
reforms  in  the  industrial  relations  system  required  to  promote  more  collective  representation  along 
occupational or industry cluster lines, rather than within the workplace, an essential component of building 
greater security in the context of these individualized employment relations. 
Reforming Industrial Relations 
The  current  labor  relations  system  discourages  representation  for  workers  in  flexible  employment 
relations. Under the current system, for workers to gain collective representation, they must identify and 
defend a clear and sufficient "community of interest" with a clear employer, and ensure that a majority of 
workers within that community vote for collective representation even in the face of significant employer 
opposition.  Rather  than  being  based  almost  exclusively  on  increasingly  ephemeral  worksite-based 
communities  of interest, an improved labor relations system should  encourage collective representation 
along  somewhat  more  stable  occupational  and  industry  lines,  with  the  community  identified  informally 
through similar work practices and labor market experiences. One  well-developed presentation of  what 
such a system might look is Charles Heckscher’s (1996) The New Unionism. His system doesn’t depend on 
collective  bargaining, but instead collective strength is built through “associational unions," whose activities 
focus on advocacy, legal representation, and the  provision of a  broad range of  educational and service 
activities.  To  be  fully  effective,  however,  associations  must  also  be  able  to  enter  into  contractual 
agreements  with  employers—with  individual  companies  certainly  but  more  importantly  with  multiple 
employers  and  industry  associations.    This  would  give  them  greater  ability  to  curtail  bad  employment 
practices,  improve  career  opportunities,  and  negotiate  improved  compensation  systems.  Building 
representation  along  such  occupational  and  industry  lines,  however,  would  require  some  significant 
changes in labor law (Stone, 2004). At the minimum, it would require  provisions for allowing  pre-hire 
agreements and creating incentives for promoting industry-wide bargaining, which are currently prohibited 
outside the building trades (Friedman, 1994). Workers should also once again  have the ability to  exert 
economic pressures on  employers. Many such  efforts  used to be legal prior to the Taft-Hartley Act of 
1947 and, in fact, millions of nonfactory workers—teamsters, longshoremen, waitresses, cooks, musicians, 
and  others—who  successfully  organized  between  the  1930s  and  the  1950s  relied  on  pre-hire 
agreements; recognitional picketing; secondary boycotts; limitations on nonunion or nonunion goods; and 
other  approaches  to  secure  bargaining  rights.  Making  these  approaches  legal  once  again  would  make 
representation  more  possible  for  subcontracted  workers,  as  well  as  for  more  mobile  professionals, 
consultants, and technical workers. Another legal reform that would assist  collective representation is to 
develop  mechanisms  for  minority  representation,  requiring  employers  and  industry  associations  to 
negotiate with groups of workers, even if they didn’t have majority representation. In essence this would 
help  lower  the  bar  for  workers  seeking  assistance  in  negotiating  better  employment  relationships,  by 140 
 
 
allowing a minority of workers to have outside support even if they are not able to convince a majority of 
the need for union representation. 
In many cases, employers would be resistant to the expansion of collective representation, thus requiring 
significant political pressure based largely on collective organizing amongst workers in an industry cluster. In 
many situations, however, it is possible to develop win-win strategies in which employers also benefit from 
collective organization in an industry, and thus might be less resistant to workers’ collective representation. 
This is particularly evident in cases where unions or other workers’ associations can solve collective actor 
problems that employers face,  particularly around skills development and training.  All  employers like to 
have a well-trained workforce, but individual employers have little incentive to contribute to training their 
own  when  high  levels  of  turnover  mean  they  are  unlikely  to  reap  the  benefits  of  increased  training 
investments. In a classic collective actor  problem, what is rational from the  perspective of individual firms 
ends  up  undermining  skill  development  in  the  industry  as  a  whole.  This  dynamic  was  evident  in  the 
"shortage"  of  information  technology  workers  the  U.S.  experienced  in  the  late  1990s.  Many  detailed 
examinations of this phenomenon made it clear that management practices and the institutional framework 
of skills development were a key part of the  problem, helping to explain the ineffective response to the 
rapid  growth  in  demand  for  information  technology  workers  at  the  time  (Cappelli,  2000;  National 
Research  Council,  2001).  Unions  and  other  workers’  associations  organized  on  an  occupational  or 
industry  level  could  help  solve  problems  like  this,  by  negotiating  with  employers  to  invest  in  regional 
training  programs  and  collaborative  learning  networks.  Workers  would  gain  from  improved  career 
opportunities,  while  employers  would  be  able  to  capture  many  of  the  same  gains  from  investment  in 
human resources in organized regional labor markets that they used to capture in internal labor markets. 
When  unions  or  professional  associations  play  a  strong  role  in  helping  with  skill  development  and 
promoting  improved  competitiveness  in  the  industry,  such  win-win  strategies  are  possible  (AFL-CIO 
Working For America Institute, 2000).   
Social Compensation System 
Collective  representation,  however,  is  simply  one  avenue  towards  improving  working  conditions.  The 
greatest  challenge  unprotected  workers  face  is  the  unpredictability  of  earnings  over  time,  and  the 
vulnerability  to  layoffs  and  economic  downturns.  With  high  levels  of  volatility,  information  technology 
workers  face  frequent  periods  of  unemployment,  while  sustained  downturns  often  require  complete 
career shifts. Long-term skill obsolescence can result in  declining  earnings over time as well.  In  essence, 
workers face increased risk in contemporary labor markets. One of the basic principles of mitigating risk in 
all contexts is to spread the risk across larger numbers of risk-bearers, and to diversify, in this case, income 
streams. In  essence, promoting broader social wage systems  becomes an essential tool in mitigating the 
impacts of our high-risk economy (Mandel, 1996). What follows are some schematic suggestions of ways 
that an increased social wage could be implemented in innovative ways, looking first at initiatives that have 
emerged  from  information  technology  industries  themselves,  then  in  related  industries  (e.g., 
entertainment), and finally those that are not industry specific  but depend instead on direct government 
policy. 141 
 
 
One way to increase the social wage would  be to  expand the  use of stock options, which have  been a 
critical form of compensation for  certain middle- and  upper-level  employees in Silicon Valley.  While the 
bursting of the late 1990s stock market bubble has made many stock options worthless, they still provide a 
valuable model in which employees can  benefit from the increased value of the entire  company, not just 
their own work. Of course there are problems with the way stock options  have been provided to date. 
Most importantly, they have generally been made available to only a relatively limited portion of the direct 
workforce, primarily executives and higher-level professionals, excluding many lower-level employees and 
"indirect  workers"  (e.g.,  temporary,  independent  contractors,  and  subcontracted  workers).  It  would  be 
possible, however, to pass legislation prohibiting discrimination in the provision of stock options, similar to 
legislation prohibiting discrimination in the provision of health and pension benefits. This might require, for 
instance, that stock options be provided to all employees if they are provided to any employees, perhaps 
in proportion to their salary.  
An even broader, more ambitious approach would be to promote increased access by workers’ to stock 
ownership in the economy. One innovative proposal developed in the Silicon Valley context was to create 
a  California  Lifelong  Learning  Fund  (Benner  et  al.,  1999).  The  idea  behind  this  proposal  was  that  all 
businesses operating in the state would be required to make annual  payments (including  possible stock 
contributions) to a fund that would then  be invested primarily in California-based companies. This would 
have the effect of helping to improve the California economy, but revenue from the fund over time would 
then  be  made  available  to  all  residents  of  the  state.  The  concept  was  based  on  the  Alaska  Permanent 
Fund, which was established through an Alaskan constitutional amendment approved by Alaska's voters in 
1976. It provided that at least 25 percent of oil revenues paid to the state would be deposited into a public 
savings account and invested for the  benefit of current residents and all future generations of Alaskans. In 
the Alaskan case,  dividends from the fund are paid directly to all Alaskan residents (this totaled $1,963.86 
per person in 2000).
9 The  proposal in  California was to make the funds available to every state resident, 
but only specifically for education purposes, and to help (albeit disproportionately) lower-income residents. 
While the proposal never made it beyond the conceptual stage, it was an innovative idea that built directly 
on the notion that work in an information  economy is a collective task, requires collective learning, and 
should be rewarded at least in part through collective means.
10  
Another direct way of mitigating risk is to expand workers’ access to income beyond wage-labor, such as 
promoting  asset  ownership  and  equity  stake  in  economic  enterprises.  One  model  that  workers 
themselves  could  try  to  negotiate  for  is  to  have  some  portion  of  their  compensation  linked  with  the 
revenues generated from projects they have worked on. This idea builds from the model developed in the 
Motion Picture and  Television Industry, another highly volatile, information-based industry.  Unions in this 
                                                 
9   See http://www.apfc.org.  
10   A similar principle underpins an even more ambitious proposal developed in a national context.  In The Stakeholder Society, Bruce Ackerman and 
Anne Alstott propose that every U.S. born resident be provided with a $80,000 "stake" when they turn 18 years old, to be funded out of an annual 
wealth tax.  The motivation for their proposal is primarily to address inequality in economic opportunity, but clearly it could also decrease workers’ 
vulnerability to labor market shocks through expanding their wealth and thus, diversifying their income sources.   
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industry
11  have  negotiated  a  compensation  system  with  the  Alliance  of  Motion  Picture  and  Television 
Producers  (the  dominant  employers’  association)  that  includes  the  provision  of  residuals.  These  are 
additional payments to workers for the exhibition of a product in media other than the one for which it 
was originally created (e.g., movies shown on TV), or for its reuse within the same medium subsequent to 
the initial exhibition, and payment continues as long as the product continues to be sold. Residuals have 
become  an  extremely  important  source  of  income  for  many  people  in  the  industry.  For  actors  in 
particular,  residuals  account  for  46  percent  of  all  compensation  in  1990.  For  actors  in  television 
commercials,  who are at the  bottom of the acting hierarchy and mostly only receive the minimum pay 
scale, residual compensation is particularly important, amounting to four times as much as initial session 
fees  (Gray  and  Seeber,  1996;  Paul  and  Kleingartner,  1994;  Christopherson  and  Storper,  1989).  It  is 
possible to imagine similar compensation systems being negotiated by associations of workers in high-tech 
industries  as  part  of  their  compensation  packages,  and  thus  have  income  sources  even  when  they  are 
unemployed.  
At the broad governmental level, another clear area where reforms are warranted, and could help spread 
risk and diversify income streams for workers, is in the area of the unemployment insurance (UI) system. 
Designed more than 60 years ago to provide partial, temporary replacement of wages to workers during 
temporary  cyclical  downturns,  this  system  has  now  become  outdated,  making  it  more  difficult  for 
unemployed  workers  to  benefit.  The  UI  system  assumes  that  layoffs  are  primarily  temporary,  not 
structural,  and  that  workers  will  return  to  the  same  job  or  industry.  It  provides  no  assistance  to  help 
workers  develop  new  skills  or  get  retraining—indeed  it  discourages  workers  from  getting  significant 
retraining since workers lose their benefits if they are  not actively looking  for work, even if this involves 
going  back  to  school  to  get  skills  for  a  new  career.  Furthermore,  the  eligibility  requirements  for 
unemployment  benefits  exclude  many  unemployed  workers,  particularly  those  in  nonstandard 
employment relations,
12 and by the late 1990s only 42 percent of the unemployed actually received UI 
benefits,  down  from  a  high  of  75  percent  in  1975.  The  benefits  provided  through  unemployment 
insurance are also inadequate, typically only replacing 40-45 percent of a worker's wage up to a maximum 
benefit. Such a low replacement level provides little assistance for people trying to refine or expand their 
skills to meet the needs of our rapidly changing economy. Consequently, the program does little to reduce 
chronic  and  repetitive  unemployment  (U.S.  Department  of  Labor,  1998).  Reforms  should  expand 
eligibility, increase benefit levels, and make it easier for workers to continue to receive benefits even while 
improving their skills or shifting  careers.  In  essence, the goal should  be to transform the unemployment 
insurance system into a “retraining and reemployment insurance” system.  
A more innovative "layoff insurance" program should also be seriously considered. This concept, which has 
gotten support from some labor economists, is designed to  compensate workers for income losses they 
may experience after  being laid off.  Since the 1980s, between 45 and 50  percent of displaced full-time 
workers  who  find  full-time  replacement  jobs  within  two  years  are  consistently  earning  less  than  they 
                                                 
11   Primarily the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), the Writers Guild of America (WGA), and the Directors Guild of America (DGA). 
12   Including the self-employed, many part-time and temporary workers, anyone who may have left a job for any reason other than being involuntarily 
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earned prior to being laid off—a full third typically earning more than 20 percent less than prior to being 
laid off (Hipple, 1999). Layoff insurance would supplement pay for these workers for a period of time even 
after they get a new job, helping to make up a portion of their lost income. This would cushion the impact 
of  the  disruption,  while  helping  workers  plan  more  confidently  for  the  future  knowing  they  wouldn’t 
suddenly find themselves with much lower pay for an extended period of time. It would also encourage 
people in their efforts to move to a  new career or industry, knowing they  can supplement their lower 
earnings for a period of time until they gain more experience and expertise (Jacobson, 1995;  Baily et al., 
1993; Mandel, 1996).  
Clearly  one  of  the  other  areas  with  the  most  pressing  needs  is  health  care  benefits,  and  in  particular 
addressing  the  problems  associated  with  the  current  system  of  employer-based  health  insurance.  The 
current  system  is  very  poorly  suited  for  a  mobile  workforce  and  rapidly  changing  industries.  Workers 
without a long-term, stable employment relationship, including many  part-time, temporary, and contract 
workers along with many low-wage workers, all have a more difficult time getting health  care insurance. 
Meanwhile, the substantial administrative costs involved every time someone switches an employer wastes 
unnecessary resources while providing suboptimal care for large sectors of the workforce. The goal of an 
efficient,  truly  universal  single-payer  system  may  seem  impossible  in  the  current  climate.  Nonetheless, 
health insurance coverage should not be based on one’s place of work. One highly innovative program in 
Silicon Valley  provides  universal health insurance  coverage for  children, funded in  part through funds the 
City of San Jose and  County of Santa  Clara received in the Tobacco  Industry lawsuit settlement (Long, 
2001). Other opportunities  include promoting  portable  union  benefits  programs or collective  programs 
available through professional associations, which  would allow for the  benefits of economies of scale in 
purchasing and administration. Many small businesses would benefit from such expanded systems as well, 
since they would be able to reduce administrative costs of benefits systems.   
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Obviously the reforms and new ideas outlined above are schematic, and far from a complete program for 
building collective voice and security in volatile labor markets.  Rather than develop a detailed set of policy 
proposals,  however,  my  purpose  has  been  to  explore  more  far-reaching  concepts  and  ideas.  Labor 
markets in the information economy are significantly different from those that existed during the height of 
the  industrial  era.  The  policies,  programs,  and  institutions  that  shape  contemporary  labor  markets, 
however,  still  reflect  many  of  their  industrial  age  origins.  As  a  result,  the  working  conditions  for  many 
workers are poorly regulated, and consequently, workers are poorly protected from the volatility inherent 
in contemporary high-risk labor markets. In essence, workers at the core of the most dynamic information 
technology-based region face processes of labor informalization that make them highly vulnerable.   
The proposals to address this problem that are outlined here are primarily conceptualized in the context of 
a relatively vibrant  economy. Furthermore, they are not designed to address the  conditions of extreme 
poverty that many  workers in true informal employment situations face.  As a result, clearly the strategic 
approaches outlined in this  paper would  be limited in their ability to significantly impact the lives of truly 144 
 
 
impoverished  or  marginalized  workers  trying  to  survive  at  the  margins  of  contemporary  society.  The 
strength of these proposals, however, lies in their attention to fundamental features of labor markets that 
seem associated with an information-based economy. This lends them particular salience in current policy 
debates, since it suggests that what is required to address broader problems of informalization is not simply 
incremental  tinkering  with  existing  institutions,  but  a  more  far-reaching  restructuring  of  labor  market 
institutions to make them more suited to contemporary labor market dynamics. 
In addition, many of the proposals suggested here provide intellectual support for policies being proposed 
in other contexts with more desperate economic  circumstances. For instance, the arguments for greater 
socialization of  compensation systems  provides further support  for the economic  benefits of social wage 
programs  in  various  forms,  such  as  the  Basic  Income  Grant  currently  being  debated  in  South  Africa 
(Samson  et al., 2002) or other forms of  basic income  being  proposed in  Europe  by the Basic Income 
European  Network  (BIEN).
13  The  arguments  for  improved  mechanisms  to  ensure  multi-employer 
collective  bargaining arrangements could help provide resources to workers in subcontracted sweatshops 
of  major  multinational  firms.  The  arguments  to  try  to  influence  the  activities  of  a  wide  range  of 
intermediary organizations might bring to light effective ways of restricting exploitative labor brokers, and 
supporting membership-based intermediaries in a variety of different contexts.    
Regardless of the  utility of these ideas for specific application in  different  contexts, the  central argument 
remains the same: Processes  of labor market informalization are not limited to peripheral workers and 
regions of the work economy, but are in fact characteristic of fundamental transformations in labor market 
processes in the  core of arguably the most  dynamic region in the emerging information  economy. As a 
result,  developing  new  strategies  for  building  collective  voice  and  security  will  require  far-reaching 
approaches  that  don’t  assume  that  “good  jobs”  are  characterized  by  stable  work  and  unmediated 
employment relationships. There is an urgent need for more creative thinking and the exploration of more 
extensive policies that can directly address the structure and dynamics of labor markets in the information 
age.   
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Informalizing and privatizing social reproduction: 
The case of waste collection services 
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This  paper focuses on  waste  collection strategies in Black townships of  Cape  Town, South  Africa during 
the  first  phase  of  local  government  restructuring  (1997-2001).    Despite  the  “one  city,  one  tax  base” 
aspirations of the antiapartheid struggle (see Robinson, 1998), in 1996, shortly after the political transition, 
the  postapartheid  government  enthusiastically  adopted  the  neoliberal  GEAR  policies  that  have  led  to 
continued stratification of urban services and growing inequalities
1 (Terreblanche, 2002; McDonald and 
Smith,  2004;  Bond,  2000;  Miraftab,  2004;  Cheru,  2001).    The  community-based  and  women-only 
strategies used  by the  Cape  Town local government in this  period exemplify the  interwoven  nature of 
labor in the realms of production and reproduction
2 and  how the interests of  capitalism are served  by 
dominations established through race and gender.   
This  paper  examines  the  Cape  Town  municipality’s  treatment  of  waste  collection  services  in  black 
townships as an example of a neoliberalizing local government providing items of collective consumption:
3 
to wit, a municipal government restructured as a market actor and pressured  by  financial  constraints to 
recover the  costs of expanding municipal services to a new  constituency (the newly incorporated  black 
townships).   The  case study reveals two aspects of local government’s provisioning social reproduction 
within a neoliberal policy framework:  (1) A public good, and hence  presumably a public responsibility, is 
privatized  by  being moved  both to private sector subcontractors  (in this case, Tedcor Ltd.) and to the 
private sphere of households and women’s domestic responsibilities (in this case, women-only Masicoce 
and volunteer groups).  (2) The privatizing local government participates in labor flexibilization for providing 
public  services.    Most  research  has  examined  labor  flexibilization  and  informalization  in  production  and 
                                                 
1   The studies on poverty and inequality reveal that these inequalities have indeed grown in the last decade.  The share of income for the poorest 40 
percent of households, for example, has steadily declined from 1991 to 2001; from 1996 to 2001 alone the decline was at a rate of -3 percent.  For 
the households with the highest 20 percent of income, however, the share of income grew from 71.8 percent in 1991 to 72.2 percent in 2001 
(Terreblanche, 2002: 33). 
2   Here reproduction is defined as activities at both the household and the state levels that maintain “the labor force through provision of basic needs and 
through broader processes of social reproduction" (Klak and Lawson, 1990: 305).  In stressing the links between production and reproduction, Bakker 
and Gill (2003: 22) state the importance of seeing social reproduction as both a productive potential and a condition of existence for the expanded 
reproduction of capital and social formation—not simply equate reproduction with care economy, important as that is.   
3   Castells (1983) defines collective consumption as the social processes in consumption of the services produced and managed collectively.  Production 
of collective consumption items—i.e., public services— is necessary to reproduction of labor power and/or to the reproduction of social relations.   149 
 
 
profit-maximizing behavior of private sector companies
4 or the income-generating strategies of the poor; 
this paper, however, focuses on social reproduction and the behavior of the public sector.   
By revealing the role of the local government in the privatization and informalization of social reproduction, 
the paper also sheds light on the fluidity of realms constructed as production and reproduction.  In this case 
a  municipal  government,  whose  constitutional  laws  make  access  to  municipal  services  a  public 
responsibility  and  citizenship  right,  met  the  pressure  to  recover  operating  costs  from  service  fees  by 
associating those services with the domestic sphere and justifying the use of women’s unpaid work through 
volunteer or other community-based groups.  The paper argues that this case exposes the fallacy in binary 
constructs of production/reproduction public/ private and underlines their contested social construction.   
The paper relies on both secondary information and the field information obtained in  Cape Town in the 
summers  of  2001  and  2002.
5    The  first-hand  information  comprises  a  series  of  open-ended  and 
semistructured interviews with the city officials at the unicity (the term used for unified municipality), private 
company  operators,  and  individuals  contracted  for  waste  removal  in  the  informal  sector  townships,  in 
addition to the community members of various waste  collection schemes described here.  An important 
secondary  source  of  information  is  an  earlier  investigation  by  the  International  Labor  Research  and 
Information  Group  (ILRIG)  into  partnership  schemes  for  waste  removal  in  Khayelitsha  (see  Xali,  2001; 
Qotole and Xali, 2001).   
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section I explores the current financial framework of the Cape 
Town  municipal  government,  as  groundwork  for  understanding  the  environment  that  increasingly 
constrains local governments to operate as private sector entities and to adopt market principles of full cost 
recovery.  Section II outlines the strategies used by the government to serve the black townships of Cape 
Town during 1997-2001.  Those strategies include a public-private partnership hiring nonunionized male 
and female workers from among the township’s unemployed, and two campaigns that rely exclusively on 
the labor of local women, as volunteers or as casual workers with no job security or employment benefits.  
Section III, the interpretive framework, stresses the state’s privatization and flexibilization of labor for social 
reproduction.  Drawing on feminist scholarship that articulates the relationship among gender, production, 
and  reproduction,  this  section  discusses  the  gendered  nature  of  global  neoliberal  policies  in  both 
conceptualization and  effect, and how those  policies privatize the public interest and dissolve the  public 
realm.  Section IV tries to answer the salient question of how the South African state, in its postapartheid 
moment, can justify exploiting impoverished women’s casual and unpaid labor.  In that regard, the section 
discusses  the  significance  of  (1)  the  patriarchal  gender  values  that  ascribe  “municipal  housekeeping”  to 
                                                 
4  The Confederation of Employers of South Africa (COFESA) offers a good example of  industries’ labor flexibilization practices.   COFESA “advises 
employers  on  restructuring  their  production  such  that  employment  contracts  are  converted  into  service  contracts,  and  employees  become 
independent contractors.  The firm is then run as a network of contractors. While the activities of COFESA and similar organizations are aimed mainly 
at  bypassing  minimum  standards  labor  legislation  and  collective  bargaining  agreements,  the  organization  has  been  able  to  use  arguments  of 
empowerment and microenterprise development to justify its activities. The organization claims to have restructured employment contracts in over 
13,000 companies, thereby creating a network  of over 700,000 ‘independent contractors,’ who were previously employees in the restructured 
companies” (Valodia, 2001: 877, citing Jones, 1999). 
5  The interviews for this project were conducted in the summer of 2001 by the author and were followed up by her student assistant, Nicole Lamers, in 
the summer of 2002.   150 
 
 
women’s “motherly” and moral duty; and (2) the rhetoric of voluntarism and black empowerment that 
misconstrues labor as skills training.  The concluding section stresses the gendered nature of the neoliberal 
state’s privatization agenda for public services, in its resilience on the free and casual labor of women.  Also 
noted  is  the  way  in  which  the  public  sector  actively  participates  in  labor  flexibilization,  and  how  the 
distinctions between established public/private, production/reproduction are subservient to the interests of 
capital accumulation.  
I. CASE STUDY 
Local Government’s Financial Environment 
Postapartheid South  Africa set out to integrate segregated areas and reduce the  disparities in access to 
urban services and  decision making through restructurings of government and basic services.  Across the 
nation, local governments were established to decentralize government decision making and give localities 
more responsibilities.   In the  Cape  Town metropolitan area, the process  had two  phases.   In the first 
phase  (1995/96–2000),  administrative  units  were  redemarcated  to  form  a  reduced  number  of  local 
governments  spanning  the  racialized  areas;  the  second  phase  (2000  to  present)  created  one  municipal 
government (the unicity), which unified all the local governments in Cape Town into a single financial unit 
with  a  common  system  of  taxation  and  one  budgetary  environment.    To  facilitate  direct  input  on 
development  by community groups through the local government, Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) 
were  called for; Reconstruction and Development Program Forums (RDP forums)  were also created in 
every  community  and  township  for  community  participation  and  communal  decision  making.    Local 
governments were to work closely with RDP forums to come up with IDPs setting development priorities 
for their communities.   
Subsequently,  however, local governments  have found themselves with only a limited ability to fulfill the 
IDPs  and  to  deliver  basic  shelter  and  services  to  the  poor.    The  reasons  are  clear:  the  government 
restructuring  increased  the  mandate  of  local  municipalities;  yet,  according  to  the  Financial  and  Fiscal 
Commission in 2001, the amounts of intergovernmental grants from the central to the local levels fell in 
real  terms  to  85  percent  less  than  those  in  1991  (ILRIG,  2001:  26).    With  so  little  intergovernmental 
transfer  of  funds  (4  percent)  (Coopoo,  2000:  6),  90  percent  of  the  unicity’s  budget  comes  from  local 
revenues.   Those revenues include the sale of  bulk services such as water, sanitation, and  electricity (85 
percent) and, to a limited extent, property rates and levies (Watson, 2002: 77, citing Ministry of Provincial 
Affairs and Constitutional Development, 1998).   
Thus since 1994 local governments have been  caught  between a rock and a  hard place,  working with 
limited  budgets, yet responsible for enlarged constituencies.  To manage, local governments restructured 
their  delivery  of  municipal  services.    One  strategy  was  “ring  fencing”  the  budgets  for  specific  services, 
meaning that  each service  had to recover its own  cost.   Another strategy was to shift the  provision of 
public services to the private sector; that was facilitated  by the Municipal  Infrastructure  Investment Unit 151 
 
 
(MIIU),  based at the Development Bank of South  Africa with funding  from international donors and the 
central government.  MIIU promotes the outsourcing of municipal services and helps municipalities form 
partnerships with private companies.
6   
Unicity’s Waste Collection Strategies 
Today  the  Cape  Town  unicity  covers  an  extended  area  with  a  population  of  over  3.5  million.    A 
combination of municipal (i.e., council) and private or community-based (i.e., noncouncil) waste collection 
services  covers this population’s almost 832,000 service points.  Service ranges from full coverage by the 
municipality  and/or  private  companies  regularly  collecting  waste  at  each  residence,  to  the  rudimentary 
service in  which the municipality or private companies  collect waste  periodically at  communal skips.  In 
between those levels of services are several community-based schemes in which  both private  companies 
and residents collect and sometimes also remove waste; those schemes are found particularly in the areas 
newly  incorporated  into  the  unicity’s  service  responsibility,  namely  black  townships  and  informal 
settlements.   
The noble rationale for restructuring the waste collection services in Cape Town was to ensure service to 
all areas of the  city, including the  newly incorporated  black townships and those informal areas that  had 
receive(d) no or minimal services.  The  city officials and planners involved in  formulating these strategies 
were interviewed for this research and for the most part had the interest of the communities in mind.  The 
outcome, I argue, nevertheless failed their  expectations in that it promoted  not only labor  casualization, 
but  also  differing  levels  of  services  that  reproduce  apartheid’s  spatialized  hierarchies.    Elsewhere,  I 
substantiate this assertion and  depict the present structure of waste collection services for  Cape  Town 
residents; I refer readers to that article for full documentation (Miraftab, 2004).  
This paper examines only the early phase of the waste services restructuring (1997–2001), and a series of 
pilot projects that were the  basis for the unicity’s official schemes adopted in 2001.  In those projects the 
use of gendered  discourse justified treatment of waste collection as an activity belonging to the realm of 
social reproduction performed by the unpaid or low-paid labor of women.  That, I argue, constituted the 
direct participation of the state in labor flexibilization and blurred the  distinction  between the  public and 
private sectors.   
During  the  study’s  time  frame,  three  community-based  waste  collection  strategies  were  operating  in 
recently  incorporated  townships.    They  are  discussed  below:  a  partnership  scheme  (Tedcor)  that 
embraced the private sector; the community and the municipality; and two women-only strategies that the 
unicity called campaigns (Masicoce and volunteer groups).  
 
                                                 
6  Established in 1998, MIIU in its first three years launched partnerships with a value of over ZAR 5.6 billion.  At the 1998 exchange rate this equals a bit 
less than one billion U.S. dollars.  For more on MIIU, see their website at http://www.miiu.org.za/ 152 
 
 
Partnership Scheme 
The partnership scheme was implemented in Cape Town in 1997.  The local authorities subcontracted a 
private company (Billy Hattingh  Co.—BH later sold to The  Entrepreneurial Development  Corporation—
Tedcor)  to  perform  garbage  collection.    BH  in  turn  subcontracted  unemployed  members  of  the  local 
community,  referred  to  as  local  entrepreneurs,  who  were  responsible  for  daily  management  of  the 
scheme.    Entrepreneurs  supervised  waste  collection  by  local  laborers  and  had  valid  driving  licenses  to 
operate  the  garbage  trucks  and  carry  waste  to  designated  dumpsites.    The  local  laborers,  too,  were 
recruited  amongst  unemployed  members  of  the  community.    Their  work  consisted  of  collecting  and 
removing waste from the contracted area’s 50,000 service points (approximately 300 to 700 shacks and 
dwellings per worker, per week), sweeping streets and sidewalks and collecting illegal dumping from public 
spaces.    At  the  time  of  the  fieldwork,  under  this  scheme  in  Khayelitsha,  9  jobs  were  created  for 
entrepreneurs (seven men and two women), and 100 jobs were created for local laborers (split male and 
female).  BH workers, with five-year contracts at the official minimum wage of South African rands (ZAR) 
1,300,
7 earned less than two-thirds of the wages for formal municipal workers.
8   
Masicoce, or One-Person Contract (OPC) 
This  is  one  of  the  two  women-only,  community-based  waste  collection  strategies  of  interest  here.  
Masicoce,  or  one-person  contracts,  started  in  Cape  Town  in  1997  originally  as  the  Clean  and  Green 
project, initiated under the auspices of Keep South Africa Beautiful (KSAB)
9 and  promoted  by an  NGO 
called The Fairest Cape.
10  During 2000–2001, before local governments’ unification and as part of a larger 
campaign to promote voluntarism and community-based action, the  Clean and Green  project was taken 
over by the  Cape Town municipality and  changed its name to Masicoce (“Let’s clean  up!” in the  Xhosa 
language).  Masicoce, in its original formulations as Clean and Green and as one-person contracts (1997–
2000 and 2000–2001) involved women only.  The scheme used one contractor (hence its name) within 
the community to oversee the recruitment, firing, and performance of local unemployed women.  For the 
2000–2001  period,  the  scheme  hired  105  women  (one  for  every  350  dwellings)  full  time,  but  on 
nonrenewable, one-year contracts with no benefits, at a fixed monthly wage of ZAR 800 (not quite one-
third of what formal municipal employees received).  They were  provided with brooms and  plastic  bags, 
and  carried  the  bagged  public  waste  to  specific  points  for  deposit  into  skips.    However,  the  periodic 
removal of the skips to the dumpsite by other contracted private companies often lapsed, leaving workers 
with the additional burden of rebagging trash that had built up around the overflowed skips and been torn 
by animals.   
                                                 
7  Based on exchange rates of July 2002, this equals approximately U.S.$130. 
8  Monthly wages of Tedor workers are about ZAR 1,300 (U.S. $130), versus those of  ZAR 2,200 (U.S. $220) for unionized municipal workers.  Based 
on the exchange rates of July 2002. 
9  This movement had been inspired by the Keep America Beautiful movement.  In South Africa, as a movement to promote voluntarism, KSAB has 
operated in other regions of the country since 1995. 
10  It was funded by South African breweries (supplying plastic bags and brooms) and also by the Public Works Department, which at the time was in 
charge of the waste collection services for the newly integrated areas.  153 
 
 
Volunteer Women’s Group 
The second women-only strategy operating in black townships of Cape Town was comprised of volunteer 
groups.  These groups were promoted by local councilors as part of a larger campaign launched in 2000, 
the Mess Action Campaign (MAC)—a play on the famed ANC Mass Action Campaign during the years of 
antiapartheid struggle—to encourage voluntarism and  community-based action.
11  The volunteer women 
sweep the streets and collect trash from public spaces.  These groups work mostly in areas of the city with 
no  services  other  than  periodic  removal  of  waste  from  communal  skips.    For  the  women  volunteers, 
incentives vary from improved hygiene of the neighborhood streets and protection of their children from, 
e.g.,  broken  glass,  used  condoms  and  syringes,  to  an  enhanced  possibility  of  employment  in  the  paid, 
community-based waste collection schemes.  At the time of the field research (July 2002), about a dozen 
volunteer groups operated in Cape Town.   
Many of the volunteer women interviewed in Khayelitsha, Boys Town, and Onati did not know how the 
various programs differed.  Some were disappointed, to say the least, when given only plastic bags, but no 
pay.  Others were aware of the voluntary nature of their work, yet hoped that it would improve their 
chances of work with the Masicoce or Tedcor schemes.  Hard-working and desperate to find a source of 
income the women continue their free work, cleaning at home and also in the neighborhood, with hopes 
that their efforts will eventually lead to “real” jobs.  They also have the moral satisfaction  that in this way 
they are carrying out their responsibility of caring for their children and the community they live in. 
 
Volunteer women waste collectors.  Cape Town, South Africa. Photo by the author 2001. 
                                                 
11  It is important to keep in mind the ways in which local party politics play into both the rhetoric of waste collection and the strategic choices of elected 
city officials.  Western Cape and Cape Town constitute the strongholds of parties in opposition to the ANC.  Indeed, in the national elections of both 
1994 and 1999, the ANC did not win majorities in this region.  In the local government elections of 1999, the Democratic Alliance, the alliance of 
Democratic Party (DP), and National Party (NP) won the local elections and constituted the city officials.  Cost recovery strategies discussed in this 
paper should not, however, be interpreted as particular to Cape Town or the local opposition parties; the ANC-dominated national government has 
also spearheaded the neoliberal GEAR agenda within the national government. 154 
 
 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Informalizing and Privatizing Social Reproduction 
The  literature  examining  neoliberal  globalization  finds  one  consequence  of  it  to  be  the  feminization  of 
poverty (Kingfisher, 2002; Mittleman, 2000).  Whether  called restructuring and liberalization, in the first 
world,  or  structural  adjustment  and  debt  management  in  the  third  world  neoliberal  policies,  by 
withdrawing public support for basic and social services, have intensified the exploitation of women’s labor 
and  have  furthered  their  impoverishment.    The  policies  assume  the  availability  of  women’s  infinite  and 
elastic  labor;  they  bank  on  women’s  free  and  underpaid  work  at  home  and  in  the  community  to 
compensate for the erosion of the public realm and the abandonment of its responsibilities.  
Socialist feminist scholarship of the 1970s, which  demonstrated that domestic work is as much a part of 
the  productive  process  as  manufacturing  is,  made  a  significant  breakthrough  in  tracing  the  connection 
between housework and waged work for the capitalist processes of accumulation (McDowell, 1991).  An 
emerging scholarship pushes that revelation further through an expanded notion of labor that rearticulates 
formal-informal linkages (Benería, 2003) and the production-reproduction nexus (Bakker and Gill, 2003) in 
the context of neliberal globalization.   
With a focus on the industrial, postwelfare societies, Bakker and Gill (2003) hypothesize “the contradiction 
between global accumulation of capital and the provisioning of stable  conditions for social reproduction” 
(ibid.: 27) or  what Lawson and  Klak (1990) call the  current crisis of reproduction.   In their compelling 
analysis Bakker and Gill (2003: 18) argue that the ontology of neoliberalism entails “not only multiple forms 
of  commodification,  but  also  new  patterns  of  exploitation  and  control  of  labor  in  the  production-
reproduction relationship.”  Following Bordie (1994), they assert that accumulation of capital in its current 
crisis has  had to reprivatize social reproduction.   That process moves social reproduction  to the  family, 
where  it  “naturally  belongs,”  and  to  the  market,  where  women’s  traditional  caring  activities  are 
commodified.   
Feminist empirical scholarship in third world cities has contributed to those insights by further opening the 
category of labor and expanding the scale of analysis that considers the provisioning of social reproduction.  
Such studies reveal that women’s labor force participation through the informal economy is significant for 
both the  national and the global  economy (Benería, 2003) and that women’s subordinated labor force 
contributes  significantly  to  the  informal  production  of  urban  space  and  the  development  of  urban 
neighborhoods (Miraftab, 1998; Moser and Peake, 1995).  Furthermore, this scholarship shows how the 
privatization  of  social  reproduction  in  third-world  cities  also  occurs  at  the  community  level  through 
women’s informal labor on neighborhood care.  As in postwelfare societies the household is the primary 
site  of  privatizing  social  risk  and  social  reproduction  (Kingfisher,  2002),  so  in  third-world  societies, 155 
 
 
neighborhood and community constitute a prominent site for such a process.  Women’s community care 
through their affective labor, though it does not generate income, produces relationships that gives them 
access to services and resources.
12 Women’s unpaid  community management in  unserviced, periurban 
neighborhoods organizes  for self-help provision of the services that are missing (Miraftab, 2001; Chant, 
1996;  Moser,  1993;  1987).    Elsewhere  (Miraftab,  1998)  I  refer  to  these  processes  as  feminization  of 
informal urban development, whereby in many third-world cities women are “unpaid urbanizers.”   
Third-world  states’  budget  cuts  have  eliminated  much  of  the  intended  development  in  cities,  including 
infrastructure  and  such  collective  consumption  items  for  informal  settlements  and  poor  populations  as 
schools, roads, water, shelter, electricity, and  health  clinics.   Similarly, privatization of  public services or 
strategies of cost recovery for them  have led to evictions and service  cut-offs for the  poor (Miraftab and 
Wills,  2005).    Those  policies  also  have  expanded  the  range,  scope,  and  depth  of  women’s  labor 
exploitation in poor households and informal settlements.  The absence or inadequacy of urban services in 
poor  neighborhoods  has  generated  additional  and  new  ways  of  exploiting  women’s  work  in  social 
reproduction  (Elson, 1992; Benería 1992; Gonzales de la Rocha, 1989).  One example, as discussed in 
this paper, is the unpaid or poorly paid performance of municipal waste collection services by women.   
The present study of the waste collection strategies of Cape Town's municipal government contributes to 
the scholarship articulating the conjuncture of  capitalism and  patriarchy in dissolving and  depoliticizing the 
public realm (Bakker, 2003; Kingfisher, 2002; Clark, 2004).  As the crisis of capital accumulation requires 
conquering new markets, marketizing new realms, and commodifying new terrains, the state itself  comes 
to  think  and  act  like  a  market  actor  (Brown,  2003).    Cape  Town  is  a  case  in  point:  the  municipal 
government cost recovery policies privatize and flexibilize the labor in its collection of waste, a service that 
is in the interest of the public and hence  clearly a public responsibility.  But the local government moves 
that responsibility to private firms and to the private sphere of women’s responsibilities for household and 
community care (Samson, 2005).  It further promotes labor flexibilization  by disassociating itself from the 
labor that is providing social reproduction service, and allowing others (subcontracting firms or individuals) 
to use women’s unpaid or underpaid labor in precarious conditions.  That process in poor black townships 
simultaneously depoliticizes the public realm and intensifies women’s burden. 
Discursive justification plays a  critical role in that  process, as analyzed  below.   In failing to deliver  public 
services, an inherently legitimizing activity for a state, the Cape Town municipality seeks legitimacy for that 
strategy by using the discourses of gender empowerment and job training.   
 
                                                 
12  For  example,  in  low-income  townships  of  Cape  Town,  South Africa,  Pointer  and  van  Heusden  ‘s  ethnographic  study  (2005)  reveals  that  for 
households whose services have been cut off for nonpayment, women’s affective labor in building a strong relationship with the wider community is 
the key to their access to water and other services they have been deprived of by the municipality’s cost recovery policies.   156 
 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
Gender and Municipal Housekeeping 
Conjoined motivations of poverty—dire need for some source or hope of income and “morality," doing 
something  to  better  things  for  their  children  and  community  as  “good  women/mothers”—drive  the 
participation  of  poor  women  in  the  low-paid  or  unpaid  programs  described  in  this  paper.    As 
breadwinners of their households in an environment with no prospects of jobs, the township women who 
work  in  the  community-based  waste  collection  schemes  are  desperate  for  any  source  of  income,  no 
matter how little or insecure.  At the same time, as caregivers of their families, they also are concerned 
with their children’s health and safety.  Thus, they join the Masicoce for minimal pay or a volunteer group 
for no pay in hopes that their work will eventually lead to a “real” job.  But they also feel moral satisfaction 
that they are thus  carrying out their responsibility to  care for their  families and  for their neighborhoods.  
The mingled rationalizations emerge as one group of volunteer women interviewed explain their activity:  
We are the volunteer group,  we started from last year [2001], May 7th, we  were 150 
members at that time. We were supposed to clean the street area….That is our purpose. 
We are sweeping from 8AM to 3PM,  but when it is raining we don’t sweep….We are 
using our own brooms….[the councilor] says to us that he will get us something. He said 
he will go to the minister to get us something, but  he  hasn’t yet….our streets were so 
dirty,  and  we  were  not  working,  doing  nothing  at  home—so  we  decided  to  collect 
garbage  to  clean  our  area.  And  there  were  so  many  condoms  everywhere  and  the 
children  would  play with them and it is so  dirty and also there is  HIV….we also  want 
something for us….They should give us something—we are hungry. I have no money to 
pay  for  food  or  school  for  the  children—they  should  give  us  some  work  (Interview, 
2002). 
These women, who spend all day sweeping the streets of their neighborhoods without pay, cling to hope 
for a job in the future as well as valuing the immediate reward of protecting their children from cutting their 
bare feet or  playing with used  condoms.  Khayelitsha men, who stand all day along the shoulder of the 
entrance to the nearby N2 highway, also often end their day without pay but have only the hope of being 
picked up to sell their labor the next day.  Gender values shape the distinction between the women’s and 
the men’s days spent without pay in hope of a future job.  The gender codes justify time spent in unpaid 
labor by women as something more than an economic activity in that it contributes to their other area of 
responsibility, as caregivers.  The desperate conditions of poverty combined with gender codes and values 
are what neoliberalism taps into to finance governments’ cost recovery agenda. 
Here  one  may  note  McGurty’s  (1998)  historical  account  of  waste  collection  in  turn-of-the-century 
Chicago.   In the absence of any acknowledged state role in  urban services for the growing city, waste 157 
 
 
collection was in the hands of private sector contractors.  In response to the great public health risks thus 
imposed on the city’s inhabitants, women through their women’s clubs and associations, worked to have 
waste  collection  recognized  as  a  responsibility  of  the  state.    But  to  do  so  they  had  first  to  justify  their 
activism  in  a  public  realm  that  the  patriarchal  society  defined  as  the  realm  of  men.    The  women  used 
“municipal housekeeping” as the banner under which they asserted their involvement in such an issue as 
collection of waste.   They proclaimed their “womanly  duty to  provide a clean and nurturing  home” and 
hence  their  moral  obligation  to  extend  “their  domestic  caretaking  into  the  neighborhood  streets”
13 
(McGurty, 1998: 27, 30). 
A  century  later,  as  neoliberal  urban  policies  urge  the  state’s  abdication  from  providing  basic  services  in 
favor  of  the  private  sector  doing  so,  the  rhetoric  of  gender  roles  is  again  invoked  to  justify  women’s 
involvement with public waste collection. This time, however, the women are not well-off but poor, and it 
is not their ability to change policy, but their poorly  compensated or even unpaid manual labor that is at 
issue.  And it is the  city officials and the  private sector  contractors undertaking waste  collection who are 
using gender-specific rhetoric—in their own interest.    
The  significant  role  of  Cape  Town  women  in  waste  and  garbage  collection  is  not  coincidental,  but 
entrenched  in  patriarchal  gender  relations  that  extend  women’s  domestic  responsibilities  to  municipal 
housekeeping.  Patriarchal gender ideologies that see  chores as solely women’s responsibility go on to 
assign them the  cleaning of  neighborhood spaces as well, as an extension of women’s  duties to  protect 
their  families  from  filth  and  harm  (Beall,  1997;  Samson,  2003).    This  ideology  when  internalized  by 
women lends itself to  capitalism’s cost-cutting logic, particularly in its  neoliberal version,  by justifying the 
underpaid and casual labor of women, e.g., in collecting municipal waste.   
This  case  example  exposes  the  interwoven  interests  of  the  neoliberal  state  and  patriarchal  gender 
hierarchies, and how privatizing local governments, as well as private sector firms, furthers the casualization 
of  labor,  especially  among  poor  women.    Also  noteworthy  here  is  the  fluidity  with  which  provision  of 
waste collection services shifts between the  conceptual realms of production and reproduction.  Gender 
ideologies  and  beliefs  support  the  shift  of  activities  to  provide  basic  public  services  from  the  realm  of 
production, where it is assumed that men perform them for pay, to the realm of reproduction, where it is 
assumed that they will be performed unpaid by women.   
Labor Misconstrued as Skills Training and Empowerment 
Claiming kinship with the analogy of “teaching people how to fish rather than giving them a fish,” a senior 
Cape  Town  official  interviewed  tries  to  present  these  waste  collection  schemes  as  opportunities  for 
women’s job training, giving them skills to enhance their employment eligibility  elsewhere.   That official 
also explicitly disavowed the state’s role in the  employment of municipal workers: “As local government 
we do not employ, we empower others to employ people from disadvantaged backgrounds.”   
                                                 
13  Ironically,  women  and  trash  have  historically  been  connected.   Research  undertaken  in  different  parts  of  the  world  underline  a  strong  gender 
dimension in waste collection strategies (see Assaad, 1996; Beall 1997; Ali et al., 1998; SEWA, 1988).   158 
 
 
Using  the  rhetoric  of  training  enables  the  municipality  to  obscure  its  responsibilities  to  its  formal  work 
force, allowing  private individuals or firms to  hire  casual labor at lower wages for the work of  providing 
municipal services.  In none of the three waste collection strategies examined in this paper does the local 
government recruit, supervise, pay, or dismiss workers.  Rather it contracts services to private sector firms 
such as BH/ Tedcor.   Those firms then sidestep the formal municipal workers,  hiring  unemployed local 
labor at half the  cost and  double the workload.  Or the private  firm subcontracts to an individual, e.g., 
Masicoce, who then hires women for casual labor at less than minimum wage and with no job security.  
Whether the work is shifted to a private firm (Tedcor), an individual (Masicoce), or a volunteer community 
group, the  Cape Town municipality avoids responsibility for labor conditions in the provision of municipal 
services.  Labor casualization among the unicity’s unemployed, disadvantaged population is thus relied on 
to reduce local government’s costs for services.   
Furthermore,  by  calling its Masicoce strategy a “campaign,” the unicity tries to  present it as a voluntary 
action.  That ploy takes away a significant right from the workers.  Referring to the scheme as a campaign 
identifies  the  women  working  in  it  not  as  employees  but  as  campaign  members.    Consequently,  their 
payment  cannot  be  considered a wage to be measured  by the  criteria of  fair labor compensation.   The 
Masicoce women’s remuneration at less than the official minimum wage (ZAR 800 versus the ZAR 1,300 
official minimum wage)
14 and with no  benefits is represented as simply an amount the government offers 
to support their campaign participation, “job training,” and acquisition of “new skills.”  It therefore escapes 
assessment as the compensation of labor. 
Two main arguments  used  by city officials to justify the schemes  using temporary and below minimum-
wage  labor  are  (1)  black  empowerment,  for  Tedcor  entrepreneurs;  and  (2)  skill  training,  for  Masicoce 
women.  A review of the programs, however, finds only negligible returns for the workers.  The Tedcor 
scheme hires only nine individuals as local entrepreneurs, of whom only two are women.  In the Masicoce 
scheme, the actuality is that sweeping streets and  picking up litter develops no  new skills leading to other 
employment.  Keeping the Masicoce contracts as temporary does spread the year’s income among more 
women,  but  the  City’s  argument  that  it  also  spreads  an  opportunity  to  “acquire  skills”  is  transparently 
specious.   The scheme has no long-term benefit for its women workers.  After one year, their incomes 
and  chances for  employment are as  bleak as before.  Moreover, as one  of the residents state, the one 
year  with  a  source  of  income  leaves  them  in  difficulty  later  because  they  start  credit  and  financial 
commitments that soon have to be interrupted.   
The examination of these schemes reveals  how, within a neoliberal  policy  framework of  cost recovery, 
municipal governments participate in the  flexibilization of labor just as the  private sector corporations do.  
Empowerment  of  blacks  and  women,  and  skill  training  for  disadvantaged  township  women  are  the 
spurious discourses used to legitimize dissolution of the public realm and public responsibilities.  Patriarchal 
gendered interests and neoliberal accumulationist interests conjoin to reduce the public interest to the sum 
                                                 
14  ZAR 10 equals U.S.$1, based on exchange rates of July 2002. 159 
 
 
of individuals’ interests.  Any  political  notion of  public realm and  common good is stripped of legitimacy 
(Kamat, 2004). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The case analyzed in this paper contributes to several debates within the feminist and urban scholarship. 
First, the analysis here reveals the gendered nature of neoliberal urban policies of cost recovery, which rely 
on investing the free labor of women to provide collective consumption items.  In the third world the use 
of female casual labor is part and parcel of the governmental project of minimizing expenditures for  basic 
public services.   These  policies, gendered in nature, are also gendered in effect: they pile on  women’s 
burdens of free labor for home, for community, and then for the municipality.   
Second, the analysis shows the resiliency of capital, in managing its crisis of accumulation by shifting capital’s 
burden  from  public  to  private  and  from  production  to  reproduction.    The  current  global  neoliberalism 
restructures the realms of  production and reproduction, redefining the responsibilities of the  public and 
private sectors and blurring the distinctions between them.  As in the waste collection  case studied here, 
shrinking  the  public  sector's  responsibilities  ultimately  privatizes  the  public  realm.    The  public  sector's 
responsibility  is  moved  to  private  subcontracting  firms  and  to  the  private  sphere  of  household  and 
community care for social reproduction.  What emerges clearly is the deception in constructing realms of 
production/reproduction, public/ private, and informal/formal in polar relations.   
Third,  the  paper  demonstrates  how  labor  flexibilization  is  not  unique  to  the  private  sector.    As  local 
governments increasingly embrace the  private sector’s mantra of cost recovery and treat their  citizens as 
no more than  customers, they abandon the distinction  between government and the private sector in 
addressing the public good.  As illustrated by the privatizing of local government in Cape Town, the public 
sector is increasingly responsible for labor informalization and flexibilization.  This public sector trend calls 
for attention in the ongoing debate on globalization and labor casualization; most of the relevant literature 
has focused only on the behavior of private sector companies.  The present study brings to light how local 
governments, as well, promote casual and flexible labor to manage their costs for providing services.   
The neoliberal South African government, in its postapartheid moment, uses gender beliefs and values to 
justify the  use of  women’s free or  cheap labor in the  black townships, and to disguise its  participation in 
labor flexibilization.  In the Cape Town case studied here, gender ideology intertwined with the rhetoric of 
voluntarism  and  empowerment  obscures  the  actual  nature  of  women’s  labor  in  the  waste  collection 
schemes and the state’s furthering of precarious and casual conditions of labor in the black townships.  
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This  brief essay seeks to bring together two discursive realms that exist in parallel research universes: the 
first is concerned  with the processes and impacts of  the increasing informalization of labor markets with 
globalization (the subject of this volume) and the second is concerned with  understanding the  processes 
and impacts of urban spatial growth in the global South. In doing so, the essay raises questions about the 
political challenges that increasing informality in urban space  presents for  both social mobilization that is 
seen as  desirable  by those  who seek change, and  episodic  collective violence that effective governance 
seeks to prevent.  
The  two  discursive  realms  have  intersected  earlier,  mostly  in  studies  of  informal  shelter  provision  and 
territorial claim making in urban areas. However, little attention has  been  paid to  debates that seek to 
understand  the  relationship  between  the  workplace  and  living  spaces,  one  notable  exception  being 
feminist scholarship  that  focuses on home-based work.  There is also another tradition, summarized  by 
Asef Bayat (1997; 2000) that has explored the nature of “marginality”—the current equivalent of which can 
arguably  be  seen  as  informality—and  its  influence  on  the  structure  and  politics  of  urban  life.  A  slightly 
different argument will be made here: that space and our understanding of the spatial growth of cities must 
be  brought  into  the  informalization  debates  if  we  are  to  understand  the  full  implications  of  increasing 
informalization  of  labor  markets  on  cities  and  the  attendant  political  challenges  that  it  poses.  Increasing 
informalization  combined  with  the  increasing  nesting  of  work  in  living
1  produces  particular  patterns  of 
urban growth that reflect deepening social segregation. These spaces restrict mobility by first restricting and 
then intensifying inequity of access to employment, material resources, and safe employment contributing, 
in turn, to further informalization and entrenched cycles of poverty. One result is the etching of sociospatial 
inequities  into  the  urban  landscape,  shaping  contentious  politics—from  collective  mobilizing  to  episodic 
violence—in specific ways.
2 The term “contentious  politics” is used intentionally.
3   By  bringing together 
                                                 
1   As David Harvey pointed out in an early essay on the ideology of planning: “the organization of work is predicated on a separation between work and 
living” (Harvey, 1995: 189).  This principle of separation pervades planning and public policy. However, various factors from changes in employment 
relationships, and decline in manufacturing and  increase in service-oriented industry in a  globalizing world, to significant technological change have 
contributed to the erosion of barriers between work and living. This is truer of those at the extremes of the income scale.  
2   There is a large literature on the politics of violence in urban settings, to which I cannot do full justice in this essay.  The intention here is to show that 
entrenched and increasing informality, whether in spatial or labor market realms, creates inequitable and unjust conditions that intersect favorably with 
the politics of caste, religion, and nation to explain the construction of episodes of violence. Other writers have written extensively about the role of the 
state and violence specialists (Tilly, 2003; Brass, 2003), or the role of associational ties in promoting or diminishing violence in civil society (Varshney, 
2002; Beissinger, 2002). 
3   See Aminzade et al., 2001; McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly, 2003 
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“macro- and micro-level approaches, structure and intentionality, under a single rubric” contentious politics 
allows  us  to  analyze  the  construction  of  a  range  of  social  movements  and  organizing  processes  (King, 
2004: 438).    
The  arguments  made  will  rest  on  evidence  from  two  Indian  cities,  Delhi  and  Ahmedabad,  where  the 
growing informal economy and the politics of informal labor have  been studied  extensively. The  primary 
focus will  be on the politics of “informals,” Cathy Rakowski’s (1994: 3) term for the men, women, and 
children who work in the informal sector, to which I will add: particularly those who remain poor, and are 
forced  to  live  in  informal/illegal  settlements  in  urban  neighborhoods  or  “localities,”  a  term  that  better 
describes the sites of enmeshed networks of labor, employment, and shelter. The Delhi and Ahmedabad 
cases  are  similar  in  that  they  demonstrate  the  construction  and  rearrangement  of  urban  space  as  a 
patchwork  of  deeply  segregated  localities  in  cities  and  along  urban  peripheries,  driven  by  a  politics  of 
informality that is both the everyday politics of stealth, survival, and encroachment, as well as the seemingly 
sporadic  episodes  of  collective  violence  and  the  politics  of  redress.  The  cases  differ  in  that  they 
demonstrate the  construction and rearrangement of  urban space taking  place under somewhat  different 
conditions. Ahmedabad is a globalizing city  undergoing massive shifts in its economic manufacturing base, 
where the political economy of increasing informalization of labor and its intersection with the  politics of 
caste and nation are crucial. In contrast, the Delhi case demonstrates how environmentalism and elite-led 
pressures to modernize and sanitize the  city  by the  expulsion of  certain forms of industry construct the 
urban periphery and the politics  of informals. The essay is in two parts the first  discusses the  discursive 
realms  mentioned  in  this  introduction  to  clarify  conceptual  categories  and  their  relationships,  and  the 
second looks closely at the cases of Delhi and Ahmedabad to draw out the spatial implications and political 
challenges of increasing informalization of labor markets in particular local contexts.  
TWO REALMS: INFORMALIZATION OF LABOR MARKETS / INFORMAL URBAN SPATIAL 
GROWTH 
Informality—which was named and began to be defined in the  early 1970s following the ILO report on 
Kenya  and  Keith  Hart’s  study  of  the  Ghanaian  economy—is  here  to  stay.
4  Our  understanding  of  the 
informal economy is gaining depth, even as it is becoming clear that there is still a lot to learn. The  early 
debates,  summarized  by  Caroline  Moser  in  an  article  (1984)  and  a  book  chapter  (1994),  centered  on 
employment,  work,  and  poverty,  with  much  of  the  research  focusing  on  concept  clarification,  in  both 
definitional and operational terms, as well as on the linkages  between the informal and formal sectors. 
Policy recommendations included appropriate macroeconomic interventions to  promote investment and 
growth  as  well  as  the  best  means  to  promote  microenterprise  development  and  other  services  for 
informal workers. However, as industrial restructuring, liberalization, and globalization intensified through 
the last two decades of the twentieth century, other issues came to the forefront, including the effects of 
                                                 
4   See, ILO. 1970. Towards Full Employment: A Programme for Columbia. Geneva: ILO 
  ILO. 1972. Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya. Geneva: ILO 
  Hart, Keith. 1973. “Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana” Journal of Modern African Studies 11, 1: 61-89.  165 
 
 
labor standards and regulatory structures on  informal sector  workers, and the role of  nongovernmental 
organizations  in  both  apolitical  microenterprise  development,  and  intensely  politicized  organizing  for 
change (Rakowski, 1994).  
In reviewing research on the informal sector, Rakowski (1994) proposed a typology that  broadly divided 
the structuralists from the legalists. The structuralists’ perspectives were rooted in the initial ILO studies on 
labor markets and were informed  by Marxist and dependency theorists, who linked work in the informal 
economy to the uneven nature of capitalist development. The structuralists noted the absence of the state, 
and  projected  it  as  the  crucial  regulatory  and  policy  setting  actor  that  could  enforce  equity  of  labor 
conditions,  wages,  and  status  of  workers.  In  contrast,  the  legalists,  emphasized  informality  as  a  rational 
economic strategy, and repositioned informals as entrepreneurs whose spirit of enterprise was stifled by 
state imposed institutional constraints. For both structuralists and legalists, however, a central concern was 
to  understand  the  relationship  between  poverty  and  informalization.  The  modalities  of  employment, 
sector,  gender,  and  age  were  shown  to  be  important,  and  policy  formulations  emerged  from  our 
understandings of these modalities.  
Attention also  began to  be  paid to the political challenges attendant in the informalization of work in the 
current age of hyperglobalization. Researchers portray the informal economy as either the fictive space of 
last resort, where the poor lacking any other means of survival gather to seek refuge, or as a collection of 
individual  and  occasionally  collective,  acts  of  resistance,  deliberate  ingenious  responses  to  hostile  and 
adverse  economic  conditions.  Rakowski’s  classification  of  structuralists  and  legalists  is  less  applicable,  as 
both the state and the ingenious informals—whose every action is often interpreted as a form of political 
resistance  to  the  formalized  spaces  being  created  by  modernizing  and  exclusionary  structures  of  global 
capital and development—are  present. Aili Marii Tripp’s (1997) study of women working in the informal 
economy  in  Tanzania  and  John  Cross’s  (1998)  work  on  street  vending  and  taxi  services  seek  to 
demonstrate these positions. Researchers like Jan Breman (2001; 2002), however, shifted the focus from 
the openings  for collective mobilization to the ways in which the struggle to improve living conditions in 
the landscape of informal sector labor is hampered by the weak articulation of collective action (2001: 30-
37, electronic  edition).  In  following the  politics of “footloose labor” in the western state of rural Gujarat, 
and the fortunes of millworkers who got thrown out of formal sector employment and into work in the 
informal sector in Ahmedabad, Breman also made, amongst other points, specific  connections  between 
increasing  informalization  of  the  labor  system,  and  the  trends  toward  spatial  segregation,  as  well  as 
escalating  social  violence.    He  sought  to  show  the  ways  in  which  the  deterioration  of  work  and  labor 
conditions  and  the  weakening  of  unions  that  had  bridged  intercommunal  divides  in  a  variety  of  ways, 
combined with the politics of caste, religion, and nation to lead the urban poor to become the grist of the 
communal violence mill. The work of people like Tripp or Breman,  however, remains somewhat distant 
from the literature on the  politics of  informality rooted  in territorial formations—the slums and squatter 
settlements where many informals live.   
Like the debates on the informal economy, early research on informal housing first focused on definitional 
and  conceptual  issues,  before  moving  into  prescribing  interventions  in  housing  and  land  markets.  As 
mentioned earlier, the two realms that we are looking at here—one focusing on work and employment in 166 
 
 
the  informal  sector,  and  the  other  on  urban  spatial  issues,  especially  through  the  lens  of  shelter  and 
informal housing—remained largely separate, with some exceptions, particularly in research and activism, 
structured  around  gender  and  home-based  work  as  the  crucial  organizing  principle.
5 One  result  of  this 
separation was that space rarely became an important variable in the informal sector debates, and our 
understanding of the relationships between labor markets in the informal sector, policy responses to it and 
the spaces in which urban residents live and work remains poor.  
The  informal  housing  literature  (in  which  most  of  the  spatial  references  to  informality  are  embedded) 
emerged  initially  from  studies  of  settlements  in  Latin  American  cities.    Innovative  early  work  sought  to 
redefine squatting and slums by exploding “myths of marginality” (Perlman, 1976) and exposing it as an 
elite instrument of social control over a laboring class that was the product of particular capitalist structures 
(Castells,  1983).  Squatting  and  land  acquisition  helped  explain  the  politics  of  informality  as  a  politics  of 
protest,  of  collective  mobilization  for  survival,  and  a  fighting  economic  chance.  Several  major  works 
followed  and  over  time,  the  policy  world  too  began  to  respond  to  the  shift  in  perspectives  on  who 
squatters were and what they  could do  by  promoting  upgrading, legalization, and land titling  programs 
(Rodwin, 1987). The location of settlements, from the occupation of state-owned marginal lands to the 
development of settlements on the urban periphery also came to be studied. 
The majority of the urban poor however, did  not mobilize and seek redress  for  blatant injustices, and 
Scott’s (1985) landmark work on the everyday modes of resistance of Javanese peasants helped elaborate 
the survival strategies of those who were  perceived as powerless.  While adherents to the survival thesis 
“undoubtedly  contributed  to  recovering  the  Third  World  poor  from  ‘passivity,’  ‘fatalism’  and 
‘hopelessness’… ‘their overemphasis on the language of survival strategies maintained the poor as victims, 
as lacking agency” (Bayat, 1997: 56). Bayat’s own work in Tehran and Cairo provided another perspective 
on the  everyday  politics of informality in the face of increasing informalization of work amidst spreading 
informal settlements. He emphasized a “street politics” that signifies an articulation of discontent, a politics 
of redress, not  protest,  where noncollective but prolonged  direct action to achieve gains is interspersed 
with  episodic  collective  action  in  defense  of  gains.  Pace  Scott,  Bayat’s  work  emphasizes  not  just  quiet 
everyday  resistance  and  creeping  encroachments  in  urban  space,  but  also  focuses  on  the  episodic 
moments of open protest that mark the point when encroachments have spilled over the tacit agreement 
between the state and poor. The state’s regulatory apparatus then kicks into gear, and retaliation  can  be 
swift.  
As important to understanding this mix of the everyday and the episodic in the politics of informality is the 
emergence of historical work, such as Nandini Gooptu’s (2001) expansive study of the politics of the urban 
poor in  early twentieth  century  northern  India. Gooptu  examines “the emergence of a  casual, informal, 
urban workforce in the interwar period, and illuminate[s] its momentous political and social consequences 
in arena’s far outside the workplace” (2001: 429) to highlight the significance of the social  construction of 
                                                 
5   Methodology is another reason for the separation (also see footnote #1). Labor market literature tends to focus on the worker and the workplace as 
the unit of analysis, while the literature on informal housing focuses on the housing unit, the household, and more recently, the individual, as the unit of 
analysis. However, as the essay’s introduction emphasized, feminist theorists who sought to understand women’s work did explicitly address this issue.  
Organizations like SEWA also spanned this divide through mobilization strategies that focused on work, gender, and locality. 167 
 
 
the poor and of poverty. In the process, she demonstrates the ways in which these constructions shaped 
both public policy and political relations in late-colonial India. Two issues raised by Gooptu are germane to 
this essay: the ways in which local planning policies shaped sharply divided  urban localities, and the forms 
of  contentious  politics—response,  protest,  and  violence—that  resulted  from  the  intersections  of  the 
politics  of  informality,  caste,  religion,  and  nation.  Through  careful  archival  work  on  the  effects  of  local 
policies, and the study of vernacular cultural responses like the nautanki and the akharas, Gooptu’s work 
addresses  an  important  gap  in  the  informalization  literature.
6  What  is  striking  is  the  resonance  of  her 
observations  on  late-colonial  northern  India  with  the  situation  in  contemporary  Delhi  and  Ahmedabad, 
where space and territory intersect with work and laboring practices to shape a range of political responses 
from collective mobilization to violence.  
Breman,  Bayat,  Gooptu  and  the  work  of  organizations  like  the  Self-Employed  Women’s  Association 
(SEWA)
7 in Ahmedabad, lend support to the central argument of this essay: that  urban space must  be 
explicitly brought into the debates around informalization of work and labor. Research that is emerging out 
of India on  urbanization trends, city growth, industrial clusters, and increasing informalization of the labor 
force in the face of restructuring pushed by liberalization and market-friendly economic policies can also be 
drawn on to support this claim. As a  planner  focused as much on  planning processes and the  design of 
local level institutions as on the spatial realm  within which they take  place, I wish to make the case for 
having space —not just modalities of employment, sector, gender, or age—be an organizing principle in 
thinking  about  the  processes  and  impacts  of  increasing  informalization,  and  how  we  build  collective 
struggles for change in vibrant but fractured  urban environments. This is not a new or revolutionary idea. 
Lefebvre  (1991),  Castells  (1983),  Harvey  (1989),  Massey  (1992),  Swyngedouw  et  al.,  (2003)  amongst 
others, have explored the relationship between power, sociospatial relations and their expression in the 
production of space(s). However, the discursive realms of informalization—particularly in labor markets—
and the impacts of spatial planning  have had the tendency to remain somewhat separate. This essay will 
bring these realms together by examining two relationships that will help draw out the spatial implications 
and political challenges of increasing informalization of labor markets, in particular local contexts.  
The  first  relationship  to  be  examined  in  the  context  of  the  two  cases  is  that  between  the  informal 
economy and the work of informals at the scale of the local, so as to  understand its relationship to the 
production  of  urban  space.  Supporting  this  argument  is  the  notion  that  space  underpins  livelihood,  as 
Lefebvre  (1991)  argued,  and  that  work  is  nested  in  the  larger  structure  of  
livelihood.
8 Space is not a neutral backdrop, an empty abstraction, or a field existing in the social sense only 
                                                 
6   The nautanki is a genre of folk play or popular vernacular theatre and the akharas are local gymnasiums or wrestling dens which served as a site for 
training a specialized group of wrestlers and as a center of a physical culture.  
7   SEWA is a well-known trade union started by Ela Bhatt. 
8   Consider, for example, this passage on the embeddedness of women’s lives from Tripp’s study of the informal economy in Tanzania: 
  “Women’s  entrepreneurial  activities  are  heavily  embedded  in  their  daily  lives  and  are  part  of  a  whole  array  of  day-to-day  activities.  Women’s 
involvement in the market takes place within the context of all of these life-sustaining activities and is not separate from the many other dimensions of 
life. These activities include childcare, family care, buying and cooking food, housecleaning, keeping the home and  its surroundings tidy, physically 
building houses, clothing the children, fetching fuel and water, taking care of the health of the family, taking care of the disabled, elderly  and sick, 
cultivating, tending cows and goats, helping neighbors with needs, taking care of the poor in the community, organizing celebrations, helping raise funds 
for the community, helping with extended family needs, assisting other women in childbirth, assisting in funeral preparations, helping in the husband’s 
business, and many other such activities. These alternative logics are revealed in a number of ways (1997: 120)." 168 
 
 
for an activity to take place. It simultaneously defines activity, even as it acts to reinforce inequities in power 
and resource allocation, and the formation of identities. The urban spaces thus  produced are sometimes 
physically bound in the larger context of the city and the region; but more crucially, they serve to further 
circumscribe work and the movement of workers in the informal economy, as will be discussed in more 
detail later. 
Related to this issue of a dialectical relationship between the informal economy and space, is the second 
question:  does the very nature of urban space production shape responses to the political  challenges of 
informality? John  Cross (1998, 2000) has made the point that both extent of visibility and territoriality of 
forms  of  informal  work  (street  vending,  taxi  services,  and  land  invasions  being  his  three  examples)  are 
important conditions in shaping forms of protest and social movement organization in the informal sector. 
But what if the urban spaces in which informal activity takes place, the spatial life world of informals, are as 
important a condition? Bayat (1997, 2000) has shown that urban streets, public space par excellence, are 
crucial to the  episodic nature of the  politics of informality.  The street provides the space  where  passive 
networks can be activated for contentious collective action. This essay will focus however, on the ways in 
which urban space  restricts mobility and in doing so, plays a role in increasing informalization of work, 
which  then  shapes  the  possibilities  for  the  exercise  of  power  or  protest,  collective  organizing,  and 
governance. 
These are some of the questions that occupy researchers such as Breman (2001, 2002) and Mahadevia 
(2001) on Ahmedabad, and Benjamin (1996), Baviskar (2001) and Bentinck and  Chikara (2001) among 
others, on Delhi. Building on their work and Bayat’s insights, this essay will focus on the  periodic sudden 
outbursts of  protest and violence that  can  be linked  both to  the swelling ranks of  workers in  precarious 
informal work settings and to the divided inequitable  urban settings that mark contemporary cities in the 
global South. These outbreaks mark extreme disruptions in everyday sociospatial power relations in cities; 
but, in doing so, they throw into relief our lack of understanding of the ways in which spatial life-worlds of 
the urban poor are articulated and the impact of public policy and planning on the lives of the majority of 
city residents.  The implicit question, of  course, is how informality in these fractured urban settings affects 
the arduous process of urban governance and the maintenance of social order. It must be emphasized that 
the  intention  is  not  to  demonize  the  poor  or  to  say  that  poverty  drives  people  to  violence.  Neither 
poverty nor primordial loyalties are seen here as causal factors in urban violence. They do, however, lead 
to forms of sociospatial segregation and inequality,  which this essay  does argue are  fundamental to the 
construction of forms of contentious politics.  
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INFORMALIZATION, THE WORK OF INFORMALS, AND THE PRODUCTION OF    
URBAN SPACE   
  
 
  
 
The two case cities are Delhi, capital of India—parts of which pay tribute to formal Master Planning,
9 and 
Ahmedabad, often likened to Manchester in the UK for its once prominent role, second only to Mumbai, 
in the Indian textile industry. Ahmedabad is also the largest  city in Gujarat, currently India’s second most 
industrialized state, and in the news since 2001 as a site of violent Hindu-Muslim riots. The city has seen 
communal rioting before, but it is the changing nature of the riots and the responses to it that are crucial to 
the argument  being made  here.
10  Studies of Delhi and  Ahmedabad have been  conducted  by scholars 
from a range of  disciplines—economists, sociologists, planners,  demographers, anthropologists—and  by 
some activists who are interested in explaining various aspects of the working of the informal economy. 
Delhi  is  India’s  third  largest  metropolis  with  a  population  of  about  9.8  million  within  its  municipal 
boundaries in 2001.
11 The metropolitan area is estimated to have a population of about 13.8 million (Dhar 
Chakrabarti, 2001: 1). The city sits on land that has been continuously settled for about 2,500 years, and 
                                                 
9   There have been two Master Plans for Delhi (MPDs) implemented in 1962 and 1990. Designed to be classic comprehensive plan documents, the 
MPDs are routinely flouted by politicians, administrators, and well-connected elites with other priorities (a well-known example being the time that the 
city hosted the Asiad Games in 1982) and have also been criticized for their lack of attention to Delhi’s real issues, including the fact that the majority of 
residents live in settlements that are deemed illegal and work in the informal economy, a sector that the plan prefers to ignore. The ways in which 
Master Plans, a crucial tool of modernist planning, have routinely excluded the poor and ignored their needs is a subject of several studies, including 
James Holston’s (1989) classic critique of Brasilia. For recent critiques of Delhi’s master plan see Dhar Chakrabarti (2001), Benjamin (1996, 2000), 
Baviskar (2001), and Roy (2000). 
10   Communal riots have occurred in 1969, 1985, 1986, 1990, and 1992-93.   
11 Population  figures  from  provisional  tables  released  on  the  Census  of  India  website   [http://www.censusofindia.net/results/  slum1_m_plus.html]. 
Accessed July 2003. 170 
 
 
as India’s capital and showcase city, its infrastructure and housing needs have received more attention than 
almost any other urban area. It is also India’s fastest growing metropolitan area, drawing immigrants from 
both rural areas and the smaller towns and  cities of northern  India. Ahmedabad, in contrast, is a smaller 
city with a  population of about 3.5 million, within its municipal  boundaries, and while it shows  physical 
growth amidst suburban sprawl, its economy has seriously stagnated with the decline of its manufacturing 
base and the periodic episodes of communal clashes between Hindus and Muslims. Like Delhi, it too has a 
historic walled city, established in 1546 AC, at its core. Both cities have large administrative infrastructures 
and well-established bureaucracies for municipal governance. However, like most Indian cities more than 
half their population lives in informal settlements and works in the informal sector. Places of residence are 
in, around, or close to places of work. Slums, shantytowns, and localities with an intense mix of small-scale 
industry and businesses are as pervasive as modern skyscrapers, gleaming corporate offices, malls, large 
factories, and individual bungalows behind high walls.  
The case of Delhi and Ahmedabad illustrates  both the similarity and the  differences in the ways in which 
particular patterns of urban space are  produced. In Delhi, the focus is on the impact of the  expulsion of 
small-scale  industry  employing  large  numbers  of  informals  following  enforcement  of  environmental  and 
land use  planning principles, while in Ahmedabad, the  focus will  be on the impact of a two-decade-long 
restructuring of the textile industry amidst globalization. 
Delhi 
What is the nature of the relationship between the informal economy, the work of informals, and the 
production  of  urban  space  in  Delhi?  Brief  descriptions  of  three  economically  vibrant  lower-income 
localities in the  city  provide a glimpse into these relationships. The  housing in these localities  has been 
variously classified as slum and squatter settlements or jhuggi-jhompris, which have a  population of about 
2.5 million; as unauthorized colonies with a population of about 1 million, which may look somewhat more 
formal in terms of the construction materials used but have a similar environment and lack legal status like 
squatter settlements; or as urban villages that have  been absorbed into the  city, but  due to their lack of 
basic urban services exist much like slums. Not included here are approximately 70,000 pavement dwellers 
and the 2 million people who live in Legally Notified Slum Areas, mostly in the severely overcrowded, old 
walled city of Delhi, an area originally meant to accommodate about 60,000 residents (Dhar Chakrabarti, 
2001: 4-8). 
Networks of labor, employment, and shelter are thickly intertwined in many lower-income localities. The 
first locality to  be  described, for our argument here, is Vishwasnagar in East  Delhi, a mixed-use  cluster 
where housing does not fit  easily into any one of the  categories in the  previous paragraph. Vishwasnagar 
has over 2,000 mostly home-based  enterprises which in 1995, produced about 40 percent  of the total 
domestic market for cables and conductors—both for the high-end industrial market and on the low-end, 
for TV and  cable. Economic activity in Vishwasnagar is not just centered around a range of manufacturing 
enterprises of various scales, it also generates other economic activity like a parallel trading environment, 
the  local  manufacture  of  capital  machinery,  a  number  of  transportation  options,  an  array  of  local  retail 
services, and—this is important given the  partly illegal nature of the settlement—a sophisticated local real 171 
 
 
estate market that provides a range of production settings through a variety of contractual arrangements. 
Solomon  Benjamin  (1996,  2000),  from  whose  work  this  description  is  drawn,  estimated  that  in  1995 
Vishwasnagar produced about 25,000 jobs in  direct employment and about 35,000 indirect jobs. In the 
1991 electoral rolls, there were 21,000 voters living in the neighborhood. 
A second locality, Gopalpur, surveyed and  described  by Johan Bentinck and Shilpa  Chikara (2001), is a 
small village of about a thousand residents that was absorbed into the  city in 1991 and over a period of 
two decades, saw itself get transformed into an urban informal industrial cluster and settlement. It too has a 
range of small enterprises, mostly dealing with plastic waste and metal fabrication and a substantial number 
of households participating in piece rate contractual work, putting together cassette tapes for example.  
The third locality, Samaipur, is large like Vishwasnagar but more spatially heterogenous: it consists of the 
original urban village, an adjoining squatter settlement, the  unauthorized Sanjay  Colony thriving  through 
carefully cultivated ties with local political patrons, as well as a formal “industrial estate” established by the 
government. Bentinck and  Chikara (2001: 5) write, “when visiting Samaipur the smoke, the garbage, the 
filthy water in the open drains and stagnant pools, the  noise level, and the  enormous number of people 
can overwhelm the outsider. But  first impressions do  not tell the whole story.” The entire area contains 
about  1,200  enterprises.  Of  these  about  500  smaller  units  are  located  in  Samaipur,  which  follows  the 
locational patterns of Gopalpur fairly closely.  The residents of Sanjay Colony tend to  have factory jobs in 
both  the  industrial  estate  and  the  village.  In  both  villages,  Gopalpur  and  Samaipur,
12  much  of  the  land 
continues to be held by the original residents who then lease it out to entrepreneurs who  come in from 
the  city.  The workers, mostly migrants from  Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, live in the vicinity. The degraded 
living conditions in Gopalpur and Samaipur amidst the belching smoke from factories and high noise levels 
coexist with a thriving, vibrant economy.  
Such localities house over  half of the Delhi metropolitan area’s 13.8 million residents.  The government 
estimates that about 63 percent of employment in  Delhi is generated in the informal sector mainly, in 
manufacturing, transportation, and retail trade activities (Dhar Chakrabarti, 2001). This is much lower than 
the oft quoted estimate that more than 90 percent of India’s employment—which accounts for about 50 
percent of total GDP—is in the informal sector (Kundu and Sharma, 2001: 10). The continued growth 
and vitality of Vishwasnagar, Gopalpur, and Samaipur is through encroachment and quiet expansion where 
everyday transactions make for a  politics of stealth, survival, and patronage.  Even the  naming of "Sanjay 
Colony” in Samaipur after Indira Gandhi’s second son signifies the careful attention given to these issues. 
To continue with the story, in November 2000, responding to a long-standing public interest writ petition 
originally filed in 1985, and the government’s lack of response to an 1996 order asking for compliance by 
December 31, 1999, the Supreme Court of India issued a contempt notice on the Delhi administration. 
The notice ordered the immediate  closure and subsequent relocation of all industries in  nonconforming 
(mostly  residential)  areas  of  the  Master  Plan.
13  The  petition  was  originally  filed  by  a  well-known 
                                                 
12   This pattern is not common and outsiders generally hold land. There are a total of 106 urban villages in Delhi. 
13   On July 8, 1996, 11 years after the first filing, an activist judge, Justice Kuldeep Singh, took action and ordered the closure of 168 hazardous industries 
located in contravention of the MPD. In three months between September and November of the same year, another 823 units were ordered closed,   172 
 
 
lawyer/environmentalist,  M.C.  Mehta,  in  response  to  the  contradictions  between  the  Master  Plan’s 
prescriptions  and  ground  realities.  The  original  filing  was  a  response  to  air  pollution  caused  by  stone 
crushing units that ignored the locational and zoning provisions of the Master Plan.
14 However, 11 years 
later when the  petition was finally acted  upon by the  Supreme Court, the focus of action had shifted to 
what had  begun to be  perceived as the main culprit in Delhi’s worsening air pollution problem: industrial 
units, mostly small-scale industries in nonconforming areas. As a number of commentators have noted, a 
combination of elite environmentalist and consumer action groups shaped by  
upper-class  concerns  about  health,  safety,  aesthetics,  and  leisure  in  concert  with  the  state  drove  this 
process (Baviskar, 2001; Roy, 2000).
15 The process reads like a reiteration of the  earlier sanitization and 
cleanliness drives documented by Gooptu (2001) in the towns of late-colonial northern India.  
The impact of the  November 2000  court order was  enormous.  If  enforced  fully, it could have thrown 
close to 2 million people out of work, and potentially closed about 98,000 industrial units. One immediate 
result  was large-scale violence and rioting.  Schools  closed, eight  buses were  burnt and all trade  unions 
struck work in support of an all Delhi Bandh
16 called by the Small-Scale Industries Action Front. A national 
weekly reported, 
As was to  be expected,  the owners and workers of the SSIs [small-scale industries], 
who  faced the prospect of loss of livelihood, took to the streets,  bringing traffic to a 
halt.  As  the  rampaging  mob  began  burning  government-owned  buses,  the  police 
resorted  to  several  rounds  of  firing.  Three  persons  were  killed  and  several  others 
injured. There was no let-up in the fury for some days (Frontline 17, 25, December 9-
22, 2000). 
Delhi’s laboring poor’s minimal gains were threatened and the swift violent response—in marked contrast 
to  the  stealthy  manner  in  which  the  settlements  grew  and  flourished—is  reminiscent  of  Bayat’s 
descriptions of informal settlements in Tehran and Cairo. 
Another  result  (in  response  to  a  previous  court  order  passed  in  1996  that  had  shut  down  about  823 
industrial units, of which 168 subsequently moved out of Delhi) was the government’s acquisition of 1,903 
acres  of  land  in  the  town  of  Bawana,  about  ten  miles  north  of  Delhi,  to  relocate  non-water-polluting 
industry.  Water-polluting  industry  was  to  be  relocated  to  another  town  in  the  north,  Narela.  The 
government planned to offer incentives to move industry to outlying areas in the adjoining states of Uttar 
Pradesh,  Haryana,  and  Rajasthan.  About  a  year  after  the  riots,  the  industries  minister  announced  that 
                                                                                                                                                             
affecting about 50,000 workers. The Court ordered that compensation be paid to workers but only one industry owned by the State Government 
complied. The Court also asked the Delhi Government to create a list of polluting units and implement the provisions of the MPD. Four years later, 
angered by the continued noncompliance of the state, the Court passed the historic November 17, 2000, order requiring all polluting industries in 
residential areas to be shut down and subsequently relocated. 
14   See Interview with M.C. Mehta in the journal Frontline 17, 25. December 9-22, 2000 [http://www.flonnet.com/fl1725/index.html]. Accessed July 
2003  
15   This becomes even clearer when a government study has noted that industrial units are not the biggest pollution source, which have been identified 
as emissions from 3 million registered vehicles (70%), emissions from power plants (13%), and from industrial units (12%) (Dhar Chakrabarti 2001: 
18, quoting White Paper on Pollution in Delhi with an Action Plan, Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests, 1997: 6). 
16   A bandh (in Hindi, closure) is a lightening strike that shuts a city down. 173 
 
 
2,900 plots (out of an estimated total of 16,000) were ready for possession in Bawana. By April 2002, the 
government  expected  14,000  industrial  units  employing  about  133,000  workers  to  relocate.
17  The 
experience of the 168 big industrial units that had moved out of the  city in 1996, and failed to reemploy 
the vast majority of their workers, was ignored.
18 
What was the effect of this Court order on the localities that were described earlier? Bentinck and Chikara 
(2001) report that after the city returned to its everyday rhythms, Samaipur residents  used their political 
connections to get large parts of their village declared an industrial area. Polluting factories are allowed to 
operate in such areas. Most of the factories in Gopalpur, in  contrast, have  closed. People have  begun to 
move away. Some factories run illegally at night, others try and pay off inspectors to get their designation 
changed.  The general thinking seems to be that factories will shut  down or move further away from the 
city, into the  neighboring states of  Rajashtan and Haryana, for example, since they will  not be unable to 
meet  any  new  standards  of  pollution  control  that  the  Delhi  government  may  require,  and  still  remain 
economically viable.  
Across Delhi, a diverse set of responses has  been observed. Many large owners with factories  closer to 
the  city center have  chosen to  convert industrial land to  commercial and retail or office space that often 
fetches higher returns. Some have moved investments into other areas. A number have chosen to move 
further out into Rajashtan like the factory owners of Gopalpur.
19 To quote Baviskar, “the ability to weather 
displacement varies with the capital, material and symbolic, at one’s command" (2001: 11). 
But what have we learned about the relationship  between the informal economy and the production of 
urban space? First, that dynamic, informal economy industrial clusters, such as Vishwasnagar, Gopalpur, or 
Samaipur, establish clearly demarcated mixed use settlements, that often fall under the rubric of slums and 
squatter settlements and which rely on particular patterns of political patronage and the everyday politics of 
stealth and encroachment to circumvent the legal system and the zoning functions laid down by the Master 
Plan. The Master Plan seeks to establish state authority through standardization, and the separation and 
regulation of the spaces, in which Delhi’s residents may reside, work, labor,  play, or shop. Using James 
Holston’s terminology,
20 these settlements are usurpative spatial formations where government authority 
                                                 
17   Plans to build 50 lakh (5 million) low-income housing units were also announced, though little has happened since. See news story “2,900 Plots 
Ready for Possession in Bawana Industrial Estate,” in Times of India, November 13, 2001,  
[http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com]. Accessed July 2003 
18   A number of reasons contributed to workers’ refusal to move to new locations including the distances which the units moved from workers' places 
of residence (often around the original  location of the factory itself) and the lower minimum wages in the areas they moved to. The large factory 
owners, who had convinced the Court to agree that they could move anywhere in the country, chose to move hundreds of miles away to other 
States and benefited both from the sale of their industrial land in Delhi, and additional incentives from other State Governments looking to  attract 
industry.  
19   A report titled, Things Fall Apart – Voices of Women Affected by the Closure of 168 Units by the Janwadi Adhikar Manch showed that families of 
workers in the big units that moved were severely impacted. Of the 53 households interviewed, only 16 had a stable source of income and women 
and children had taken to piece-work to support the family. Some workers had been employed for up to 20 years in the factories but could still not 
afford to relocate when factories moved far away as in the case of G.D. Rathi Steel Ltd. that moved to the city of Alwar in Rajasthan. Workers who 
refused reemployment at the new location were eligible for only six months of wages as compensation, in contrast to compensation of six years wages 
in the case of closure (Rajalakshmi, 2000). 
20   Describing  usurpative  settlements  on  Brasilia’s  periphery,  Holston  writes,  "This  formation  usurped  government  authority  in  the  sense  that  it 
encroached  upon  its  sole  right  in  the  Federal  District  to  found  settlements,  distribute  residential  rights,  regulate  property  relations,  authorize   174 
 
 
has been gradually encroached on  by those who lack rights to productive lands and legal residence. The 
location and clustering of  work and shelter is  crucial to their residents’ survival and  livelihood strategies. 
Second, as the settlement flourishes, it draws more workers who know they can find itinerant work, casual 
or  semiregular  wage  labor,  or  more  established  work  in  factories  or  piece  rate  work,  all  without  an 
expensive commute  or a search for  formal housing that  can  cut deeply into their meager  wages. Third, 
when the state moved to shut down polluting factories, it displaced nonconforming land uses, which when 
deprived  of  productive  land  then  relocated  further  out,  creating  yet  another  cluster  around  which  the 
economy could grow. The process is iterative. Samaipur and Gopalpur, for example, were once villages 
on the urban  periphery. The exemption of villages from zoning regulations initially attracted Delhi-based 
entrepreneurs, which then lead to the intensification of informal sector enterprises and so on. This process 
of  displacement  of  industrial  clusters  to  the  periphery  is  abetted  by  the  outward  push  of  low-income 
residential areas  due, in  part, to differential land rates specified in the Second Master Plan  (1982-2001): 
commercially zoned Delhi Development Authority land is worth 100 times the land that is demarcated for 
lower income residential purposes (Roy, 2000).
 21 
It is also important to note who the informal workers are and where many of them come from. In Delhi, 
about 92 percent are migrants from the states of Uttar Pradesh,  Haryana, Rajashtan, and Bihar: three of 
which  rank  very  low  on  all  development  indices.  There  is  little  information  on  their  exact  moment  of 
arrival into the  city, but research indicates that the majority of migrants are unskilled, illiterate, and  often 
seeking to escape the poverty and oppression of the countryside.
22 Their move into Delhi “either through 
desire or violence”  to imperfectly quote Malkki (1992: 24), swells the ranks of workers in the  informal 
economy  (85%  come  from  rural  areas  and  another  15%  from  small  towns).  There  is  thus  a 
rearrangement of regional and even national space on an urban/small town/rural axis, turning on the issue 
of work in the informal sector.  The  cities, and  particular localities in them, then  become the spaces of 
subsistence work and survival on a grand scale.  
What we  have in Delhi then, is a city of fractured localities shaped  by economic necessity. We also have 
patterns of urban growth shaped by the location of work and residence of informals and by the expulsion 
of work under problematic principles of environmental and land use planning. The episodic violence and 
riots  that  followed  the  November  order  died  down  almost  as  quickly  as  they  started.  Petitions  were 
submitted to  both the local and the Union government, but at the time of writing this  paper little  had 
happened  to  secure  the  rights  of  the  displaced  workers.  The  political  challenge  for  organizing  remains 
acute.  As Roy points out, “traditional organizing methods” based on fordist production models are failing 
the needs of the workers in the informal economy. Instead, he suggests that 
                                                                                                                                                             
constructions, and the  like … [leading to] a recurrent pattern of urban development: those who  lacked the rights to settle  organized to usurp” 
(1989:270) 
21   Land rates are as follows: Rs. 140 for housing for economically weaker sections; Rs. 1000 for public and semi-public lands; Rs. 3,000 for industrial 
plots and about Rs. 6,000 for commercial uses (this has gone up to Rs. 16,000 in current projects).  
22   Illiteracy rates were high (total 71.2%, amongst men 51% versus women 83.4%); for the first 1-3 years mostly single male households, longer 
duration families had an average size of 4.6 persons (average for city 5.2 persons). Migrants come from UP/Haryana/Rahjashtan (80%), Bihar (12%), 
and other states (8%). 175 
 
 
 [o]rganisation at the  place  of residence  … provides a strong supplementary force to 
the strength of labour. It not only draws the worker’s family into the larger social arena, 
it also provides the potential for sustaining the struggle for a better life, not just a better 
job. Within the context of globalisation and privatisation as an answer to upper middle-
class  aspirations,  there  is  an  emerging  possibility  of  emphasizing  the  right  to  safe 
livelihoods for workers in a democratic society (2000, electronic edition). 
Ahmedabad 
The expulsion of informal work to the urban periphery is seen under different conditions in Ahmedabad. 
Here the production of urban space is linked to the fortunes of the textile industry. In 1960, at the height 
of its vitality, composite spinning and weaving textile mills and allied industries accounted for about two-
thirds of the industrial production of Gujarat and about half of total employment. A quarter of the working 
factories  were  based  in  the  eastern  areas  of  Ahmedabad  and  about  83  percent  of  total  industrial 
employment in the city was in composite textile mills, the  backbone of the state’s economy. The textile 
workers with their relatively stable jobs and strong unions formed the “labor aristocracy” (Breman, 2001).  
The importance of the textile mills to the economy declined as the economic base began to diversify.
23 Jan 
Breman has argued that the policies of economic liberalization implemented across India starting in 1991, 
was  seen  in  Gujarat  from  the  late  1960s  onwards.  Few  rules  were  implemented  to  formally  regulate 
industry  and  when  owners  shut  down  mills  (in  the  face  of  increased  unionization  and  costs  for 
technological  upgrading) to seek  higher return on  capital  elsewhere, they met little opposition from the 
state. Meanwhile, the emerging industries of cement and petrochemicals, among others, located in Surat, 
Vadodara, and Baruch districts, and  Ahmedabad  continued to decline. In the  decade  between 1982-83 
and 1992-93, the share of total industrial output of the textile industry dropped from 36 to 15 percent and 
the share of total employment was reduced from 69 to 30 percent (Mahadevia, 2001: 146).  
The  decline of the composite textile industry led to large  numbers of textile workers  being retrenched 
starting with 6,552 workers in 1982. As the industry continued to shrink, the retrenchments increased 
with another wave of  closures in 1988 when over 20,000 workers lost their jobs. The final figures vary: 
Mahadevia  (quoting  Patel,  1997)  estimates  that  67,541  workers  were  retrenched  between  1982  and 
1997 while the Textile Labor Association estimates that a total of 100,000 workers (about 18 percent of 
the  city’s  population) were retrenched  between 1982 and 1995 (Jhabvala, 1995, quoted in Mahadevia, 
2001:  148).  The  vast  majority  of  these  workers  got  little  or  no  compensation.  Where  did  these 
retrenched  workers  go?  Very  few  left  the  city,  and  both  Mahadevia  (1998,  2001) and  Breman  (2001) 
demonstrate that the majority moved into the informal sector. 
Through a careful analysis of changing workforce structures and economic census data, Mahadevia shows 
that  larger  numbers  of  workers  were  entering  the  informal  sector  workforce  in  Ahmedabad  city  as 
                                                 
23   Within the textile industry, small powerloom units where pay is mostly by piece-work have become the norm. The exception (in terms of large mills) 
is those producing synthetic fabrics or fabric (like denim) for export markets. 176 
 
 
compared to the rest of the state. The rates of growth of women workers is  higher than  that of men 
leading her to conclude that falling household incomes were forcing more household members, especially 
women,  into  the  workforce  on  a  full-time  basis.  By  analyzing  employment  growth  rates  for  the 
Ahmedabad  Municipal  Corporation,  separately  from  that  for  the  Ahmedabad  Urban  Agglomeration, 
Mahadevia also shows that more men workers were absorbed in nonhousehold sectors in the peripheral 
areas of the city
24 while growth rates for women workers were greater within city limits. Women tended 
to  stay  closer  to  their  places  of  residence  and  to  obtain  jobs  in  the  household  manufacturing  informal 
sector.  Mahadevia’s  analysis  of  census  and  economic  data  is  supported  by  several  surveys  and  case 
studies.
25 Retrenched millworkers did  find lower-wage employment in other sectors,  but as  household 
incomes continued to fall and living standards declined, women’s participation in the informal sector labor 
force—particularly  in  lower-income  households—increased.  SEWA’s  1993  survey  of  its  members  (22 
percent of whom still had husbands working in the textile industry) indicated that two-thirds of them lived 
below the  poverty line. It also showed that there was a substantial over supply of labor leading to wages 
being pushed down to below 50 percent of minimum wage. A more recent survey of 600 households by 
Breman  and  Patel  supported  by  anthropological  fieldwork  with  60  households  in  1999-2000,  also 
supports these  findings (Breman, 2001). Incomes of millworkers who  had  lost their  jobs were typically 
about half to four-fifths of their previous earnings, and were well below minimum wage. In addition most 
of these workers did not enjoy the job security or stability that they had  before and their living standards 
had seriously deteriorated.  
Spatially, the localities where the mills were  concentrated began to  decline as the mills  closed, and jobs 
were lost. As the eastern  peripheries  began to draw more workers, increasing tensions between Hindus 
and Muslims drove the Muslim minority away from the older mill neighborhoods into contained slums and 
settlements on the other side of the river. In roughly the same period (between 1981 and 1996-97) the 
numbers of  people living in slum areas almost doubled (Breman, 2001, quoting Dutta and Batley, 1999: 
39-42),  even  as  the  middle-  and  upper-class  neighborhoods  of  high  rises,  shopping  malls,  and  sleek 
buildings continued to expand in the west (Patel, 1995; Spodek, 2001). In its quest to keep urban spaces 
as planned modern places for the elite of a global city, the city government became more stringent both in 
its planning and management of the city and in the implementation of various tax collection laws and other 
public policies. One example being major antiencroachment  drives in the city that were lead by an active 
and often, over zealous Municipal Commissioner, in response to the increase in the number of hawkers in 
the  city,  “an  activity  to  which  many  displaced  workers  had  resorted  to”  (Mahadevia,  1998:  258). 
Mahadevia’s work clearly indicates that the  pattern of centrifugal urban growth in  Ahmedabad under the 
logic of globalization was supported and many ways even led by increased informalization in labor markets.  
                                                 
24   Industries in the peripheries (mostly in the eastern areas) included diamond cutting and polishing ateliers, small-scale powerloom units, and other 
manufacturing establishments with low-capital intensity and fluctuating production capacity that resulted in unstable informal sector employment. Male 
workers remained mostly in nonhousehold manufacturing, and as participation in the sector declined (from 46 percent in 1981 to 38 percent in 1991) 
tended to move into trade and commerce (from 20 percent in 1981 to 26 percent in 1991) and construction (3 percent in 1981 to almost 5 percent 
in 1991) (Mahadevia, 2001: 150) 
25  See Patel, B. B. (1990) Survey of Workers of Closed Textile Mills in Ahmedabad for Planning for Alternative Employment. Ahmedabad: Gandhi Labor 
Institute; Jhabvala, R., and Bali, N. (undated) My Life, My Work – A Sociological Study of SEWA’s Urban Members. Ahmedabad: SEWA Academy. This 
was based on a 1993 survey of SEWA members.  177 
 
 
Ahmedabad’s  fractured localities, similar to those in Delhi are made  possible  by the everyday  politics of 
patronage  and  survival.  The  segregation  in  and  between  these  localities  was  deepened  by  the  losses 
experienced  by the retrenched millworkers. As in Delhi, the large scale of these localities, as well as the 
segmented and  highly volatile nature of  both the spaces and structures of  work and living, present huge 
obstacles to political organizing for change. Breman (2001) writes, 
Although strikes and other  forms of militancy are  common, they are  usually sudden, 
fragmented and more or less spontaneous eruptions of  dissatisfaction. Such recurrent 
acts of resistance are restricted to disconnected local conflicts, flaring up and dissipating 
again  in  a  short  time.  This  incapacity  to  express  power  and  solidarity  systematically 
rather  than  sporadically  is  in  the  first  instance  a  consequence  of  the  segmented  and 
highly volatile nature of the informal labour regime. 
In the city where SEWA pioneered trade union organizing amongst women street vendors, few organizing 
models  have  emerged  amongst  the  thousands  of  displaced  millworkers.
26  Moreover,  the  shift  to  the 
informal economy has served, in most cases, to accentuate the reliance and trust on ties of caste and faith 
in localities, further exacerbating existing divisions.
27  
Starting in February 2002, Ahmedabad saw the worst communal riots between Hindus and Muslims since 
independence. While rioting has taken place many times before, the violence of 2002 scaled new horrors. 
Breman  (2002)  has  made  the  persuasive  argument  that  it  is  the  85,000  millworkers  forced  into  a 
downward spiral of precarious jobs in the informal sector on the urban periphery who became the grist of 
the communal riot mill. For him, there is no coincidence in the fact that the violence between Hindus and 
Muslims was greatest in the old industrial areas of the  city on  the eastern  banks of the  River Sabarmati, 
where the majority of retrenched millworkers now live. Earlier cycles of violence had already started the 
process  of  ghettoization  of  the  Muslim  community  and  over  time  Ahmedabad  has  become  a  city  of 
localities segregated not just by privilege and wealth, but also by religious affiliation.  
Breman  also  suggests  that  structures  of  trade  union  organization  (the  work  of  organizations  like  the 
Majdoor  Mahajan  Sangh)  that  had  preached  and  consciously  kept  communal  harmony  in  earlier  riots 
(despite caste and faith affiliations with particular jobs and tasks in the mills) have shattered and with it any 
hopes of holding the urban  community together (Breman, 2002). This argument echoes the  findings of 
Ashutosh Varshney (2002) who has argued that it is the level of  bridging capital—present in longer-term 
patterns  of  communal  interaction  between  Hindus  and  Muslims  and  often  established  through  various 
forms of political action—that effects the durability of communal peace. In contemporary Ahmedabad, for 
all the reasons outlined above, communities  have increasingly split along traditional lines of religion and 
caste, which makes them vulnerable to manipulation by the politics of exclusion practiced by the Bharatiya 
                                                 
26  Breman  and  Mahadevia  have  both  noted  that  caste  and  faith  always  played  a  major  role  in  the  organization  of  work  in  the  mills  and  in  the 
representation of workers in theTextile Labor Association, TLA, the major union to which about half the workers belonged. In addition, all the major 
unions in India (much like the rest of the world) made a colossal error in choosing to focus only on the formal sector. 
27  This  is  not  true  in  the  case  of  SEWA’s  members,  many  of  whom  are  Muslim  women.  The  union  has  emphasized  gender  interests  and  the 
commonality of problems women face as residents of poor localities.  178 
 
 
Janata Party, the party of the Hindu religious right, as well as by other religious groups. The argument is a 
simple one: there is no associational platform left for social mobilization and collective action that bridges 
difference.  
The story of Ahmedabad’s growth is thus  both similar and different from that of Delhi. Both  cities are a 
patchwork  of  segregated,  segmented  localities  where  the  spaces  of  work  and  living  overlap  to  various 
degrees.  The  case  of  Ahmedabad  illustrates  the  production  of  space  as  a  result  of  the  processes  of 
deindustrialization and restructuring of the textile industry while the  case of  Delhi reveals the difficulties 
associated  with  imposing  environmental  regulations  in  mixed  industrial  clusters.  Throughout,  the  rift 
between the life and image of these messy localities and the global, modern Master Planned spaces of the 
middle and upper classes remain clear and sharp. The imperative of statecraft, of state led  policy-making 
and planning to regulate and standardize in the shadow of images of global modernity, widens the cleavage 
between the informal and the formal sectors. Illegality is an important dimension of this scenario, as is the 
spreading privatization of service provision, both issues that Edesio Fernandes (2002) and Faranak Miraftab 
(2002) have addressed in much more eloquent and detailed terms at the conference. 
And  what  of  the  political  challenges  these  localities  pose?  The  indisputable  connections  between  the 
assertion  of  gains  through  the  modality  of  a  personalized,  patronage-based  politics  of  stealth,  and  the 
sudden,  episodic,  disconnected nature of  protest, and—to quote Breman once more, “the segmented 
and  highly  volatile  nature  of  the  informal  labour  regime”  begs  the  question  of  how  the  cycle  can  be 
broken.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This  essay  sought  to  bring  space  into  the  discussions  on  the  processes  and  impacts  of  increasing 
informalization of labor markets. It argued that space, not just modalities of  employment, sector, gender, 
or age, but also space needs to be an organizing principle in thinking about the processes and impacts of 
increasing informalization and  how we  build  collective struggles for  change in vibrant but fractured urban 
environments. 
Space  here  was  understood  not  just  as  a  backdrop  to  urban  activity  and  action,  but  as  simultaneously 
defining urban activity, in the  process, reinforcing inequities in power and resource allocation.  Related to 
this issue of a dialectical relationship  between the informal economy and space, were the ways in which 
urban  space  restricts  mobility  and  in  doing  so,  plays  a  role  in  increasing  informalization  of  work;  thus, 
shaping the possibilities for the exercise of power or protest, collective organizing, and governance 
The lower-income localities of Delhi and Ahmedabad described above were informal economy clusters of 
mixed residential and industrial uses that produced segregated urban spaces that were slowly being pushed 
out into the periphery,  helping create  cities whose metaphorical centers are state zoned and regulated 
spaces for the elite, empty of the people whose labor produces much of the city.  179 
 
 
The  political  implications  of  this  deepening  segregation  are  significant.  Organizing  people  living  in 
segregated, mixed-use localities that seem to be the basic building  blocks of the urban fabric,  presents a 
political challenge not just in terms of articulating a collective platform for the everyday politics of informality 
and the livelihood related struggles of workers in the informal sector, but also in terms of creating equitable 
urban governance structures. 
What are the ways out of this seeming impasse? Edesio Fernandes (2002) and others have pointed to one 
range of possible responses through the reworking of legal systems. In this we should include the ways in 
which  planners demarcate and regulate space. Land use, zoning, and  nuisance policies in the localities of 
Vishwasnagar or Samaipur clearly need to be defined differently from the ways in which they are currently 
understood and implemented. They need, for example, to reflect the complexity of enmeshed sociospatial 
networks of employment, work, real estate, and shelter as well as the residents’ own perspectives on the 
priorities  for  change.  Another  important  issue  is  the  consequences  of  abatement  of  environmental 
hazards—a topic that  we cannot do full justice to here.  Equally  crucial are urban  policies that  focus on 
providing equitable services and making productive land and other resources available to all groups. 
But governance is more than the equitable provision of services and resources. It is also about institutional 
accountability and the incorporation of citizen needs and aspirations into policy. It is these issues that point 
to the importance of community organizing in the localities where residents  both live and work as Dunu 
Roy and Jan Breman so accurately addressed in the context of the problems of the politics of informality in 
Delhi and Ahmedabad. 
As important, though not the focus of this essay, is the suggestion that the cities of the global South, riven 
as they are by informality and its consequences,  provide examples of segregated localities that are very 
different from the  ways in which we understand racial, ethnic, or  economic segregation in  European or 
North  American  cities.  Understanding  informality  in  urban  space,  its  spatial  implications,  and  political 
challenges  creates  opportunities  to  shape  an  urban  theorizing  rooted  in  the  various  local  contexts  of 
Southern cities,  not just the  Northern global city-laboratories of  London,  Chicago, or  Los  Angeles that 
have produced most of our urban theories to date. 
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